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This work advances the use of nonclassical logics for developing
qualitative models of real-world systems.

Abstract mathematics is "quali-

tative" inasmuch as it relegates numerical considerations to the background and focuses explicitly on topological, algebraic, logical, or
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other types of conceptual fonms.

Mathematical logic, the present topic,

serves to explicate alternative modes of reesoning for use in general
research design and in model construction.
The central thesis is that the theory of fonmal logical systems,
and particularly, of logical systems based on nonclassical modes of
reasoning, offers important new techniques for developing qualitative
models of real-world systems.

This thesis is supported in three major

parts.
Part I develops a semantically complete axiomatization of L. A.
Zadeh's theory of approximate reasoning.

This mode of reasoning is

based on the conception of a "fuzzy set," by which means it yields a
realistic representation of the "vagueness" ordinarily inherent in
natural languages, such as English.
All axiomatizations of this mode of reasoning to date have been.
deficient in that their linguistic structures are adequate for expressing
only the simplest fuzzy linguistic ideas.

The axiomatization developed

herein goes beyond these limitations in a two-leveled formal system,
which, at the inner level, is a multivalent logic that accommodates
fuzzy assertions, and at the outer level, is a bivalent formalization of
segments of the metalanguage.

This system is adequate for expressing

most of the basic fuzzy linguistic ideas, including:

linguistic terms,

hedges, and connectives; semantic equivalence and entailment; possibilistic reasoning; and linguistic truth.
The final chapter of Part I applies the theory of approximate
reasoning to a class of structural models for use in forecasting.

The

result is a direct mathematical link between the imprecision in a model
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and the uncertainty which that imprecision contributes to the model's
forecasted events.
Part II studies the systems of logical "form" which have been
developed by G. Spencer-Brown and F. J. Varela.

Spencer-Brown's "laws

of form" is here shown to be essentially isomorphic with the axiomatized
propositional calculus, and Varela's "calculus for self-reference" is
shown to be isomorphically translatable into a system which axiomatizes
a three-valued logic developed by S. C. Kleene.

No semantically complete

axiomatization of Kleene's logic has heretofore been known.
Following on Kleene's original interpretation of his logic in the
theory of partial recursion, this leads to a proof that Varela's concept
of logical "autonomy" is exactly isomorphic with the notion of a
undecidable" partial recursive set.

"to~ally

In turn, this suggests using Kleene-

Varela type systems as formal tools for representing "mechanically
unknowable" or empirically unverifiable system properties.
Part III is an essay on the theoretical basis and methodological
framework for implementing nonstandard logics in. the modeling exercise.
The evolution of mathematical logic is considered from the standpoint of
its providing the opportunity to "select" alternative modes of reasoning.
These general theoretical considerations serve to motivate the methodological ones, which begin by addressing the discussions of P. Suppes and
M. Bunge regarding the role of formal systems in providing "the semantics
of science."

Bunge's work extends that of Suppes and is herein extended

in turn to a study of the manner in which formal systems (both classical
and nonclassical) can be implemented for mediation between the observer
and the observed, i.e., for modeling.

Whether real-world systems in

fact obey the laws of one logic versus another must remain moot, but
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models based on alternative modes of reasoning do satisfy Bunge's
criteria for empirical testability, and therefore do provide viable
systems perspectives and methods of research.

This work is dedicated with love and appreciation to
GURU MAHARAJ JI,

without whose grace I could not possibly have gained
the presence to see it through.

But if a man meditate on Me and Me alone, and will
worship Me always and everywhere, I will take upon Myself
the fulfillment of his aspiration, and I will safeguard
whatsoever he shall attain.
Lord Krishna
From The Baghavad Gita (Swami 1977, p. 90)

PREFACE
The underlying theme of this work originated approximately ten
years ago during my master's degree program in mathematics at Simon
Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada.

From a course in mathe-

matical logic came the idea that, if one could write all of the laws of
physics in a semantically complete formal logical system, then the
semantic models of that system would represent all and only those possible
universes in which the given laws hold true.
I mentioned this idea once to Professor R. Dass, an applied mathematician working in relativity theory.

He replied that any model of· the

world is scientifically acceptable as long as it is internally consistent,
agrees with the known data, and is explainable to other mathematicians.
This was positive encouragement that the idea was worthy of development,
but the opportunity for carrying it further did not arise at that time.
During these same years came my first encounter with G. SpencerBrown's Laws of form, which I read with avid interest, but then put
aside as being little more than an anomaly of logical studies and as
having only peripheral significance.

My main interests turned toward

multivalued logics, modal logics and particularly, the subject of paradox.
These studies bore out a speculation that, if a meaningful rendering of
paradox could be developed, then Dr. Dass's requirement of consistency
could be dispensed with, or at least, be replaced with a more general
one.
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These ideas remained foremost with me as a beginning student in
systems science at Portland State University, 1975.
began anew for a possible line of development.

There the quest

The first concrete idea

arose serendipitously, in the office of my faculty advisor, Professor
George Lendaris.

While waiting for him to finish a telephone conversa-

tion, I took an issue of The International Journal of General Systems
from his bookshelf and began turning pages.
That issue contained Francisco Varela's paper, "A calculus for
self-reference," in which I immediately recognized exactly the same
notations as used in the book by Spencer-Brown.

Curiosity quickly

manifested in activity, and a thorough review of both Spencer-Brown's
book and Varela's paper led to the next most natural question:

What is

the relationship of these systems to contemporary systems which use the
standard linguistic forms?
An exploration of this question was carried out under the tutelage

of Professors Robert Rempfer and Robert Stanley of the Portland State
University Department of Mathematics.

This resulted in a paper which

was ultimately accepted for publication (Schwartz 1981a) in the same
journal as carried Varela's paper and which now appears in this dissertation as the essential content of Part II.

Francisco Varela was one of

the reviewers of the published version, and his remarks were most helpful
in producing what appears here as Chapter 9.
The work in Part I of this dissertation arose through a continued
association with George Lendaris, who introduced me to Professor L. A.
Zadeh's theory of fuzzy sets and approximate reasoning.

By the time the

work on Varela's calculus was complete, it had become clear that this
calculus could be taken also as a formalization of a small collection of
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Zadeh's basic ideas.

This suggested expanding the language of the

"isomorphic copy," of Varela's system into a richer language, adequate
to express a more extensive portion of Zadeh's theory.

This work began

as a project for a systems research workshop, with both George Lendaris
and Professor Martin Zwick, and culminated in a semantically complete
axiomatization of the essential aspects of approximate reasoning.

The

proof of semantic completeness given here is patterned after a similar
proof given for a somewhat simpler class of "free-variable theories" in
my master's thesis (Schwartz 1973), and its success is due largely to
some special algebraic techniques developed by myself and my master's
thesis advisor, Professor S. K. Thomason.
I was most fortunate in having the opportunity to present

thes~

ideas to Lotfi Zadeh himself, in an informal seminar at Berkeley,
California, 1980.

It gave me a special inspiration when he said that.he

was impressed with my work, and I am grateful for his comments which led
to the correctin of several oversights in an earlier version.

For the

work in this part, Professor Stanley must also be credited for many
helpful suggestions on improving the written presentation.
The concluding chapter of Part I came out of some studies with
Professor H. A. Linstone, in technology assessment.

Dr. Linstone extended

a challenge to show that fuzzy sets had a practical viability, and the
reponse that has manifested here is an application of approximate reasoning to the problem of forecasting under uncertainty.

This same chapter

comprises a talk given at the 1981 meeting of the Society for General
Systems Research, and a shorter version appears in that meeting's proceedings (Schwartz 1981b).
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The work in Part III arose in an attempt to formulate earlier
philosophical ideas and was intended originally as a short introduction
to a dissertation consisting mainly of Parts I and II.

When Martin

Zwick introduced me to the works of Mario Bunge, however, the task
quickly developed into a research project of its own.

The outcome has

been to provide the entire dissertation with a solid methodological
base.
Here I would like to formally express my sincerest appreciation to
all of these fine gentlemen for the part they have played in
ment and in the production of this work.

~y

develop-

Their assistance and constant

encouragement have obviously been essential to my success.

And this

applies especially to my advisor, George Lendaris, who helped see me.
through more difficulties and setbacks than I could possibly document
here.
Also I wish to mention other mentors who in various ways have been
invaluable sources of encouragement and inspiration.
Devendra Sahal, Magaroh Maruyama, and Ervin Laszlo.

These are Professors
The latter in

particular should be thanked for helping with my first professional
p'ublication (Schwartz 1977) and thereby encouraging me that my ideas
could be of interest.

None of these, of course, should be held account-

able for any errors or inaccuracies that this dissertation might still
contain.
To Mary and Greg Valdez of the Word Rite Center, Tualatin, Oregon
must go credit for their very elegant production of the typed draft.
This was produced on their IBM OS/6 word processor, with a math-symbol
attachment, and has gone through several editings and revisions.

ix
Last, I must also express my recognition of Guru Maharaj Ji, to
whom this work is dedicated.

I was initiated into Guru Maharaj Ji's

knowledge and meditation in Portland, Oregon on November 4, 1974, and it
was in fact the experience of his knowledge which inspired me to return
to the university.

Through my efforts to practice his knowledge as he

prescribes, I gained the requisite clarity to carefully distinguish
between my studies and the ultimate purpose of my life.

This has given

me the very precious opportunity to engage in my mundane pursuits with a
true sense of detachment, and oftentimes, an ineffable joy.

Each person

finds a purpose in the objects of his devotion, but it is only in
devotion to the Truth that the true purpose is revealed.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Each stage of society's advance bears forth its own requirements
in the art of managing complexity.

Systems science represents a contem-

porary answer to the complexity of the contemporary world.
the multitude of academic disciplines and technical

It overlays

spe~ializations

with

a broad-based interdisciplinary (or transdisciplinary) approach to
problem solving in a multifaceted environment (the systems approach).
It studies systems as "whole entities" and strives to lay down

princ~ples

which describe their structures and dynamic behaviors more or less
independently of their specific constituting parts (general systems
theory).

And it provides a technical language for cross-disciplinary

communication among scientists, artists, engineers, economists, sociologists, etc., for pooling talents as required by a given problem setting.
Mathematical systems theory represents that part of the systems
research movement which provides mathematically succinct analytical
tools for general systems analysis.

Systems may be stable or adaptable;

fragile or resilient; they might seek goals, oscillate, wander, or
evolve; they may be hierarchical, or self-referential, or autopoietic
(self-perpetuating); they may be deterministic or stochastic; our perceptions of them may be complete and precise, or only partial and fuzzy;
and so on.

This newly emergent plethora of "systemic" concepts presents

the need for new mathematical techniques appropriate for providing them
with rigorous formulation.

As with traditional science, so also with
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systems science, mathematics remains the handmaiden of conceptual
precision.
Qualitative mathematics may be defined as mathematics used to
represent nonmeasurable system properties.

Ill-defined problems such as

arise in the so-called "soft" sciences like economics, policy research,
and futures studies, are not always amenable to the traditional
mathematics--e.g., differential equations and statistics--which rests on
objective numerical measurement of system parameters.

Important para-

meters of many systems are often difficult, or impossible, to.provide
with accurate representation--e.g., corporate morale--yet they must be
accounted for in any reasonable systems analysis.

Recent developments

in mathematical systems theory now show that several branches of abstract
mathematics offer effective methods for meeting this requirement.

The

usefulness of abstract mathematical theories for providing a qualitative
methodology stems from their ability to leave numerical considerations
in the background and to focus explicitly on geometrical, algebraic,
logical, or otherwise conceptual forms.

As illustrations, consider the

following:
1) Topology studies geometrical shapes with respect to their
properties that remain after stretching and bending.

A contemporary

example of quality representation coming out of this area is Thom's
theory of "structural stability and morphogenesis" (catastrophe theory)
which applies differential topology to the study of sudden, discrete
transformations induced by the gradual application of a continuous force
(Thom 1975).

Another is "Q-analysis," Atkins topological "language of

structure," which defines a system in terms of interdependencies existing
among the system parameters (cf. Cavallo 1979).
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2) Abstract algebra, topology's mathematical counterpart, studies
the general properties of algebraic functions and relations.

As examples

in this area we have Petri's "general net theory," which combines graphical and computational tools for modeling systems in terms of informational flows (also cf. Cavallo 1979), Sahal's use of the algebraic
theory of dimensions to define a concept of "self-similitude" for evolving systems (Sahal 1976 and 1978), and an application of category theory
to the study of autonomy and self-organization in living systems (Varela
and Goguen 1978).

Another instance is the class of "structural models,"

which combines both algebraic and topological ideas.

In general, a

structural model is a collection of variables together with their interrelations (Lendaris 1980), and it is represented geometrically as a
digraph in which the interrelations are exhibited in a visual display.
3) Mathematical logic explicates various aspects of human
ing within a precise formalism.

reaso~

The leading example of quality represen-

. tation in this area is L. A. Zadeh's theory of "fuzzy sets and approximate
reasoning."

This theory has an advantage over many forms of qualitative

mathematics in that it formally represents "quality" as a property of
the system observer's use of language and his manner of reasoning with
linguistic ideas, rather than of the system being observed.

Hence, it

provides a convenient tool for modeling and manipulating linguistic
evaluations.

Moreover, approximate reasoning can capture some of the

same properties as other modeling methods.

For example, Zwick, Schwartz,

and Lendaris (1978) show that Thom's "cusp" and "butterfly" catastrophes
can be represented as properties of fuzzy sets; and where this dissertation Part II discusses the formal representation of paradoxical system
properties, Zadeh (1979) shows that analogous results are obtainable in
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a "possibilistic logic" based on fuzzy sets.

Such a methodology, more-

over, should not in any way be confused as one which is itself inexact
or imprecise.

While it is possible to develop a mathematics of imprecise

ideas, precision at some explicit level is always inherent in the very
nature of all mathematical methods.

An "imprecise mathematics" would be

a contradiction of terms.
The work undertaken in this dissertation falls within the category
of mathematical logic.

Specifically, it addresses the application of

nonclassical logics in systems research.
encapsulated as follows:

The central thesis may be

that the theory of formal logical systems, and

particularly, of logical systems based on nonclassical modes of reasoning,
offers important new techniques for building qualitative models of
real-world systems.

The present work is here claimed to advance this

thesis a further step beyond its current stage.

Moreover, the work is

in this respect largely foundational; other than the structural models
discussed in Chapter 6, no new models are produced. ·The primary effort
has mainly been to develop the basis for using nonclassical logics in
systems analysis, and thereby, to indicate more clearly how models based
on such logics may be designed.

This is accomplished in three major

parts.
Part I develops a semantically complete formal axiomatization of
the basic ideas appearing in Zadeh's theory of approximate reasoning.
In particular, the development includes both a multivalent logic, which
takes as its truth values the points in the interval [0,1], and a "fuzzy
logic," which takes for its truth values certain fuzzy subsets of [0,1].
The primary motivation for this part of the work is the same as for the
axiomatization of other mathematical theories.

It lays down in concise
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tenns exactly those ideas which the given theory entails, and it provides
a means by which one can then examine that theory for its consistency,
completeness, decidability, and other properties as a system of mathematical deduction.

Semantic completeness, particularly, is in this respect

essential, for establishing that the resulting formalization indeed
represents the relevant aspects of the informal theory.

Part I further-

more develops a new class of structural models for use in systems forecasting.

In this case, approximate reasoning is used to provide a

fonnal link between the "imprecision" of a structural model as a representation of reality and the "uncertainty" of the model's forecasted
results.
Part II studies the logical systems developed by Spencer-Brown.
(1969) and Varela (1975), which provide special symbolisms and rules of
operation for the logical "forms" that underly both classical and selfreferential reasoning.

The work in this dissertation establishes the

exact relation of these systems to formal logical systems which employ
the standard linguistic notations.

Based on a connection with recursive

function theory, this in turn yields insights into the potential use of
self-referential reasoning for modeling "mechanically unknowable" or
empirically unverifiable real-world system properties, such as the
notion of a "perfect system" (Wienberg 1975), or certain formulations of
"time" (Gale 1968).
Part III explores the theoretical foundations and methodological
framework for applying nonclassical logics in mathematical modeling.
This includes a consideration of how the theory of formal logical systems
is related to the "semantics of science" in the sense discussed by Bunge
(1973).

The principal conclusion is that, since nonclassical logics are
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semantically "meaningful," they lead to empirically testable models of
real-world systems and therefore yield methodologically correct approaches
to model specification.
The philosophical remarks on the use of formal systems (Part III)
was initially what inspired an interest in the calculus for self-reference
(Part II), and the results of Part II provided the technical insights
which led to the axiomatization of approximate reasoning (Part I).

Thus

the above arrangement of the three parts is somewhat the reverse of the
chronology in which the essential ideas evolved.

The chosen order of

presentation is appropriate, however, since the later developments have
ultimately become the core of the work.
Each part of the work is essentially self-contained in its concern
with a specialized body of ideas, but all three parts are tied by a
common purpose: the use of formal logics in improving our understanding
of the world.

Here follows a brief exposition of the context in which

these studies arise and a summary of the main results.
§l.l.

Overview Of Part I
During the last seventy or eighty years, the study of natural

languages has developed more or less independently of mathematical
logic, even though these studies have enjoyed common philosophical
underpinnings.

Linguistics has of course emulated mathematics to an

extent, in striving for rigorous, analytically precise models of the
verbal modes of human communication.

But mathematics was not correspon-

dingly inspired to expand the expressive capabilities of formal languages
beyond the requirements of a two-valued "true-false" level of discourse.
This was due primarily to the interest in analyzing the foundations of
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mathematical thought, for which the two-valued logic was generally
adequate.
It was in response to these shortcomings of conventional mathematics that approximately fifteen years ago L. A. Zadeh proposed the idea
of "fuzzy sets."

The seminal paper (Zadeh 1965) described how impreci-

sion and value judgments in the use of natural languages can be modeled
in a rigorously defined algorithmic semantics through a simple generalization of the classical definition of a set of elements.

Whereas a

classical set S may be represented by a membership function Ps by letting
P (x)=1 if x is "in" the set S, and letting PS(x)=O if x is ·"not in" S,
S
the idea of a "fuzzy set" is obtained by allowing P to range over the
s
entire interval from 0 to 1.
"grade" of membership in S.

Thus one obtains the idea of a
As an example:

"degree~'

or

If T is a fuzzy set of

"tall persons," then a person who is six feet in height might have .9.as
a grade of membership in T, while a person who is five feet six inches
in height might have a grade of membership of only .4 in T.

The assign-

ment of such grades of membership is by and large the product of a
subjective interpretation in the context of a given "universe of
discourse"--e.g., a building which is only six feet in height in the
fuzzy set of "tall buildings" would have a very low grade of membership.
Usually the grades of membership are given in terms of an explicitly
defined function on the interval [0,1].
Thus formulated, fuzzy sets lead naturally to an interpretation of
"linguistic hedges"--Le., modifiers like "very," "more or less," "almost,"
and "quite"--as well as the Boolean connectives "not," "or," and "and,"
as operations on membership functions of fuzzy sets.

The result is an

intuitively plausible algorithmic interpretation for simple propositions
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like "John is tall," "May has dark hair," and "May is much younger than
John," as well as the somewhat more complex propositions such as "Most
Frenchmen are not blond," "It is quite E.£ssible that many

w~althy

Americans

have high blood pressure," and "It is probably quite true that most X's
are much larger than most Y's" (from Zadeh 1978a).

Further, by means of

the fuzzy interpretations of the Boolean connectives, one obtains a
well-defined and intuitively plausible logic for reasoning with fuzzy
linguistic assertions.
After several preliminary pioneering papers on this idea, there
began a rapidly accelerating acceptance of fuzzy sets into a multitude
of technical disciplines.

After only one decade of research, Gaines and

Kohout (1977) summarized the literature on fuzzy sets in a bibliography
which listed some 1,150 entries with approximately 750 being specifically
concerned with the theory and applications of this one idea.
bibliography by Kandell

~nd

Now, a

Yager (1979) pushes the total to 1,800.

entries.
Applications of fuzzy sets have been investigated along such
topics as pattern recognition (Zadeh's initial concern), cybernetic
controls, automated production systems, quality control, multiplecriteria decision making, fuzzy classification schemes, data base management, dynamic systems modeling, and natural language processing.

In

general, the theory of fuzzy sets offers many opportunities for improving both the basic machine capability and the man-machine interface.
Papers by Zadeh have focused primarily on the theoretical developments.

The idea of linguistic hedges was explored (Zadeh 1972).

The

idea of a "fuzzy logic," which takes as its truth values the fuzzy
subsets of [O,l]--rather than the points in [0,1] as is characteristic
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of most multivalent logics--began to take shape in 1975 (Zadeh 1975a and
1975b) and was later studied as a "fuzzification" of the Lukasiewicz
infinitary logic

L~

''''1

by Bellman and Zadeh (1977).

Zadeh's more recent

works (1978a and 1978b) have developed the theory of "linguistic possibility," or "possibilistic reasoning," which provides translation rules
for transforming natural language expressions into a computable formalism
(PRUF) .
The philosophical aspects of "fuzzy reasoning" have been explored
by Gaines (1976).

Related books and edited collections of

ing of mention are:

es~ays

deserv-

Kaufman (1975), Moisil (1975), Zadeh and Fu (1975),

Gupta, Saridis, and Gaines (1977), Dubois and Prade (1978a), Kandel and
Lee (1979), Gupta, Ragade, and Yager (1979), and Negoita (1980).

Now that the theory of approximate reasoning has crystalized into
an established body of knowledge, an obvious next step is to provide .
this theory with a complete formal axiomatization.

Giles (1976) took a

preliminary step in this direction by showing that the axioms for
Lukaseiwicz's infinitary logic

L~

''"1

also serve as axioms for a multivalent

interpretation of the fuzzy Boolean connectives.

The language of

L~,

''"1

is

essentially identical with the language of the classical propositional
calculus, however, and therefore does not have the capability for
expressing such concepts as "semantic equivalence," "semantic entailment,"
"linguistic variable," "hedge," "linguistic truth," and so on, which are
essential to the theory of approximate reasoning.

Axiomatizing these

more complex ideas evidently requires a formalism with substantially
richer linguistic capabilities.
The work in Part I of this dissertation makes a further step in
this direction.

A class of formal logical systems is defined wherein
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each system represents one or more linguistic variables over a single
universe of discourse.

These systems are unique in their use of a

linguistic-axiomatic structure which operates simultaneously at two
distinct but interrelated semantic levels.

An "inner level" accommodates

fuzzy linguistic assertions such as "John is young and very tall" in a
multivalent interpretation, and an "outer level" accommodates composite
expressions like "'John is young and very tall' is semantically equivalent with 'John is not old and not at all short'" in a bivalent interpretation.

In effect the outer level is a formalization of part of the

metalanguage that is used for discussing linguistic assertions, and
bivalency stems from the tacit assumption that at the metalevel two
linguistic assertions either are or are not semanticaIly equivalent.
Once defined, the multivalent axiomatization of approximate reasoning is easily modified to become a semantically complete axiomatization
of a "fuzzy logic" per se, which uses "fuzzy numbers" in [0,1] as truth
values.

There remain, however, many fuzzy-set theoretic ideas which are

not represented in these formalisms.

In particular should be mentioned

the fuzzy quantifiers like "most," "almost all," and "few."

Further,

while the present axiomatization captures the abstract idea of a linguistic hedge, it is still not sufficiently rich to provide hedges with
explicit arithmetical definitions.

Nevertheless, given the results of

Part I, it is evident that many of these limitations can be dealt with
through further extensions of these two-leveled systems.
The principal accomplishments represented by this part of the
dissertation may thus be summarized as follows:

(i) a rigorous formaliza-

tion of the general concept of "linguistic variable" in the context of
semantic equivalence between linguistic assertions, and (ii) a precise
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axiomatization of how these linguistic ideas are interrelated under both
multivalent and fuzzy-logical interpretations.

Part I contains five

chapters, as described below.
Chapter 2 provides the basic terminology.

This includes all the

relevant concepts from the theory of formal logical systems, together
with all needed ideas from the theory of fuzzy sets and approximate
reasoning.

In its treatment of formal systems, this chapter also serves

the purposes of dissertation parts II and III.
Chapter 3 gives an explicit definition of "linguistic

t~eory"

(or

"theory of a linguistic variable"), which incorporates the abovementioned
two-leveled linguistics into the form of a rigorously defined class of
formal logical systems.

Accompanying this is a definition of the

tics for linguistic theories, amounting to a precise

se~~n

set~theoretic

description of the concept of linguistic variable.
The main result is established, in full detail, in Chapter

4~

The

given class of linguistic theories is complete with respect to the given
semantics.

This result is what ensures that the axiomatization is

indeed adequate to capture the essential characteristics of fuzzy linguistic variables and the multivalent theory of approximate reasoning.
In other words, semantic completeness ensures that all and only the
semantically "true" fuzzy linguistic propositions are formally derivable
from the axioms in question.
Miscellaneous extensions and generalizations of the main results
are considered in Chapter 5.

These include:

linguistic theories of

mUltiple and interrelated linguistic variables; linguistic theories
having multiple universes of discourse; the full fuzzy logic, as described above; a formalization of possibilistic reasoning; and several
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alternative modes of fuzzy-logical inference.

The most significant

result of this chapter is the extension to an axiomatization of fuzzy
logic, and the proof that this axiomatization also is semantically
complete.
Chapter'6 concludes Part I with an application.

The structural

modeling package, SPIN (McLean, et. al. 1976), is enhanced by incorporating a fuzzy-reasoning approach to "certainty accounting."

The

result is an explicit formal connection between the certainty in a given
model as a correct description of reality and the certainty
model's forecasted results.

o~

that

Briefly stated, the less "fuzzy" the model,

the more certain are the results, and the more "fuzzy" the model, the
less certain are the results.

Algorithms are developed for calculating

"degrees of certainty" of forecasts as degrees of truth of fuzzy-logical
propositions, and sample computations are provided for a simple model,
with five parameters.
Here it should be mentioned that, while such models as discussed
above might be construed as an approach to the method of "future discounting" discussed by Linstone (1973 and 1979), that author has pointed out
to me in private communication that "uncertainty" is only one of several
motivations for discounting, which in particular include matters of
economics and of biological survival.

Further, where Bellman (1977)

suggests the "tremendous opportunities" offered by fuzzy systems theory,
Linstone and Simmonds (1977 pp. 133-134) overlay this with the qualification that one must also be watchful that adopting such tools do not
constrain one's view in places where new modeling techniques need to be
invented.

Similar remarks apply, however, to all modeling techniques,

be they fuzzy or not; it is nowdays commonly understood (although

13
perhaps not commonly put into practice) that one should only use modeling
tools where they apply.

Even given the above qualification, therefore,

this author sides with Bellman, but only by putting more stress on the
"opportunities."

It is simply a matter of time before fuzzy systems

prove their worth in forecasting as well as the other fields where they
are now being applied.
§1.2.

Overview Of Part II
Historically, paradox has been the bane of the mathematical disci-

plines.

The reason?

In any classical, Aristotelean logic, paradox

inevitably leads to a completely trivial system in which all propositions
become formally provable.

Thus, if Aristotelean logic is to be vindicated,

paradox must be eliminated.
A case in point is Russell's discovery of a paradox in Frege's
theory of sets (Russell 1902).

Because both Frege and Rus.:;ell aimed to

promote classical logic as the irrevocable basis of all

math'~matical

reasoning, including that employed in set theory, a resolution of the
Russell paradox was required within this frame.

Hence arose the theory

of types (Russell 1908).
Yet paradox itself is a naturally occurring form of human intellection.

People oftentimes argue themselves in circles quite cheerfully--

and usually unwittingly--without showing the slightest signs of discomfort or remorse.
~he

One day a person might be a convinced optimist, and

next day be the most cynical pessimist, or he might decide once to

pursue a certain objective, and then suddenly begin moving in a completely
different direction.
largely "irrational."

It is nowdays a cliche that human behavior is
How one should characterize "rational" behavior
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is, of course, a subject of debate.

Yet it is in any case clear that, if

there is any "logic" which would be appropriate as a basis for modeling
such irrationality, it is evidently not the internally consistent
Aristotelean logic of the exclusive "true or false."
Bateson gave substance to this view in a study of schizophrenia
(Bateson, et. al. 1956).

Through internalizing a paradoxical "double

bind," a person can entertain two contradictory beliefs simultaneously,
with either one of them becoming available as a behavioral prescriptor.
Based on this discovery, Bateson and his coworkers thus proposed that
the capacity to entertain paradoxes is a factor in many psychological
disorders.
But paradoxical reasoning per se need not be characterized as
exclusively pathological.

Many philosophies, eastern and western,

ancient and modern, openly acknowledge paradoxical assumptions (cf. Smith
1976).

For example, Hinduism conceptualizes Brahman as being "neither

this nor that" but a fundamental reality
intellectual comprehension.

resi~ing

beyond the realm of

And Sartre's existentialist philosophy is

founded on a belief that freedom of the will is simply a "fact," but
that in its "facticity," it is "absurd"; we have freedom of choice, but
we are bound to choose, lest we lapse into "nothingness" (Sartre 1956).
Hence, Sartre's freedom is beyond reason, but is nevertheless real;
Le., it is illogically "true."

In such cases, paradox (or absurdity)

plays the special role of defining limits for the human rationality, by
pointing to--or at least suggesting--the existence of realities which
are completely beyond the human abilities to comprehend.
Given this "naturalness" of paradoxical reasoning, therefore, it
might be expected that even the mathematical sciences should begin to
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introduce paradoxical ideas into their models of reality.

Mathemati-

cally, paradox is distinguishable from an ordinary contradiction as
being an assertion to the effect that a certain proposition is equivalent with its negation (P='P), whereas a contradiction asserts the
simultaneous truth of a proposition and'its negation (P&'P).

While no

scientific theories to date have openly promoted paradoxical (or contradictory) ideas, there are various instances which impinge on paradox in
their use of semantic self-reference or other forms of logical circularity.
Recent developments of, this genre include the following:

the idea of

mutual causality (Maruyama 1963); the interdependency of the observer
and the observed (von Foerster 1973 and Howe and von Foerster 1975);
systemic self-modeling (Sahal 1976, 1977, and 1978); and the
systems law" (Weinberg 1975).

"perfec~

Further, Maturana (1970) analyzes cogni-

tive self-reference as a function of circularity in the neural structure
of the brain, Zwick (1978) suggests that the "measurement problem"'in
quantum mechanics might be a result of a Godelian self-reference in the
mathematical formalism; and Rescher (1973 and 1980) proposes a "logic of
inconsistency" to fulfill an evident need for drawing meaningful conclusions from inconsistent sets of data.
On the other hand, while none of these--except perhaps Rescher-openly promote the use of paradox, it appears that several of them could
be construed as entailing paradox if one chose--notably Weinberg and
von Foerster.

In any case, these examples suggest that science is but a

step away from implementing paradox in full force as a means of conceptualizing the world that it observes.

But using paradox in this manner

ultimately depends on developing logically sound modes of reasoning
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which formally accommodate paradox without simultaneously degenerating
into completely meaningless trivialities.
Part II of this dissertation studies a contemporary approach to
this issue.

In the book Laws of form, Spencer-Brown showed how the

classical bimodal logic could be reduced to a pair of simple rules
governing the manipulation of some elementary conceptual forms.

He

furthermore studied these forms for their capacity to describe paradoxical reasoning (Spencer-Brown 1969).

The result was a system of reason-

ing with two semantic "states": a "marked state" (denoted by -,) and an
"unmarked state" (denoted by a blank space) in a calculus of equations
between formal expressions, known as the "primary algebra."

Paradox in

the primary algebra has the form
p

= PI

in contrast with the form
p ::'p

which uses the standard logical notations.

Spencer-Brown was successful

in showing that the propositional calculus is mirrored in the primary
algebra in that every tautology P is representable as a formally derivable equation of the form p=~ but the ability to deal with paradoxes
went only as far as representing them outside the framework of his
algebra as arising through "oscillation" between the two states.
This limitation of the primary algebra was resolved by Varela
(1975) in a "calculus for self-reference" which extends Spencer-Brown's
conception of logical form.

The marked state and the unmarked state are

augmented by an "autonomous state" (denoted by iJ and an axiomatic
system is developed which incorporates equations of the form
p =

0
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as abbreviations of the paradoxical forms
p = Pl

in a meaningfully nontrivial formalism.

The title, "calculus for self-

reference," stems from the analysis of paradoxical equations P=PI as
being linguistic representations of a situation in which the logical
status of p is defined in terms of itself through "re-entry" into the
"form of indication"

t.

Since it is a consequence of Varela's complete-

ness theorem that the above two equations are formally derivable from
one another in the calculus, Varela's axiomatization captures the sense
in which p is paradoxical if and only if p is logically autonomous.
The aim of Part II of this dissertation is to ascertain exactly
how the primary algebra and the calculus for self-reference

correspo~d

to logical systems which employ the standard notational conventions--i.e.,
the logical connectives "

&, V ,

~,

and -.

Steps in this direction

which have already been taken by others include the following:
(i) Orchard (1975) strengthened Spencer-Brown's results by showing that,
not only tautologies, but also antitautologies and contingencies are
representable in the primary algebra, (ii) Cull and Frank (1979) showed
that the primary algebra is essentially just Boolean algebra, (iii) Varela
(1979) points out how of his semantics of "marked," unmarked," and
"autonomous" states corresponds to the semantics of Kleene's (1938 and
1952) three-valued truth-table system which uses "true," "false," and
"undefined" truth values, and (iv) Kohout and Pinkava (1980) have analyzed
the algebraic structure of both the Spencer-Brown and the Varela calculi
to what might well be the fullest possible extent, showing that the
primary algebra may be isomorphically mapped into 8 distinct conventional
systems of connectives and that the calculus for self-reference

h~s

4380
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possible interpretations, mostly as n-algebras.

These works thus explore

primarily the algebraic and semantic characteristics of the calculi and
are concerned with isomorphisms of algebraic structures, whereas the
present work shifts attention toward the formal proof-theoretic characteristics and is concerned with isomorphisms of proof systems.
It is worth noting that, while Kohout and Pinkava are correct in
their observation that the Spencer-Brown and the Varela calculi contribute essentially "nothing new" algebraically, this downplays the more
significant feature of these calculi; namely, that they are semantically
complete axiomatizations of those algebras.

Studying these calculi as

proof systems per se gives added insight into the relation of the primary
algebra to the classical propositional calculus and of the relation of
the calculus for self-reference to the Kleene system.

This leads in

turn to an extension of the study of paradox into the theory of

recur~ive

decidability--which formed the original basis for Kleene's truth-tables-and it ultimately unveils an approach to using Kleene-Varela type systems
as a framework for formalizing paradoxical general systems concepts.
Part II contains three chapters as follows.
Chapter 7 recasts Brown's primary algebra as a rigorously defined
formal logical system PA, and shows that PA is "essentially isomorphic"
with a standard axiomatization PC of the classical propositional calculus.
Stated more precisely, PA is exactly isomorphic with an inessential
extension PC* of PC that is obtained by adjoining a special symbol
a defining axiom of the form F=P&,P.
translation
bility.

t

~

and

Isomorphism takes the form of a

between formal languages which preserves formal deriva-

A consequence of this result is that equality of expressions in

PA is isomorphic with logical equivalence of propositions in PC*.
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Chapter 8 considers the calculus for self-reference, similarly
recast as a rigorously defined formal logical system CSR.

This system

is translated isomorphically into a new system K which uses Kleene's
notion of "strong equivalence" (denoted by
equality in CSR.

~)

as the correspondent of

The aim is to show that K is a semantically complete

axiomatization of the Kleene truth-table system mentioned above.

No

such formal axiomatization of Kleene's truth-table system has heretofore
been known.

Later sections of Chapter 7 show that, whereas PA is

Aristotelean, CSR is non-Aristotelean and can be extended to include
paradoxical expressions of the form

P~'P,

without degenerating into

the trivial system in which all propositions become provable.

Using

terminology defined in §2.1, this is to say that CSR, although inconsistent, is nevertheless a "coherent" formal logical system..

In this

respect, "coherence," rather than consistency, is seen to be the essential
condition for a nonclassical logic to be meaningful.
Chapter 9 explores some consequences of

Chapt~r

8, showing in

particular that, under Kleene's original interpretation of the threevalued logic in the theory of partial recursion, Varela's "autonomous
state" becomes isomorphic with the idea of a "totally undecideable
partial recursive set."

The concluding section interprets this result

in several contexts, showing the potential use of formally paradoxical
assertions for discussing "mechanically (Le., recursively) unknowable"
system properties from within a logically coherent frame.
The views expressed in the latter chapter happen to closely resemble
those of Zwick (1978), who argues that the mathematics of physical
measurement theory is such that phenomena could occur which would
be unexplainable in that they would be represented by undecidable
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propositions.

The position taken in this dissertation is at first sight

weaker, since it addresses mainly the question of how the conceptualization of such phenomena is possible (i.e., it attributes unexplainability
to the observer).

On the other hand, Zwick's view attributes unexplaina-

bility to the mathematics and does not rule out the possibility that
there might be another mathematics in which the phenomena become explainable.

On this count, the present view is actually stronger in suggesting

that certain things are intrinsically unexplainable, regardless of the
mathematics, and therefore require an alternate logic in order to be
conceived and discussed.
The results of this part are what led to the two-leveled systems
developed in Part I.

It is easily verified that all the axioms and

inference rules of the system K remain valid when that system is reinterpreted in the theory of fuzzy sets--with Kleene's strong equivalence
here being reinterpreted as semantic equivalence of linguistic assertions.
Thus, in a sense, the systems defined in Part I are extensions of K.
§1.3.

Overview Of Part III
Lukasiewicz, one of the chief developers of the theory of multi-

valued logics, prophesied over fifty years ago that science would eventually incorporate nonclassical modes of reasoning into its models of
the observable world (cf. Gaines 1976).

It is easy to see that this is

in principle a completely reasonable proposition.
There is no truly compelling reason why the naturally occurring
systems--taking this to include societies and economies as well as the
traditional objects of scientific research--should be assumed to obey
the laws of classical logic.

On the contrary, in much the same way as
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the discovery of non-Euclidian geometries led to new conceptions of time
and space, the discovery of meaningfully coherent nonclassical logics
has revealed classical logic as being only one of the many possible
frameworks for organizing ideas.

Logic, after all, is a property of the

observer, and alternative modes of reasoning may be regarded as alternative templates, or sets of spectacles, through which the world can be
viewed.

While it is true that a model of some aspect of reality must

conform to the known data, there does not appear to be anything in the
empirical realm which insists that one form of logic should take precedence over another.
The first notable instance of Lukasiewicz's idea came to fruition
during the early forties, in the form of "quantum logics" (Reichenbach
1944).

Today, there exists a rapidly growing plethora of multiple-valued

logics, modal logics, temporal logics, interrogative logics, and so on,
all of which contribute to this theme.

For specific examples cf. Rescher

(1969) and the bibliographies of Gaines and Kohout (1977) and of Dunn
and Epstein (1977).

Fuzzy logic and the logic for self-reference,

studied in this dissertation, are topics which have gained special
attention in recent years.
Incumbent with the development of such logics there arise foundational and methodological issues concerning their implementation for
real-world systems analysis.

These include the significance of formal

logic as a means of generating new perspectives on the observable world,
through "selecting" alternative modes of reasoning, together with the
manner in which formalized nonstandard modes of reasoning enter into the
relationship of the observer to the observed.

Of special importance is

the issue of the meaningfulness and empirical testability of models
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based on nonclassical reasoning.

At the heart of this is a somewhat

deeper issue concerning the status of "model theory" (i.e., the theory
of formal logical systems and their semantics) as providing the "semantics of science."

Apparently conflicting views on this subject have

been put forth by Suppes (1961), a logician, and Bunge (1973), a
philosopher of science, and a careful treatment of their discussions is
imperative for placing the use of nonstandard reasoning on a solid
foundation.
Chapter 10 begins with a historical overview of the development of
mathematical logic, which illust·rates a particular view regarding the
process by which logical studies have evolved.

Then, the special nature

of mathematical logic as providing a means of "selecting" one's logic is
studied from within this frame.

The formal distinction between a "symbol"

and its "meaning" is seen as that which lends mathematical logic its
analytical power.

Chapter 10 continues with some remarks on formal

logic as a form of qualitative mathematics--specifically, as a tool for
"quality representation" in situations where numerical techniques do not
apply.

The concluding section of Chapter 10 provides a general introduc-

tion to the theory of formal logical systems and their semantics, at a
level which is appropriate for the discussion that follows.
Chapter 11 then proceeds to methodological issues.
of modeling for the sciences is reviewed.

Bunge's theory

Then follows an analysis of

the abovementioned contrast between the views of Bunge and Suppes.

We

ultimately concur with Bunge in that an extramathematical "semantic
assumption" is essential.

Bunge's work is then built upon to show how,

together with his semantic assumption, concepts froln the theory of
formal systems provide all the necessary means for a rigorous formulation
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of Bunge's basic notions of "general theory," "model object," "theoretical
model," and empirical "testability."

This leads to a representation of

the manner in which nonclassical logics may be invoked for model construction, and the manner in which such nonstandard models enter into the
relation of the observer to the observed.

The concluding section shows

that the models thus produced are always empirically testable, as long
as the underlying logic is "coherent" in the sense discussed in Part II.
This seals in the affirmative the question of whether models based on
nonclassical modes of reasoning can have methodological viability.

PART I

AXIOMS FOR APPROXIMATE REASONING

CHAPTER 2
BASIC TERMINOLOGY
Concepts from the theory of formal systems, as needed for all
three parts of this dissertation are laid down in §2.1.

Most of these

are straightforward adaptations of standard ideas, with one notable
exception being the property of "coherence" which is defined herein
(§2.1.5.2) specifically for use in Parts II and III.

The principal

references have been Shoenfield (1967) and Mendelson (1964), while
secondary sources of information were Smullyan (1961) and Robinson
(1963).

The reader who is unfamiliar with the principles of mathe-

matical logic may find it helpful to supplement §2.1 with a reading of
§10.4, which gives a more thorough explanation of the same underlying
ideas, together with some examples.
Needed concepts from the theory of fuzzy sets and approximate
reasoning are given in §2.2.

These have been taken from two papers by

Zadeh (1975b and 1978a) and as such provide groundwork for the development in Part I.

A general introduction to the subject is provided by

Gaines (1976).
§2.1.

Formal Logical Systems And Their Semantics
We may begin with a preview of the main definitions.

A formal

logical system (§2.1.4) consists of a language, a set of axioms, some
inference rules, and a set of theorems, where the theorems are comprised
of all expressions of the language which can be generated (derived) from
the axioms by means of the inference rules.

For each language there is
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defined the companion notion of a semantics (§2.1.2), consisting of a
collection of interpretations in which expressions in the language may
obtain meanings.

An interpretation generally consists of a universe of

discourse, assignments of meanings from within that universe for the
expressions of the language, a concept of truth or validity for expressions, and a set of valuation mappings by which one determines the truth
value, or validity, of expressions in terms of their meanings.

The

general concept of a formal logic (§2.1.3) is embodied in the definition
of semantic interpretation.
The basic components of a formal logical system and its semantics
are illustrated in Figure 2-1.
§2.1.1.
Let

The details follow below.

Languages
~

be any uncountably infinite collection of objects (e.g., the

ordinal numbers).

The objects in this collection will be used as symbols

and as such will be the essential building blocks for all the formal
languages discussed in this dissertation.
speaking "symbolize" anything.

Formal symbols do not strictly

Rather, they are just abstract, indepen-

dently existing objects which may be "assigned" various meanings within
the context of different semantic interpretations (cf. §2.1.2).
A string is a finite sequence of symbols.
is its number of symbol occurrences.

The length of a string

To indicate that a sequence of

symbols is being regarded as a string, the elements of the sequence are
written as concatenated, i.e., without separating commas.

Thus, if sl'

s2' and s3 are symbols, the notation sl,s2,s3 denotes an ordinary sequence, while sls2s3 denotes a string.

Concatenation is used similarly

Formulas
Formal Logical

Theorems

$ystem

In;Eerence Rules

Truth
Values

Semantic
Interpretations

CM-e~~in~~

Figure -2-1.

Formal logical systems _with interpretations.

N
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in case the s. are strings--i.e., the concatenation to two or more
1

strings is a string.
If sand s' are strings, and

So

is a symbol, then the notation

s(s'/sO) denotes the string that is obtained from s by uniform substitution of an occurrence of s' for each occurrence of

So

in s.

It is tacit

that, if s does not contain any occurrences of sO' then s(s'/sO) is
just s.
A formal language consists of a set of symbols, together with a
set of well-formed strings, as described below:
1)

The set of symbols to be used specifically for L are assumed

to be members of the collection S given above.
N

The only requirement on

this set is that it contain a sufficient, countable or uncountable,
number of members as appropriate for the intended use of L.

Most

languages will have a few symbols designated as logical connectives,
which, in the case of standard languages, typically include a negation
symbol, denoted by', and a disjunction symbol, denoted by
2)

V.

The well-formed strings of L are selected from the set of all

strings for L.

For a specific L, well-formed strings may be defined

recursively or in accordance with a context-free grammar.

Depending on

the language, they are variously referred to as formulas, expressions,
equations, equivalences, etc.
In general, languages are defined for the purpose of formalizing
the essential ideas in an intended set of interpretations, i.e., a
semantics.

Thus, although strings per se are purely syntactical objects,

devoid of any specific meanings, well-formed strings have appropriate
forms so that they will be meaningful under certain interpretations of
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the constituent symbols.

This aspect of the creation of formal languages

is discussed more fully in §10.4.1.
§2.1.2.

Semantics

A semantics

~

for a formal language L is a class of interpretations

for L, where an interpretation I for L is defined in four steps, as
follows:
1)

A set U is specified as a universe of discourse, the members
I
of which are referred to as individuals. A universe of discourse provides
the context in which well-formed strings of L obtain meanings:

For

sufficiently simple languages, such as that of the propositional calculus and most of the other systems studies in Part II, universes of
discourse may be assumed to be empty, since the meanings of the logical-connectives are always implicit in their truth-functional behavior as
defined by the interpretation's valuations (see the following).

For

richer languages, such as studied in Part I, universes are typically
non-empty, and the interpretation then includes specific meaning assignments as described below.
2)

Meaning assignments are defined in terms of mappings of certain

symbois in L to entities in, or definable on, the universe U .
I

For

example, an "individual constant" in L (cf. §3.1.1) is assigned as its
meaning a specific individual in U , and a "relation symbol" in L (also
I
§3.1.1) is assigned as its meaning a specific relation of individuals in

r . Assignments of meanings to symbols ultimately yield meanings for

U

expressions.

For example, if a and b are individual constants, and if =

denotes the equality relation, then the expression a=b "means" that a is
equal to b.
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3)

For every interpretation, a set of values is chosen and there

is defined a set of valuations.

The values may be any objects--e.g.,

the letters T and F, the numbers 0,

~,

and 1, the members of the unit

interval [0,1], or the fuzzy subsets of [0,1].

In most places, these

are called truth-values, but an exception is in Part II, where certain
values are referred to as logical states.

Valuations are mappings of

the well-formed strings of L, or a certain subset of well-formed strings
of L, into the set of values.

For simple languages, which do not require

universes of discourse, valuations merely take the place of truth tables,
characterizing the truth-functional behavior of logical connectives.
For richer languages, valuations apply to well-formed strings which make
assertions about individuals in U , and they yield a truth-value in .
I
terms of the assertion's meaning. For example, a string of the form a=b
receives the values T or F depending on whether the individual that was
assigned as a meaning for a is, or is not, the same individual as was
assigned to b.

To avoid possible confusion, it should be noted also

that strings of the form x=y, where x and yare "individual variables"
(cf. §3.1.1), are not included in the domain of the valuation mappings,
since x and y vary over the universe U but do not have any specific
I
individual assignments.

A discussion of this appears in §10.4.1, and an

example in §3.2.
4)
strings.

A concept of truth or validity is specified for well-formed
For all languages this concept is essentially predetermined by

the set of valuations.

In the propositional calculus, for example, one

makes use of the concept of a tautology, this being a well-formed string
which is assigned the value 1 (or T) by all valuations (cf. §7.1).

In

richer languages, the appropriate concept is that of semantic validity,
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which is determined by the valuations as a property of the meaning of a
string under the given interpretation (meaning assignments) of its
constituent symbols.

For example (cf. §3.2), a string of the form a=a

would be valid, since it receives the value 1 under all valuations; and
a string of the form x=x would be valid, since, no matter what individual
constant is put in place of x, the string likewise receives the value 1
under all valuations.

The idea used in the latter example makes this

notion of validity applicable to all well-formed strings of L, whether
or not they are within the domain of the valuation mappings.

Note that

it is implicit in the foregoing that only well-formed strings which make
assertions about specific individuals are formally regarded as "true" or
"false."

The property of a strings being valid in an interpretation. I

is asserted by the notation IFS.
§2. 1. 3.

Logics

A formal logic consists of a formal language L, together with a
semantics I for L.

For any semantics, it is normally implicit in the

definition of its interpretations that all the interpretations have
their valuation mappings acting on the same logical connectives in the
same way.

For example, in classical logics, the expression

the value T, if and only if P receives the value F, and
value F if and only if P receives the value T.

P receives

P receives the

Thus, the nature of the

logic--i.e., as being two-valued, many-valued, fuzzy-valued, etc.--is
embodied in I; and any given L may serve as the language of several
different logics.
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§2.1.4.

Formal Systems

A formal logical system is normally defined for the purpose of
characterizing the properties of a given set of semantic interpretations.
In this case, it is desired to find a set of axioms and inference rules
from which one can formally derive all the well-formed strings that
happen to be true about (or valid in) all the given interpretations.
Typically, this set of interpretations is a subset
tics

~

~I

of a given seman-

for a language L, in which case L becomes the language of the

formal system and is denoted by L(F).

Then, a formal logical system F

consists of a language L(F), together with some axioms, inference rules,
and theorems, as follows.
§2.1.4.1.

Axioms

The only requirement placed on axioms of F is that they be wellformed strings of L(F).

Yet, since axioms are customarily selected

specifically for the above mentioned objective of characterizing a
subset

~I

of a semantics I for L(F), one naturally

which are valid in every interpretation in
§2.1.4.2.

~I

choo~es

only axioms

•

Inference Rules

The inference rules of F are mappings of the set of well-formed
strings of L(F) into itself.

In some treatments, inference rules are

described by means of a "schema."

For example, the rule of modus ponens

(§3.3.1 and §7.1) may be described by
P

P::IQ

Q

which says that, from the formula P, together with a formula of the form
P~Q,

one may infer the formula Q.
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In this dissertation, an n-ary inference rule is regarded as a
mapping in the sense of being a set of (n+1)-tuples of well-formed
strings having certain forms.

For example, modus ponens is herein

defined as the binary rule consisting of triples having the form
(P,~Q,Q).

Each such (n+l)-tuple is an instance of the rule; and if

(sl' ... ,sn,sn+1) is a rule instance, then sl, ... ,sn are the hypotheses
of that instance, and sn+l is the conclusion.

Thus one captures the

sense in which a certain conclusion may be derived (or
set of hypotheses
terize a set

~'

Ex

means of ! rule.

inferre~)

from a

Owing to the desire to charac-

of interpretations for L(F), one naturally chooses for F

only inference rules which always act so as to preserve validity in each
I in

~I,

i.e., so that only valid conclusions can be inferred from

v~lid

hypotheses.
§2.1.4.3.

Theorems

The set of theorems of F is the smallest set of well-formed strings
of L(F) that contains the axioms of F and is closed under the inference
rules of F.

An alternative, and sometimes useful, description of this

set is given by the following inductive definition:
1.

The axioms of F are theorems of F,

2.

If the hypotheses sl, ... ,sn in an instance of an inference rule of F
are theorems of F, then the conclusion, sn+1' is a theorem of F,

3.

Nothinr is a theorem of F except as required by 1 and 2.

It follows that the set of theorems of F is uniquely determined by the
language, axioms, and inference rules of F.
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§2.1.4.4.

Inductive Definitions And Inductive Proofs

The above inductive definition of a set of theorems is typical of
many definitions used throughout the study of formal systems.

Often-

times, the analogue of item 3 is omitted, in which case it is tacitly
assumed.

Whenever it is desired to establish that the members of such a

set have a certain property, one uses a corresponding inductive proof.
Such a proof may be regarded as a generalization of an ordinary proof by
mathematical induction, having its own form of induction hypothesis.
For example, to establish that the theorems of a system F have a certain
property P, one shows:
1.

The axioms of F have the property P, and

2.

If sn+1 is the conclusion in an instance (sl, ... sn,sn+l) of an
inference rule of F, and if the hypotheses sl, ... ,sn .have P, then
the conclusion sn+1 also has P.

In this example, the induction hypothesis is the assumption in 2 that
the property indeed holds for sl, ... ,sn'

A proof using this technique

appears below, Proposition 2.1.5.1-1.
§2.1.S.

Further Properties And Terms

The following sections discuss the concepts of proof, consistency,
coherence, Aristotelean vs. non-Aristotelean, and extension for formal
systems.

These are all strictly syntactical properties in that they

refer only to the formal structure of a system--in other words, they are
independent of any underlying semantics.
logical system.

Let F be an arbitrary formal
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§2.1.5.1.

Proofs

A proof of a string s in F is a finite sequence sl, ... ,sn of
well-formed strings of L(F) such that s is s , and for each index
n

i=I, ... ,n, either:
1.

s. is an axiom of F, or

2.

s. is the conclusion in an instance of an inference rule of F in

~

~

which the hypotheses of that instance are all among the s. for j<i.
J

Such a proof is said to have length n.

The notation

to assert the condition that there is some proof of s in F,
asserts the contrary.
writing

~Fs

and

~Fs.

(Note:

F~s

is used

a~d F~s

Many authors follow Frege (1879) by

The notation adopted here is typographically more

convenient.)
Proposition 2.1.5.1-1.
of F if and only if
Proof.

A well-formed string s of L(F) is a theorem

F~s.

To show that, if s is a theorem, then

F~s,

we use proof by

induction on the set of theorems of F.
Case 1: the string s is an axiom of F.

Then the one-string

sequence, s, is a proof of s in F.
Case 2: the string s is a conclusion sn+l in some instance
(sl, ... ,sn,sn+l) of an inference rule of F.
hypothesis is that

F~si'

for each

i~n.

In this case, the induction

Let sl' , ... ,sm' be the sequence

of strings that is obtained by putting the proofs of the s.,
for
~
together, in the order of the indices of the s ..
~

i~n,

Then the sequence

sl' , ... ,sm' ,sm+l is a proof of sm+l in F, by the definition of a proof.
Thus,

F~s

by induction on the theorems of F.
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To show that, if

F~s,

then s is a theorem of F, we can use mathe-

matical induction on the length of proofs in F.

Assume that s has a

proof of length n.
Case 1: n=1.

Then s is an axiom, by the definition of a proof.

Hence s is a theorem, by item 1 in the definition of a theorem.
Case 2: n>1; say that the given proof of s is sl, ... ,sn' where s n
is s.

The induction hypothesis asserts that all proofs in F having

length less than n yield theorems of F.

Thus all of s1, ..• ,sn-1 are

theorems of F, since each initial segment of s1, ... ,sn is a proof in F.
By item 2 of the definition of a proof, s

n

is inferred from some of the

s. for i<n by means of an inference rule of F.
~

It therefore follows by

item 2 in the definition of a theorem that sn (which is the string s? is
a theorem of F.

n.

This completes the proof, by mathematical induction on

0

In the sequel, Proposition 2.1.5.1-1 is used tacitly to equate the
properties of a string's being derivable and of its being a theorem in a
formal logical system.

Thus, the notation

F~s

is used to assert that s

is a theorem of F.
§2.1.5.2.

Consistency and Coherence

The property of consistency for a formal system is based on the
notion of a well-formed string's being an inconsistency, where an
inconsistency is a string having a certain form, depending on the system's
language.

For example, in a system which is based on the usual logical

connectives, inconsistencies have the form P&'P--in which case they are
referred to as contradictions.

Given an appropriate definition of an

inconsistency for a formal logical system, the system itself is said to
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be consistent if the theorems of the system do not include any such
inconsistent strings.
The following property asserts that the set of theorems has a
nontrivial structure.

Precisely, a formal logical system F is coherent

if there exists at least one well-formed string s of L(F) such that

~s.

This property of a formal system is used in the present work for
establishing the characterization of Aristotelean vs. non-Aristotelean
systems discussed below (§2.1.5.4).

Here it should be mentioned that

this notion of coherence bears a connection with Rescher's (1973)
"coherence theory of truth" which was developed in an effort to obtain
meaningful inferences from inconsistent sets of data.

Rescher's approach

may be characterized as an "internal" one, focusing on a concept of
semantic truth which provides the fabric upon which such inferences can
be performed; and "coherence" is taken in the literal sense as a property
of "hanging together"--a set of propositions is coherent if the propositions are not truth-functionally independent.
The present approach, by contrast, is an "external" approach which
focuses on a property of formal logical systems.

It makes no reference

to propositions being, or not being, independent, and it takes "coherence"
more in the sense of signifying "meaningfulness."

The essential ingre-

dient is retained, however, inasmuch as coherent systems as defined
herein also allow for meaningful inferences from inconsistent premises.
The above definition is in fact more closely aligned with Rescher's
most recent thinking on this problem (Rescher 1980).

What is here

termed "inconsistency" for a formal logic is there termed "strong
inconsistency," and what is here termed "incoherence" is there termed
"logical chaos."
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§2.1.5.3.

Extensions

An extension of a formal system F may be obtained by performing
one or more of the following operations:
1.

Adjoin some

~

symbols--i.e., symbols not already in L(F)--to L(F),

which generates some new well-formed strings,
2.

Adjoin some additional axioms to the set of axioms of F, thereby
generating some new theorems,

3.

Adjoin some additional inference rules to the set of inference rules
of F, which also generates new theorems.

In case of operation 1, it is always tacit that the domains of the
inference rules of F--considered as mappings--are extended to the new
language.

If S is a set of symbols, A is a set of axioms, and R is a

set of inference rules, then the system obtained by adjoining these
items to F may be denoted by F[S,A,R].
A simple extension of F is an extension that is obtained by performing operations only of the above type 2.

An extension Fi( of F is an

inessential extension of F if, for every well-formed string s of L(F)
F*rs implies that Frs--i.e.,

~k

is such that no strings of L(F) can be

derived as theorems of F* unless they are already derivable in F.

Such

extensions are generally nontrivial, however, since L(F*) may contain
strings provable only in F*.
§2.1.5.4.

Aristotelean And Classical Systems

It will be said that a well-formed string s follows from a string
.s' in F if F[s']rs.

A system F will be termed Aristotelean if, in F,

every well-formed string of L(F) follows from any inconsistency; otherwise F will be termed non-Aristotelean.

It follows that:
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1.

A system is Aristotelean if and only if all its coherent simple
extensions are consistent,

2.

A system is non-Aristotelean if and only if it has at least one
simple extension which is inconsistent yet coherent.
Regarding this usage of terminology, it should be noted that we

here deviate from an established convention.

Traditionally, "Aristotelean"

has been taken to mean "includes the law of the Excluded Middle (which
in standard languages is expressed by the formula PV,P) , and "nonAristotelean" has traditionally meant "without Excluded Middle."

This

distinction does not correspond to the above since, first, it is possible
to weaken the propositional calculus to a system which still contains
Excluded Middle but in which inconsistency does not imply

incoherenc~,

and second, there are formal systems not containing Excluded Middle yet
in which inconsistency does imply incoherence.

A notable example of the

latter is Kleene's axiomatization of the logic of intuitionism
(cf. Mendelson 1964, p. 43, Exercise 2(e), parts (i) and (v)).
It may be argued, however, that the present usage is equally
acceptable, in fact is possibly more appropriate, since it captures the
general spirit of Aristotle's thinking without becoming involved with
the details of a system's formal structure.

The sense of Aristotelean

logic was that contradiction (inconsistency) should be forbidden, and
this for the evident reason that he viewed contradiction as being tantamount to il?'.:oherence.

Readers familiar with the work of E. Post (1921)

may note that the present conception of "Aristotelean" bears a resemblance
to what is now called "post-complete" and might equally have been termed
"post-contradiction-complete."

40

Last, we should consider also how the above distinction relates to
the somewhat less precise distinction between "classical" and "nonclassical"
systems.

In this dissertation is employed the traditional meaning of

classical as referring to those systems which embody both the linguistic
structure and the full proof-theoretical strength of the classical
propositional calculus, together with its immediate derivates, such as
the first-order and second-order systems.

Given this terminology, we

have immediately that classical implies Aristotelean; but not conversely.
In §8.4 it is shown, for example, that Spencer-Brown's primary algebra,
although clearly nonclassical, is Aristotelean.

Also, the linguistic

theories of Chapters 3 through 6 are nonclassical in their use of a
"two-leveled" linguistics, but are Aristotelean since they are classical
at the "outer" level.

Examples of nonclassical non-Aristotelean systems

appearing in this dissertation are Varela's calculus and its isomorphisms
(Chapters 8 and 9).
§2.1.6.

Semantic Models And Semantic Completeness

A semantics I for a formal language L may be denoted I(L); in case
L is the language of a formal system F, then I may alternatively be
denoted by I(F).
tics for L(F).

Let F be a formal logical system and let I be a semanAn interpretation I in I(F) is a model of F if every

theorem of F is valid in I.
notation IFF.

This property may be expressed by the

A well-formed string s of L(F) is valid in I(F) if s is

valid in every model of F in I(F), in which case one may write I(F)FS.
Proposition 2.1.6-1.

For any formal logical system F and any

well-formed string s of L(F),
Proof.

F~s

only if I(F)FS.

This is immediate by the foregoing definitions.

0
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A formal logical system F is complete with respect to a semantics
L(F) if validity in

~(F)

implies formal derivability in F--i.e., if the

converse of Proposition 2.1.6-1 holds.

This concept of semantic complete-

ness captures one part of what is meant by saying that a formal system
characterizes a certain semantics.

To wit, in combination with

Proposition 2.1.6-1, it asserts that a well-formed string is derivable
in F if and only if it is valid in every "valid interpretation"--Le.,
model--of F.

Usually it is only the models in a semantics that are

mathematically interesting.

A further aspect of formal characterization is that the language
of F must be rich enough to express the essential properties of the
given semantics.

Satisfaction of this requirement is usually

determ~ned

by an intuitive judgment, based on one's knowledge of the structures
which are to be taken as interpretations.

A discussion of these and

related ideas also appears in §10.4.1, and an example appears in §3.4.2.
§2.1.7.

Classes of Formal Systems

When defining a formal system F one usually implicitly specifies a
generic type of system, representing a class

e

of systems, all of which

have certain linguistic-axiomatic properties in common.

Accordingly,

when defining a semantics L for L(F), one winds up defining a semantics
for every formal system in e, in which case, a proof of semantic
completeness for F serves as a completeness proof for every system in
This justifies saying that the entire class

e

is complete with respect

to the semanticsi, where ~ is the class of all semantics for systems
in

e.

e.
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§2.1.8.

Common Abbreviations

The notation "iff" is used as an abbreviation for the phrase "if
and only if."

Membership of an element a in a set A may be indicated by

aeA.
§2.2.

Fuzzy Sets And Logics
Since this work is focused on the specific task of ax iomati zing

the logic inherent in Zadeh's fuzzy linguistics, it necessarily leaves
out a major portion of what is nowdays a very rich body of mathematical
knowledge.

The following treatment, moreover, is intentionally brief,

and might profitably be supplemented with a reading of Zadeh (1975b) and
Gaines (1976).

Only those ideas specifically needed for Chapter 3 and 4

are provided in detail.

Other topics, such as the full fuzzy logic,

linguistic truth, and fuzzy inference, are taken up again in the appropriate sections of Chapter 5.
§2.2.1.

Fuzzy Sets

A fuzzy set is a collection of objects which has unsharp boundaries
(Zadeh 1972).

This idea is defined mathematically as a generalization

of the classical idea of a subset of a given universe U.
universe of discourse--i.e., any set.

Then a classical subset S of U

may be represented by a membership function
~S(x)=l,

if xeS; and

~S(x)=O,

if xiS.

Let U be a

~S:U~{O,l}

defined by:

By contrast, a fuzzy subset S of

U is defined as the analagous object which is represented by a function
~S:U~[O,l],

the value
in S.

where [0,1] denotes the closed unit interval.

~S(x)

In this case

is referred to as the degree or grade of membership of x

43

As an example, assume that S is a fuzzy set of "red" objects (considered as a fuzzy subset of a universe consisting of all objects).
Then a ripe red apple might be assigned the value 0.9, indicating a high
degree of membership in S, while a ripe orange might have the value 0.4,
indicating a moderate degree of membership in S.
Another example, appearing frequently in Zadeh's papers, is a pair
of explicitly defined membership functions fOl- the collections of "young"
and "old" ages of people.

Here let U be the set of ages from 0 to 100.

Then a fuzzy set Y of "young" ages may be defined by
if x ~ 25
if x > 25,

lJy(x)
and a fuzzy set 0 of "old" ages may be defined by

if x ~ 50
if x > 50.
These functions can be represented graphically as in Figure 2-2.

Note

that specification of the intended universe of discourse is always
necessary for establishing the context in which such interpretative
membership functions are to be defined.

For example, the above defini-

tions of lJ y and IJ O would not be appropriate in the context of ages of
automobiles or of galaxies. In considering a fuzzy set S as the meaning
of a natural language expression a, the grade of membership of an object
in S is referred to as that object's degree of compatibility with a.
A crossover point in a fuzzy subset S of a universe U is an object
x in U for which IJ S(x)=0.5. The support of fuzzy subset S of U is the
set of members x of U for which IJS(x) is positive. A fuzzy singleton is
a fuzzy subset whose support consists of exactly one element in U.
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Crossover Points
Figure 2-2.

compatibility functions for "Young" and "Old."
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Evidently, a fuzzy subset S of U may be represented as a collection
of ordered pairs

(~,x)

is an object in U.
each i=l, •.• ,n,

~.

1

where

is a number in the interval [0,1] and x

~

If S has finite support, say x ., ..• ,x , and for
n
1
is the grade of membership of x. in S, then S may be
1

represented symbolically as a combination of fuzzy singletons by
S =

~lx1

+ ~2x2 + ... + ~nxn'

or more compactly, by

S

n

=I

i=l

~.x

1

..

1

A similar notation might be used in case the support is countably
infinite.

If the support is a continuum, then S may be denoted by
S

Thus the signs "+",

=I

U

~.x ..
1

1

"I" and "I" are here used only as convenient nota-

tional devices and are not taken in their usual mathematical meanings.
Sometimes it is useful to write the ordered pair
separating slash mark, i.e. , as

~./x ..
1

1

~.x.
1 1

with a

For example, where U is the set

of ages from 0 to 100, a fuzzy set M of "middle" ages might be given
explicitly by
M

= 0.3/40
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+ 0.5/41 + 0.8/42 + 0.9/43 + I
l/x.1
x.=44
1

+ 0.9/49 + 0.8/50 + 0.7/51 + 0.6/52 + 0.5/53
+ 0.4/54 + 0.3/55.

§2.2.2.

Fuzzy Relations

Let a1, ..• ,an be variables ranging over universes of discourse
U1 ,···,Un , respectively. A fuzzy relation R of a , ... ,an (or on U1, ... ,Un )
1
is a fuzzy subset of the cartesian product U xU x ••• xU . Then R is
1 2
n

46
represented by an n-ary membership function

~R:U1x ••• xUn~[O,1]

and may

be expressed by the notation
R= f

~R(x1,···,xn)/(x1,···,xn)·

U x ..• xU
n
1
To illustrate (from Zadeh, 1972): if U1={TOM,DICK} and U2={JOHN,JIM},
then a fuzzy relation R of "resemblance" between members of U1 and U2
may be defined by
R = O.8/(TOM,JOHN) + O.6/(TOM,JIM)
+ O.2/(DICK,JOHN) + O.9/(DICK,JIM).

Let R be a fuzzy relation on a pair of universes U1 ,U , and let S
2
be a fuzzy relation on U and a third universe U . Then the composition
2
3
of Rand S, denoted by RaS, is a fuzzy relation on U1 ,U defined by
3
RaS = f

sup(min[~R(x1,x2)'~S(x2,x3)])/(x1,x3)'

U xU x
.
1 3 2
where sup refers to the maximum over all possible values of the indicated
variable.
Continuing the foregoing example, suppose that S is a "resemblance"
relation between members of U and U ={PETE,MlKE}, given by
2
3
S = O.6/(JOHN,PETE) + O.9/(JOHN,MlKE)
+ O.5/(JIM,PETE) + O.4/(JIM,MlKE).

Then the composition RaS is
RaS = O.6/(TOM,PETE) + O.8/(TOM,MlKE)
+ O.5/(DICK,PETE) + O.4/(DICK,MlKE),

which may be taken as a "resemblance" relation between the members of U1
and U .
3
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§2.2.3.

Fuzzy Boolean Operations And Related Definitions

In fuzzy set theory the definitions of fuzzy complement, union,
intersection, and of fuzzy set equality, inclusion, and cartesian product
are simple generalizations of the classical definitions.
Let A and B be fuzzy subsets of a universe U, with membership
functions

~A

and

follows.

The fuzzy complement of A, denoted by -A, is defined by

~B.

The three Boolean operations are generalized as

for all xeU,
the fuzzy union of A and B, denoted by AUB, is defined by
for all xeU,
and the fuzzy intersection of A and B, denoted by AnB, is defined by
for all xeU.
The fuzzy sets A and Bare equal, notation A=B, if
for all xeU,
and the fuzzy set A is included in the fuzzy set B, notation AeB, if
for all xeU.
Now suppose that B is a fuzzy subset of some possibly different
universe of discourse U'.

The cartesian product of A and B, notation

AXB, is the fuzzy relation on UXU' defined by
for all (x,x')eUxU'.
All of the foregoing reduce to the classical case if

~A

and

~B

are

restricted to the set {O,!}.
In fuzzy linguistics (cf. §2.2.5), these mathematical ideas are
used in various ways to provide meanings for natural language expressions.
In particular, the fuzzy Boolean operations -, V, and n provide fuzzy
interpretatio~s

of the Boolean connectives "not" (negation), "or" (dis-

junction), and "and" (conjunction).

Example: If the fuzzy sets Y and 0

48
defined in §2.2.1 are taken as the meanings of the expressions "young"
and "old," then the meaning of the expression "not young and not old"
would be defined as (-Y)n(-O).
§2.2.4.

Linguistic Hedges

Linguistic hedges are modifiers, usually adjectives, such as
"very," "quite," "approximately," "more or less," "somewhat," and so on.
The strength of the theory of fuzzy sets as a basis for linguistic
reasoning stems from the capacity for linguistic hedges to be represented
as well-defined operations on fuzzy-set membership functions." A typical
example is the interpretation of the "very" hedge in terms of the squaring function on [0,1].

Let A be a fuzzy subset of a universe U, and

suppose that A is being used as the meaning of some linguistic expression

a.

Then the meaning of the expression "very a" may be given as the

fuzzy subset very-A of U defined by
~very-A(x)

= [~A(x)] 2

for all xeU.

The effect of applying the "very" operator to the foregoing meanings Y
and 0 of "young" and "old" is depicted graphically in Figure 2-3.

This

particular operator is an intuitively natural interpretation of "very,"
since, in order for an object in U to have a high degree of membership
in very-Y (very-O) it must have an even higher grade of membership in Y
(in 0).
The most extensive treatment of hedges to date is Zadeh (1972),
which defines a collection of general operations--"concentration," "dilation," "fuzzification," etc.--which may be used to provide interpretations of a wide variety of linguistic expressions.

Such interpretations

are always arbitrary, except that they should reasonably conform to
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ordinary usage of the expression being interpreted.

A detailed analysis

of specific hedges is foregone in this dissertation, since the axiomatization developed herein is aimed only at capturing the general role of
hedges in linguistic reasoning and does not attempt to provide hedges
with explicit formal definitions.
§2.2.5.

Linguistic Variables

A linguistic variable is a variable whose values are expressions
in a natural or artificial language.

For example "Age" becomes a linguis-

tic variable if we take its values to be expressions like "young," "not
young," "very young," "old," "not very young and not very old," and so
on.

Such expressions will be referred to as linguistic terms.

If X is

a linguistic variable, its linguistic terms comprise a term set T(X)"
which can be generated from a smaller set of atomic terms, or terminals,
by means of a context free grammar G.

The subject of grammars is taken

up in §2.2.6.
The foregoing sections give several examples of how a linguistic
term can be given a meaning, or interpretation, as a fuzzy subset of a
universe U.

If a is a tcDffi in T(X), then its meaning will be denoted by

I Ca), where I is refE!rred to as an interpretation function, or a meaning
assignment function, for the linguistic variable X.

It follows that a

linguistic variable may be characterized as a quintuple CX,TCX),U,G,I).
The basic components of a linguistic variable are illustrated graphically
in Figure 2-4.
It is implicit in this definition that a linguistic variable may
take n-ary linglltstic terms, i.e., linguistic terms whose meanings are
n-ary fuzzy relations, as its values.

In case the variables of such
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relations range over the same universe U, then one considers only relations on U, while in the more general case that they range over different
universes, then U would be taken as the Cartesian product of those
universes.

Further, in a specific application, one usually considers

several linguistic variables simultaneously over the same universe U.
For example, a description of "young, tall, and agile men" would entail
the three linguistic variables "Age," "Height," and "Physical Fitness"
over the same universe of human males.

On the other hand, it is some-

times necessary to consider different linguistic variables
over totally distinct universes.

si~ultaneously

A situation in which this is done is

where one formally includes a notion of linguistic "Truth" (cf. §2.2.9).
Zadeh (1978a) provides the following.
~

Two linguistic terms a and

of some linguistic variable X are semantically equivalent if the

meaning assignment function I is such that I (a)=I on, where "=" is
equality of fuzzy sets as defined in §2.2.3.
entails the term

~

if

I(a)~I(~),

where

"~,,

The term a semantically

is the fuzzy set inclusion

relation defined in §2.2.3.
Semantic equivalence characterizes the situation of two linguistic
terms representing the same semantic meaning.

For example, in the

foregoing, it turns out that "young" is not semantically equivalent to
"not old," and "old" is not semantically equivalent to "not young,"
i.e., they are not semantic antonyms.

On the other hand, they could

become antonyms simply by redefining the compatability functions for
"young" and "old," perhaps along the scheme of "true" and "false" given
in §5.3.1.

Semantic entailment characterizes one of the many possible

forms of "fuzzy inference" (cf. §2.2.9).

For example, it also follows

from the foregoing that "very young" semantically entails "young."
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§2.2.6.

Grammars

The use of a grammar for generating a term set for a linguistic
variable ensures that the semantic meanings of composite terms are
explicitly definable in terms of the meanings of the smaller set of
atomic terms.

Further, the grammar approach is useful for excluding

nonsense terms like "very and not young."

As an example (cf. Zadeh,

1975b, Part II, p. 326) a term set T(X) for the linguistic variable
x=Age may be generated by a grammar G=(VT,VN,T,P), where (i) VT is the
set of atomic terms (or terminals) consisting of "young," "ol~," "not,"
"or," "and," "very," and some parentheses ( and ), (ii) V is a ·set of
N
nonterminals consisting of the letters T, A, B, C, D, and E, in which
case the letter T is a symbolic representative of the term set T(X),. and
(iii) P is a production system given by
T

-+

A,

C -+ D,

T

-+

T or A,

C -+ E,

A -+ B,

D

-+

very D,

A -+ A and B,

E

-+

very E,

B -+ C,

D

-+

young,

E

-+

old,

B

-+

not C,

C -+ (T) .

A linguistic term in T(X) is produced in G by any sequence of productions
in P which starts with the nonterminal T and ends in an expression
containing only terminals.

For example, a production of the composite

term "not very young and not very old" is
T

-+

A -+ A and B

and B

-+

-+

Band B -+ not C and B

not very young and B

-+

-+

not D and B -+ not very D

not very young and not C -+ not very
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young and not E

~

not very young and not very E

~

not very young

and not very old.
A discussion of the use of grammars, together with the use of a
"parsing tree" for analyzing complex expressions, is provided in the
above reference, pp. 326-331.

Note that a meaning for the term "not

very young and not very old" may be defined explicitly in terms of the
foregoing meanings of the atomic terms as the fuzzy set M given by
~M(x)

=min[~_(very_y)(x)'~_(very_O)(x)]
=min[l-~very- y(x),l-~very-O(x)]
=min[1-[~y(x)]2,1-[~o(x)]2].

§2.2.7.

Linguistic Approximation

Suppose that the above grammar for the linguistic variable "Age" is
extended to contain the term "middle aged" among its terminals, and
suppose that one of the production rules is
not very young and not very old

~

middle aged.

Then the fuzzy set M defined in §2.2.1 would serve as a definition of
I(middle aged), in which case the above production rule becomes an
expression of semantic equivalence.
But now consider the term "not young and not old."

The meaning of

this term will be close ·to the meaning of "middle aged," although not
exactly mathematically identical.

Yet in an application of fuzzy linguis-

tics to a discussion of human ages, it would likely cause

no difficulty

to just assume that the more complex composite term and the simpler
atomic term are interchangeable.
This illustrates a problem which has received considerable attention in the literature: that of developing en algorithm for determining
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when the meanings of two linguistic terms are sufficiently similar to
regard those terms as pragmatically identical.

This amounts to creating

an algorithmic measure of "linguistic approximation" in terms of membership functions of fuzzy sets.

Yager (1979) now appears to have resolved

this problem in a simple and intuitively satisfying approach based on
Zadeh's concept of a "level-set."
No attempt has been made in this dissertation to axiomatize the
concept of linguistic approximation.

Rather, composite terms are dealt

with only as they are generated by a given grammar.

Yet it is a reason-

able conjecture that the results of this work can be extended to include
a concept of linguistic approximation.

This would involve "fuzzifying"

the "'outer linguistic level" (cf. Chapter 3), and might lead to a

sy~tem

with three linguistic levels rather than two.
§2.2.8.

Multivalent Fuzzy Logic

Transition from the concept of a linguistic variable to a specific
multivalent logic is accomplished by interpreting degrees of compatability
as truth values.

Example: if "young" is given as its meaning I(young)

the foregoing fuzzy set Y, then the linguistic assertion "young(x)" is
taken as expressing that "x is young" and is given as its truth value
the degree of compatability lJy(x).

Thus, the assertion "x is young" is

"true" to the degree that x is a member of the fuzzy set y.
This concept of "truth" is what forms the basis for the axiomatization of a theory of approximate reasoning as a multivalent logic in
Chapter 3.

Such systems of reasoning are to be distinguished from those

for which Zadeh formally reserves the term fuzzy logic, however, which
are characterized by having the truth values be fuzzy subsets of [0,1].
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The concept of "fuzzy truth" is taken up in §2.2.9 and §2.2.10, and the
manner in which the formalism of Chapter 3 may be modified to accommodate
fuzzy logic per se is discussed in Chapter 5.
In the multivalent context, the foregoing fuzzy interpretations of
the Boolean connectives "not," "or," and "and" can be adapted to serve
as connectives between linguistic assertions.

For example, if "p(x,y)"

denotes the assertion "young(x) and old(y)", and if I(young)=Y and
I(old)=O, then the truth values of p(x,y) are given as grades of membership of ordered pairs (x,y) in the fuzzy relation I(p) defined by
~I(p)(x,y) = min[~y(x),~O(Y)]'

and if the connective was "or" rather than "and," one would use "max" in
place of "min."
Next arises the question of logical inference--i.e., a fuzzy
interpretation of the logical "implies."

While the foregoing interpreta-

tions of the Boolean connectives are nowdays well-established (cf. Bellman
and Giertz 1973) there is no widespread agreement on an appropriate form
of fuzzy-logical implication.

A general analysis of fuzzy inference and

a list of several versions appears in Gaines (1976), and Zadeh's papers
provide several other versions, including the idea of semantic entailment
mentioned in §2.2.5.
A study of this topic is undertaken in this dissertation in §5.5.
It may be noted in Chapter 3 that no specific form of fuzzy inference is
incorporated into the class of formal linguistic theories defined therein.
This leaves open the option of adjoining one of several different forms,
as a given situation may demand.
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§2.2.9.

Types Of Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Logic, And Linguistic Truth

A fuzzy set of

~ ~

is characterized by a membership function

whose values are fuzzy subsets of [0,1], rather than points in [0,1].
By contrast, fuzzy sets of the kind described in §2.1.1 are referred to
as fuzzy sets of

~

1.

The concept of a type 2 fuzzy set has been

developed into a fuzzy logic which uses fuzzy subsets of [0,1] as truth
values (Bellman and Zadeh 1977) through an application of Zadeh's
"fuzzification operator" to the connectives in the Lukasiewicz infinitary
logic

L~.

In other works, particularly Zadeh (1975b), this form of

"truth" has also been studied as a special kind of linguistic variable.
The overall aim is to provide intuitively plausible interpretations for
linguistic assertions like
"x is very young is not very true",
where the meaning of "true" is itself imprecise.
The word "Truth" becomes a linguistic variable by taking its. term
set to include expressions like "true," "not true," "very true," "false,"
"not very true and not very false," and so on, and by taking the universe
of discourse to be the unit interval.

In using these terms, however, it

soon becomes evident that the foregoing interpretations of the Boolean
connectives do not yield the ordinary intuitions about the meanings of
composite linguistic truth values.

For example, except for trivial

interpretations of the terms "true" and "false," one does not have that
the composite term "true and false" is even approximately equivalent to
the term "false," which ordinary reasoning would require.
Because of this Zadeh has developed an alternative set of connectives, specifically for use with linguistic truth.

The characteristics
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of these connectives, and the manner in which they can be represented in
a semantically complete formal logical system, is taken up in §5.3.
§2.2.10.

Linguistic Possibility

Recent work by Zadeh has been concerned with reinterpreting the
theory of fuzzy linguistics as a theory of "linguistic possibility"
(eg. Zadeh 1978a and 1978b) which is an outgrowth of earlier work under
the heading of "linguistic probability" (as in Zadeh 1975b, Part III).
Here it is worth noting that the revised terminology is clearly more
appropriate, since probabilistic logic--which uses joint probability as
its interpretation of the logical "and"--is substantially different from
the logic of fuzzy sets.
point is Zadeh (1980).

A recent paper specifically addressing this
The sense in which the term "possibility" applies

may be described as follows.

Suppose that the linguistic term "small

integer" is assigned as its meaning the following fuzzy subset of the
nonnegative integers:
SI = 1/0 + 1/1 + 0.8/2 + 0.6/3 + 0.4/4 + 0.2/5,
and consider the linguistic assertion "x is a small integer."

In the

absence of any further information about x, this assertion may be interpreted as an expression of possibility that x is an integer in the
interval from 0 to 5.

Further, given the above meaning SI of "small

integer," it makes sense to say that the possibility that x has a particular value v in [0,5] is computed as the degree of compatability of v
with the term "small integer."

Thus, given the above assertion and

meaning assignment, the possibility that x=3, for example, would be 0.6.
In this manner, the fuzzy set SI becomes reinterpreted as a possibility
distribution for the variable x.
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Zadeh has used this interpretation as the guiding intuition for
developing a set of translation rules for transforming natural language
expressions into an algorithmic language.

Thus the theory of fuzzy sets

is brought one step closer to machine intelligence applications in
natural language processing and in question answering systems.
The manner in which some of these ideas are formalizable in the
axiom systems of this dissertation is taken up in §5.4.

In general,

most of the ideas used in possibilistic reasoning are coextensive with
concepts in the theory of fuzzy linguistics and linguistic truth.
§2.9.11.

Fuzzy-Logical Quantifiers

The standard logical quantifiers, "for all" and "there exists,"
also have generalizations for use in the context of fuzzy sets.

As

well, fuzzy linguistics offers the opportunity to express the implicitly
fuzzy quantifiers of natural discourse, like "most," "many," "few,"
"some," "not very many," "almost all," etc.

The semantics of fuzzy

quantifiers has been developed in several of Zadeh's papers, and it
plays an important role in the use of linguistic possibility for natural
language translation.
Fuzzy quantification theory is not considered in this dissertation
because its introduction into the axiomatization problem would substantially increase the difficulty of establishing semantic completeness.
Now that the completeness results of Chapter 4 have been developed,
however, it appears that extension to an axiomatization of fuzzy quantification is certainly feasible, and would constitute a natural topic for
follow-on research.

CHAPTER 3
LINGUISTIC THEORIES
This chapter defines a class of formal systems wherein each system
is a formal theory of some collection of linguistic variables over a
single universe of discourse.

The first step toward this definition is

to develop a rigorously defined formal linguistics which

capt~res

the

idea of a collection of linguistic terms as being generated by one or
more grammars, together with the idea of semantic equivalence between
linguistic terms.

Formalization of semantic equivalence leads naturally

to a further introduction of negations, disjunctions, etc. of propositions that express such equivalence relations.

Thus we arrive at a

linguistics having two distinct "levels" as discussed in §1.1 and §2.2.8.
Explicit definition of the formal languages which comprise this linguistics is given in §3.1.
In §3.2 we complete the formalization of the concept of a linguistic variable by providing an explicitly defined semantics for the given
class of formal languages.

This captures the manner in which fuzzy

subsets of a universe of discourse serve as the meanings of linguistic
terms, as well as the manner in which a truth value in [0,1) for a
linguistic assertion is computed from the meanings of the linguistic
terms which occur in that assertion.

Further, this semantics incorpor-

ates the interpretation of semantic equivalence as expressing equality
between fuzzy sets.

Thus we arrive at the required interpretation of

the inner linguistic level as being multivalent and of the outer linguistic
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level as being bivalent: multivalency comes from having the membership
functions of fuzzy sets range over [0,1], while bivalency stems from the
fact that two linguistic terms either are, or are not, semantically
equivalent (cf. §2.2.8).

Even though the definition of the semantics in

§3.2 logically follows the definition of the linguistics in §3.1, it was
the desire to formalize the ideas embodied in the semantics which served
as the intuitive guide for developing the linguistics into its given
form.

The two in tandem formalize the full idea of a linguistic variable

as defined in §2.2.5.
The axioms and inference rules for a class of formal systems are
described in §3.3.

The intuitive guide in this case is the desire to

develop enough proof-theoretic strength to ensure semantic
which is ultimately established in Chapter 4.

completen~ss,

The axioms for the outer

level are adaptations of the axioms for the classical propositional
calculus, while the axioms for the inner level are based on a standard
definition of a de Morgan lattice (cf. §4.3).
The formal systems themselves are defined in §3.4, as a class of
linguistic theories, or simply theories.

(This usage of the word "theory"

is retained throughout the remainder of Part I, and should not be confused
with its more common denotation of a "first-order theory.")

The idea of

a semantic model of a theory is also discussed in §3.4, and a few elementary
results are established--such as consistency of the "minimal theory"-leading up to the work on the completeness theorems in Chapter 4.
§3.1.

Languages
The development in this section follows the pattern described in

§2.1.1.

As will be seen, "individual variables" are thought to range
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over some (unspecified) universe of discourse, "individual constants"
represent arbitrary (fixed) members of that universe, and "fuzzy relation
symbols" correspond to atomic linguistic terms--eg., a binary relation
symbol would be used to express the "similar to" relation of §2.2.2, and
a unary relation symbol would be used to represent the term "young" of
§2.2.1.
Further, the idea of a linguistic term here becomes embodied in
the formal definition of a "linguistic assertion."
informal theory of fuzzy linguistics, a composite

Note that in the
linguistic~ssertion

of the form "a(x) and f3(x)" may be written alternatively as "(a and
(3)(x)"--Le., using a composite linguistiC term--but that an assertion
of the form "a(x) and f3(y)" cannot be so replaced.

Thus the idea of. a

linguistic assertion leads to a somewhat more complex collection of
expressions than the collection of linguistic terms discussed in §2.2.8,
but it includes the original idea of a linguistic term in a proper·
subcollection.
Last, the linguistic variable per se does not receive an explicit
representation in these languages; but a given linguistic variable is
nonetheless implicitly formalized through a rigorous representation of
that variable's collection of linguistic terms.

The manner in which

further ideas from the informal theory become similarly represented will
be illustrated in some examples.
§3.1.1.

Symbols

The following collections of symbols are assumed to be mutually
disjoint subcollections of the uncountably infinite collection of symbols
which was given in §2.1.1.
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1.

Individual variables: a countably infinite set of symbols, denoted
metalinguistically by x,y,z, etc.

2.

Individual constants: an uncountably infinite set of symbols, denoted
metalinguistically by a,b,c, etc ..

This set is assumed to include

as a proper subset an uncountably infinite set of individual names,
which may receive the alternate denotations

i,1,

etc.

(Individual

names are individual constants that are used to "name" the specific
individuals in the universe of a given semantic interpretation,
cf. §3. 2 . 1. )
3.

Equality symbol: one symbol, denoted metalinguistically by =.

4.

Fuzzy relation symbols:

for each

n~O

an uncountably infinite set of

n-ary relation symbols, denoted metalinguistically by Ci,f3,Y, etc ..
The O-ary relation symbols are assumed to include a special symbol,
K , for each number re[O,l].
r

(In most cases, Kr "names" the unique

fuzzy subset S of any universe U whose membership function has
~S(x)=r

5.

for all xeU, cf. §3.2.1.)

Multivalent (or fuzzy) connectives: three symbols denoted metalinguistically by

~

(not; negation), v (or; disjunction), and A (and;

conjunction).
6.

Hedge (or special operator) symbols: for each

n~l,

an uncountably

infinite set of symbols, denoted metalinguistically by

~,

~,

etc ..

7.

Equivalence symbol: one symbol, denoted metalinguistically

8.

Punctuation marks: three symbols, denoted metalinguistically by ,

by~.

(comma), and ( and) (parentheses).
9.

Bivalent (or classical) connectives: two symbols, denoted metalinguistically by , (not; negation) and V (or; disjunction).
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Individual variables and individual constants (hence also individual names) are collectively called individual terms and will have the
common notations t, t', etc.
The logical symbols are the individual variables, the equality
symbol, the multivalent connectives, the equivalence symbol, the punctuation marks, and the bivalent connectives.
languages as defined in this section.

These will be common to all

The other symbols are proper

symbols, any of which might or might not be used in a specific language
(cf. §3.1.3).
§3.1.2.

Expressions

The linguistic assertions have the general denotations p,q,r, etc.
and are defined to consist of:
1.

Atomic linguistic assertions: expressions of the form a(t1, ... ,t ),
n
where a is an n-ary fuzzy relation symbol and t1, ... ,t are individual
n
terms (hence including expr~ssions of the form a where a is O-ary),

2.

Composite linguistic assertions: all expressions which can be generated from the atomic linguistic assertions by means of a contextfree grammar (§2.2.6), subject only to the requirement that every
such assertion has one of the following four forms:

~p,

(pvq),

(pAq), and ~(P1'···'Pn)' where P,q,Pl'···'Pn are linguistic
assertions and

~

is a hedge symbol.

The formulas have the general denotation, P,Q,R, etc. and are
defined to consist of:
1.

Atomic formulas: all equations of the form (t=t'), where t and t'
are individual terms, and all equivalences of the form
p and q are linguistic assertions,

(p~q),

where

65
2.

Composite formulas: all expressions of the forms ,p and (PVQ) where
P and Q are formulas.
Some abbreviations to be used are:
P&Q for
P~Q

(bivalent conjunction)

~('PV'Q)

for ,PVQ

P=Q for

(bivalent implication)
(bivalent logical equivalence)

(~Q)&(Q~P)

Parentheses are left unwritten when not needed for readability--e.g.,
(PVQ) may be shortened to FVQ.
tions of &

and~,

others, so that

Note also that, as in the above defini-

the connective' has a lower priority than

~PVQ

~ny

of the

means the same as (,P)VQ, rather than ,(PVQ).

In

chains of implications we may assume association to the right, so that
means the same as (PI~···~(P l~P ) ... ).
n
nn
apply for composite linguistic assertions.

Pl~···~P

Similar remarks

An expression is closed if it contains no occurrences of individual
variables; otherwise it is open.
where e,eI, ... ,e

n

The notation e(e1, ... ,en/xI, ... ,xn ),

are expressions, denotes the uniform substitution as

defined in §2.1.1.

Sometimes the items following the "/" are omitted,

in which case e(e1, ... ,e ) indicates that e1, ... ,e occur in e.
n
n
§3.1.3.

Definitions

A language L is comprised of:
1.

Symbols: the logical symbols, together with an empty or nonempty set
of each kind of proper symbol,

2.

Grammars: zero, one, or more context-free grammars which meet the
requirement mentioned in §3.1.2,

3.

Assertions: all atomic linguistic assertions which can be made from
symbols of L, together with all composite assertions that can then
be generated by the grammars of L,
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4.

Formulas: all atomic and composite formulas that can be made up of
linguistic assertions of L.
The minimal language will be the (unique) language that contains

no proper symbols and no grammars.

Thus the minimal language contains

no linguistic assertions, but it does contain formulas--e.g., there
would be a formula of the form ,(x=y).

A specific language of one or

more linguistic variables is obtained from the minimal language by
adjoining an appropriate set of proper symbols, together with one or
more grammars.

Typically, one grammar will suffice, but there is no

technical difficulty with having several.
It shall be required of every language that the cardinality of its
set of symbols be not greater than Xl' the first uncountable cardinal
number.

This assumption is needed in Chapter 4.

§3.1.4 Example
To formalize the linguistic variable "Age" discussed in §2.2 in a
formal language LA ge ,let the linguistic terms "young" and "old" be
represented by the unary fuzzy relation symbols a and ~, and let the
hedge "very" be represented by the unary hedge symbol cp.

Then the

assertion "x is very young" is represented by the formal linguistic
assertion cp(a(x)).

Composite linguistic assertions may be generated by

essentially the same grammar as given in §2.2.6:

(i) let the terminals

be the atomic linguistic assertions of L, the multivalent connectives
~,

v, and

A,

the hedge symbol cp, and the parentheses ( and ), (ii) let

the nonterminals be the letters T, A, B, C, D, and E (as before) together
with the letters! and !', (iii) rewrite the production system of §2.2.6
by everywhere replacing "young" and "old" with a(!) and

~(!'),

replacing
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"not", "or", and "and" with "', v, and /\, and replacing "very" with IjI,
and for each individual term t of L add the pair of production rules.
t

~

t and t'

t.

~

This leads to a language of the kind defined in §2.1.3.

As an example

of a formula in this language:

expresses the proposition (which might or might not be true) that "young"
is not semantically equivalent with the antonym of "old" if and only if
"old" is not semantically equivalent with the antonym of "young."
The special O-ary relation symbols K may be used to express such
r

assertions as "the individual a is .7 young" in an eqll:ivalence of the
form
a(a) ~

K.

r

This is based on the interpretations of the K defined formally below.
r

§3.2.

Semantic Interpretations
The semantics to be used in this chapter and the next shall consist

of all possible interpretations of the following kind for all languages
of the kind described in §3.1.

This section follows the pattern of

§2.1. 2.
§3.2.1.

Definition

An interpretation I for a language L has:
I.

A universe, U • For each individual in U , there is assumed to be a
I
I
unique individual name which serves as the name of that particular
individual.

-

The notation "i" then denotes the name of the individual

whose corresponding denotation is i.

The language that is obtained
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from L by adjoining all the names of the individuals in Ul is denoted
by L(I).

2.

Meaning assignments:
a.

To each individual constant a of L, assignment of an individual
l(a) in U

r

For each individual name i of L(I), it is always
""

understood that l(!)=i, i.e., that I assigns to each name the
unique individual of which it is the name.
b.

To each n-ary fuzzy relation symbol a of L, assignment of an
n-ary fuzzy relation I(a) in U . This is equivalent to specifyI
ing a membership function ~i(a):Uln~[O,l]. In particular, for each
special O-ary fuzzy relation symbol Kr (if indeed there are any
among the proper symbols of L), one might define I(K r ) by ~I{K )(i)=r
r··
for all individuals ieU ; this is to be regarded as a typical
I
assignment, however, and not mandatory for every interpretation I.

c.

To each n-ary hedge

s~abol ~

in L, assignment of an n-ary opera-

on fuzzy relations in UI such that, if L1, ... ,L n are
well-defined fuzzy relations in U , then I(~)(Ll, ... ,Ln) is a
I
well-defined fuzzy relation in U . This is equivalent to specil
tion

I(~)

fying a function
~l (tI.) (
~

3.

Fl(~)

L1,···,Ln

such that

) ( •••• )=F I ("') (~
~

Ll

(. .. ) , ... ,~

Ln

( ... ) ) .

Valuations: all mappings I: {closed linguistic assertions and formulas
of
a.

L(I)}~[O,I]

such that

b.

I(a(t1,···,tn )) = ~I(a)(I(tl)' ... ' l(tn ))
I(~p)
I-I(p)

c.

I(pvq) = max[I(p),I(q)]

d.

I(pAq) = min[I(p),I(q)]

=
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g.

I(p~q)

=

[:

if I(p) = I(q)
if not

h. I(,P) = l-I(P)
i. I(PVQ) = max[I(P),I(Q)].

An I-instance of an expression e of L(I) is a closed expression of

the form e(i!, ..• 'in/x!, •.. ,xn ) where i l , .. · ,in are individua~s in Ur
A formula P of L(I) is valid in I (Notation: IFP) if I(P')=! for every
I-instance P' of P.
Note that an interpretation I for a language L is uniquely

det~r-

mined by specifying a universe U and assigning a specific meaning in
I
that universe to each proper symbol of L.
§3.2.2.

Remark

Throughout Chapters 3 and 4 we consider only the case that the
relations being formalized in a particular language L are relations on
the same universe of discourse (c.f. §2.2.5).

The situation of multiple

universes is easily accommodated, however, as shown in Chapter 5.
§3.2.3.

Example

Continuing the example of §3.l.4, let U be the set of ages from 0
I
to 100; let

~I(a)

and

~I(~)

be any membership functions

~y

and

~O

such

that "young" and "old" are antonyms (cf. §2.2.5) and let 1(11)) be the
"very" operator of §2.2.3, defined by F (I1»(I(P))=(I(p))2
This specifies
I
one of the (infinitely many) possible semantic interpretations of LA ge .
In this particular interpretation,

~y

and

~O

will be related by

~y=l-~O'
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so that all formulas of the forms

a(t)~p(t)

and

p(t)~a(t)

are valid in

I--thus capturing the fact that in this case "young" is semantically
equivalent with "not old" and "old" is semantically equivalent with "not
young."

It follows by the definition of ":" that the formula

(P(x)~(x»

(a(x)~p(x»:

is valid in I.

If the symbols a and K.7 are adjoined to L, and I(K. 7) is defined
by

)(i)=.7, for all ieUI , then if a is such that
.7
we have that the formula a(a)~K.7 is valid in I.
~I(K

§3.2.4.

~y(I(a»=.7,

Remark

The assignments and valuations of an interpretation I for a language

L induce the assignment of a unique fuzzy relation in UI to each open
linguistic assertion of L, according to:
1.

For

m~O, ~I(

~I(a)'

a ( a1, ..• ,am,x1, ... ,xn )(i1, ... ,i)
n is a restriction of

considered as a function of jl'···,jm,jm+l'···,jm+n' to. the

variables jm+l, ... ,jm+n (and hence is a uniquely defined membership
function),

= l-~I(p)'

2.

~I(~p)

3.

~I(pvq) = max[~I(p)'~I(q)]

4.

~I(pAq) = min[~I(p)'~I(q)]'

5.

~I($(Pl'.··'Pn» = FI($)(~I(Pl)'···'~I(Pn»'

where it is understood that, for example, if

~I(p)

is a function of two

variables i 1 ,i 2 and if ~I(q) is a function of i 2 ,i 3 , then ~I(pvq) will
be a function of the three variables i ,i ,i .
1 2 3
This establishes that every open linguistic assertion may be
thought of as an n-ary linguistic term, for some number n.
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§3.3.

Axioms and Inference Rules
This section describes the basic proof-theoretic mechanism for the

linguistic theories to be defined in §3.4.
§3.3.1.

Logical Axioms And Logical Inference Rules

These shall consist of the following categories of formulas and
mappings of formulas, where "formula" here refers to the entire class as
defined in §3.1:
1.

Hilbert and Ackermann's (1928) axiomatization of the propositional
calculus: all formulas having the forms
a.

(PVP):)P

b.

P:»(PVQ)

c.

(PVQ)=(QVP)

d.

(P::»Q)~(

(RVPp(R'IQ))

together with modus ponens: from P and
2.

3.

P~Q

infer Q.

Axioms for equality of individuals: all formulas having the forms
a.

x=x

b.

xl=Yl~(x2=Y2~(xl=x2~Yl=Y2))

c.

xl=YlJ(···~(xn=Yn~a(xl, ... ,xn)~a(Yl' ... 'Yn)) ... ).

Axioms for equality of linguistic terms: all formulas having the
forms
a.

p~p

b.

Pl~ql~(P2~q2J(Pl~P2=ql~q2))

c.

p~q::l"'P~q

d.

Pl~ql~(P2~q2~(PlvP2~qlvq2))

e.

Pl~ql~(P2~q2~(PIAP2~ql~q2))

f.

Pl~ql~(···~(pn~~~$(Pl,

... 'Pn)~$(ql, ... ,qn)) ... ).
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4.

Substitution rule: from P infer P(t1, ... ,tn/x1, ... ,xn ).

5.

Axioms for a de Morgan lattice (Rasiowa 1974, p. 38): all equations
having the forms

6.

a.

pvq~qvp

pAq~q"p

(commutativity)

b.

pv(qvr)~(pvq)vr

pl\ (qAr )~(pAq)1\ r

(associativity)

c.

pV(qAp)~q

pJ\(pvq)~p

d.

pv(qAr)~(pvq)A(pvr)

pl\(qvr)~(pJ\q)v(pJ\r)

e.

"""P~p

f.

"'(pvq)~"'p""'q

(absorption)
(distributivity)
(involution)
(de Morgan's Laws)

Linear-ordering criterion: all formulas having the forms

The latter pair of axiom forms are so named because in the context
of any semantic interpretation they assert that the truth values in
[0,1] form a linearly ordered set.

These axioms playa crucial role in

the completeness proofs of Chapter 4.
§3.3.2.

Inference Rules In General

In §2.1 was mentioned the idea of an inference rule being "validity
preserving."

We may now provide this idea with a precise definition.

An

inference rule will be regular if every instance (H1, ... ,Hn,C) satisfies:
for every interpretation I of any language L which contains H1, ... ,Hn , and C,
if IFH. for all i=l, ... ,n, then IFC.
~

It is easily verified that modus ponens and the substitution rule
are regular.

An important use of the concept of regularity is established

in Proposition 3.4.2-3.
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§3.4.

Theories and Models
We are now in a position to define the desired class of formal

logical systems.
§3.4.1.

This follows the methods of §2.1.4.

Linguistic Theories

A theory T of zero, one or more linguistic variables is comprised
of:
1.

A language, L(T): a formal language of the kind described in §3.1.1,

2.

Axioms: (i) the set of all logical axioms (§3.3.1), that are formulas
of L(T), together with (ii) an empty or nonempty set of specially
chosen formulas of L(T), to serve as proper axioms of T,

3.

Inference rules: (i) the logical inference rules--modus ponens and
the substitution rule--together with (ii) an empty or nonempty set
of specially chosen proper rules of T,

4.

Theorems: the axioms of T, together with all formulas of L(T) that
can be derived from these axioms by means of the inference rules
of T.
It follows that a theory is specified by selecting a specific

language L(T), and specific sets of proper axioms and proper rules.
Proper axioms are normally used to express how certain proper symbols of
L(T) are interrelated (see the example in §3.4.3) and proper rules
might be used to express special modes of inference (cf. Chapter 5).
The minimal theory will be the theory whose language is the minimal
language, and which has no proper axioms or rules.
The criteria for a formula P of L(T) to have a proof in T (Notation:
T~P)

are given in §2.1.5.1.
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Proposition 3.4.1-1.
only if

A formula P of L(T) is a theorem of T if and

n·p.

Proof.

By Proposition 2.1.5.1-1.

0

It is well-known that a formula of L(T) becomes a formula of the
propositional calculus if we treat atomic formulas as if they were
propositional variables.

This leads to the following.

Proposition 3.4.1-2 (Tautology Theorem).
is tautology of the propositional calculus, then

If a formula P of L(T)
T~P.

If P is a tauto-

logical consequence of P , •.. ,P , and if Tt-P , for all i=l, .... ,n, then
n
1
i
T~P.

Proof.

(D~tails

are omitted; see Shoenfield 1967, p. 27).

The

first assertion follows from the fact that the axioms and inference .
rules of T include those described in §3.3.1-1.
a corollary.

The second assertion is

0

A contradiction in T will be a formula of L(T) having the form
Then consistency for T is as defined in §2.1.5.2.

P&~P.

It happens that, for any formulas P and Q of L(T), Q is a tautological consequence of P&,P.

By the tautology theorem, this implies

that a theory T is consistent if and only if there is at least one
formula Q of L(T) such that
is coherent (c.f. §2.1.5.2).

T~Q.

Thus

r is consistent if and only

if

it

This means that the formal theories defined

in this section, when viewed at the "outer level," are Aristotelean in the
sense defined in §2.1.5.4.
§3.4.2.

Semantic Models

The definition of a model of a theory T and of validity in leT) is
given by §2.1.6.

We may reitterate Proposition 2.1.6-1 in this context.
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Proposition 3.4.2-1 (Validity Theorem).
Proof.

If

then I(T)FP.

T~P,

Immediate, by the definition of model.

0

This gives the following.
Proposition 3.4.2-2.
Proof.

A theory T is consistent if it has a model.

Suppose that T is inconsistent, say

T~P&'P.

Since a

formula of the form P&,P cannot be valid in any interpretation of L(T)
(a consequence of the definition of "&"), Proposition 3.4.2-1 implies
that T has no models.

Thus if T has a model, it must be consistent.

Proposition 3.4.2-3.

If the proper inference rules of

~

0

theory T

are regular rules, then an interpretation I for L(T) is a model of T if
and only if every proper axiom of T is valid in I.
Proof.

Since axioms of Tare theorems of T, it is obvious

if 1I=T, then IFP for every proper axiom P.
tion I is such that
that

I~P

I~P

Suppose that an interpreta-

for every proper axiom P.

for every logical axiom of T.

logical rules are regular (§3.3.2).

tha~,

It is easily verified

It has been noted that the'

Thus, all axioms of T are valid in

I, and all inference rules of T always act so that validity is preserved.
It follows by the definition of "theorem" that if P is a theorem of T,
then II=P.

0

Proposition 3.4.2-4.
Proof.

The minimal theory is consistent.

Let T be the minimal theory.

By Proposition 3.4.2-3,

every interpretation I of L(T) is a model of T.
by Proposition 3.4.2-2.
§3.4.3.

Hence T is consistent

0

Example

of the linguistic variable "Age" may be
A formal theory T
Age
specified as follows. Let L(T
) be the language LA ge of §3.1.4.
Age
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Let TA

have as its only proper axiom, the formula a(x)~~~(x). Then
ge
the interpretation I of §3.2.2 will be a model of T, by Proposition
3.4.2-3.
Since the squaring function, used to define the "very" operator,
is not definable in terms of 1-, max, and min, there is no formula of

L(T

) which explicitly defines ~ as such. However, an approximation
Age
of the "very" operator can be introduced through proper axioms of the
form

which asserts that the truth value of
truth value of p.

~(p)

is strictly less than the

Since this property is satisfied by the squaring

function on [0,1], it follows that the same interpretation I of L(T

)
Age .
would be a model of the extended system that is obtained by adjoining
all formulas of the above form as further proper axioms.

This also

shows, that the extended system may have different models, based on
different meaning assignments

for~.

Further, different models of TAge

may be obtained by altering the definitions of lea) and
the requirement that

~I(a)=l-~I(~).

l(~),

subject to

Last, different models of TAge may

be obtained by moving to completely different universes of discourse.
This means that the theory of a given linguistic variable may sometimes
be used to capture the logic of that variable over several different
universes.
As one adds further proper axioms, however, the class of models
becomes more restricted.

It is possible, for example, to require that

the universes of all models have exactly 100 elements.

This may be

by adjoining some individual constants
accomplished in the case of T
Age
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a1,a2, ... ,a100 to L(TAge ), and adjoining as proper axioms a formula of
the form
x=a1Vx=a2V ••• Vx=a100
together with all formulas
,(a.=a.)
1

for

J

i~j.

The models of this extension of TA ge would then differ essentially only
in their variations on the interpretations of a, ~, and ~.
One may furthermore delimit the relevant set of truth values by
means of the O-ary fuzzy relation symbols Kr . For example, to limit
the set to just five values {0.0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1.0}, include the symbols
KO. O' KO. 25 ' KO. 5 ' KO. 75 ' K1 • O as proper symbols of L(T), and add as
proper axioms the formulas

K.75VKl.0~Kl.0'

which rank order the five values, together with the formulas
~KO.O~Kl.O

~KO.25~KO.75
~KO.5~KO.5

which describe their interrelations.

Then for every n-ary relation

symbol a of L(T) add the formula

a(xl,···,Xn)~KO.OV •• ·Va(xl,···,Xn)~K1.0·
It will follow that every semantic model of T treats each Kr as if it
were the number r in [0,1], and effectively uses only these five numbers
as truth-values.

CHAPTER 4
SEMANTIC COMPLETENESS
The results established in this chapter show that the logical
axioms and inference rules of §3.3 exactly capture the logic which is
inherent in the multivalent interpretations of the fuzzy Boolean connectives (§2.2.5 and §2.2.8) and the concept of semantic equiv&lence as
equality of fuzzy sets (§2.2.5).

Following Shoenfield (1967, pp. 41ff),

semantic completeness may be expressed in two forms:
First Form: For any theory T and formula P of L(T), if

~(T)FP

then

TI-P.
Second Form: For any theory T, if T is consistent then T has a
model.
The former is the converse of the validity theorem (Proposition
3.4.2-1), and the latter is the converse of Proposition 3.4.2-2.

Both

of these forms will be established here for linguistic theories, using
an adaptation of some algebraic methods which were developed by myself
and my master's thesis advisor, S. K. Thomason, for establishing semantic
completeness for a class of "free-variable theories" (Schwartz 1973).
This in turn is an adaptation of some methods of Rasiowa and Sikorsky
(1963) .
As motivation for this approach, let us contrast it with the
standard approach for "first-order theories" as recorded in Shoenfield
(1967).

Shoenfield's first step is to reduce the first form to the

second by means of a "Reduction Theorem for Consistency": If

T~P,

and if
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P' is the "universal closure" of P, then the simple extension T[,P'] is
consistent.
that

T~P.

Given this theorem, one then argues as follows.
Then

ness theorem.

T[~P']

Suppose

has a model I by the second form of the complete-

Because

P' is an axiom of T[,P'],

follows that P is not valid in I.
not valid in some model of T.

P' is valid in I.

But I is also a model of T.

Hence

So P is

Thus, if I(T)FP, then

~(T)~P.

It

T~P.

To establish the second form, Shoenfield employs the methods of
Henkin, which involves four preliminary results:

(i) every first-order

language L has a "cannonical interpretation" I which is built out of the
syntactic elements of L by defining the individuals DI to be equivalence
classes of individual constants of L (assuming that L indeed contains
constants), (ii) for every theory T there is an inessential extension
(in Shoenfield, a "conservative" extension) T which contains a special
c

constant for each closed instantiation 3xp in L(T), called a "Henkin
Theory" (cf. Shoenfield for a precise definition), (iii) if a Henkin
Theory T is proof-theoretically complete--i.e., for every closed P,
either

T~P

or

T~,P--then

the cannonical interpretation for L(T) is a

model of T, (iv) "Lindenbaum's Theorem," every consistent theory has a
syntactically complete simple extension.
Given these results, one proves the second form of the completeness
theorem as follows.

Suppose that T is consistent.

tion extension of T given by (ii).
is inessential.

Let Tc be the inessen-

Tc is consistent because the extension

Let T' be a syntactically complete simple extension of

Tc , as given by (iv).

T' happens to be a Henkin theory.

So, by (iii),

the canonical interpretation I of L(T') is a model of T'
(this I exists, i.e., has a nonempty universe, because Henkin theories
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contain individual constants).
L(T) is a model of T.

It follows that the restriction of I to

Thus, if T is consistent, then it has a model.

Now the free-variable theories developed in Schwartz (1974) bear a
resemblance to linguistic theories as studied in this dissertation in
that they do not 'contain quantifiers and they admit proper inference
rules (which happen to not be of any use in first-order systems).

It

turns out that, because of the use of proper rules, the above approach
does not apply for such systems.

For without prior explicit knowledge

of these rules, one has no assurance that individual constants can be
introduced into the language of T without upsetting the consistency of
T.

This difficulty is fatal to several different steps in the foregoing

proof.

For example, it happens that a universe U can be built out 9f
I
equivalence classes of individual variables (rather than constants), but

"new" constants are still needed to serve as surrogate existential
quantifiers in establishing the appropriate analogues of the reduction
theorem for consistency and of Lindenbaum's theorem.
These considerations suggest two possible alternate approaches:
(i) place sufficiently many restrictions on proper inference rules to
permit the introduction of new individual constants, or (ii) use an
algebraic approach which altogether bypasses the need for such constants.
The latter approach was chosen in Schwartz (1974) and has turned out to
serve well also in this dissertation for dealing with the considerably
more complex situation of two distinct linguistic levels together with a
multivalent interpretation.
The general strategy of this method may be outlined as follows.
We appropriate the theory of Boolean algebras (§4.1) and consider the
"Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra"

r T of equivalence classes of formulas in the
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language of a given theory T (§4.2).

If T is consistent, then the

equivalence classes of theorems of T are contained in one or more "ultrafilters" a in fT.

Any such a can be used to define a universe which

uses equivalence classes of individual terms (i.e., variables or constants)
as individuals (§4.3).

There are furthermore definable equivalence

classes of linguistic assertions, which turn out to form a separate
algebra, having the form of a de Morgan lattice (§4.3).

Then--the main

step--one can define a "cannonical embedding" !J>a which embeds this
lattice in [0,1] in such a way that the lattice ordering is
(§4.3).

,

p~eserved

This leads to the definition of the cannonical interpretations

Ia for the language L(T) of any consistent T (§4.4).
ties of the Ia are established in §4.5.

Some basic proper-

Then the two completeness

results are established in §4.6 as follows:

(i) the second form is

proved by showing that any cannonical interpretation of a consistent T
is a model of T, (ii) the first form is proved by using algebraic'
principles to show that if

T~P,

then a can be chosen in such a way that

Ia is a model of T in which P is not valid, from which it follows that
T~P

if P is valid in every model of T.
It is noteworthy that in (ii) the reduction theorem for consistency

is absorbed by the use of Boolean algebra tlFact 4" (§4.1), and that in
(i) Lindenbaum's Theorem is absorbed in the use of an ultrafilter, which
is provided by Boolean "Fact 5."

This exhibits the algebraic approach

used here as having a versatility that is not shared by the standard
syntactical proof methods.
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§4.1.

Boolean Algebras
The contents of §4.1.1 and §4.1.2 are adapted from Rasiowa and

Sikorski (1963).

All page numbers indicate places in that book where

the relevant items are discussed.

§4.1.1.

Definitions

A Boolean algebra (p. 68) is a set f that is closed with respect
to two binary operations (Notations: U and A) and one unary operation
(Notation: -) which, for all a,p,yer, satisfy the following:

= ~Va

anp = pl\a

1.

aup

2.

aU(pUy) = (aUp)Uy

3.

(aUp)l\~

=p

(aOp)Vp = P

4.

a~(pVy)

= (anp)U(any)

aU(pny) =

5.

(aU-a)np = p
Let

r

af\(pl\a) =

(an-a)V~

be a Boolean algebra.

r if, for all

(p. 44, bottom) in

1.

a,~ea implie~ anpe~,

2.

aea implies
A filter

=

~

A non-empty subset

a of r

is a filter

a,~ef,

and

a

in f is proper in f if

r

Q

a~r.

A proper filter

if, for every proper filter

A=A' (cf. "max1'mal" f1'lter p 46)
, .

§4.1.2.

(aU~)n(aUy)

aU~ea.

an ultrafilter in
~

(af\~)ny

a'

in f, if

a

r

in

~~~',

is

then

•

Basic Facts
Let f be a Boolean algebra.

The following facts are cited without

proof from Rasiowa and Sikorsky (1963), except Fact 10, which is derived.
1.

f contains a unit element (Notation:

1) defined by aU1=1 and an1=a,

for all aef, and a zero element (Notation: 0) defined by aflO=O and
..v

'"

'"
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aUQ=a for all aero

It follows that l=au-a and Q=an-a, for all aero

(pp. 37 and 68).

2.

Every subset

~

r

of

generates a filter in

section of all filters

3.

A filter

4.

If

~

~U{-a}

such that

r

Qt~

and

namely, the inter-

~c~'

(p. 45).

(p. 46).
then the filter generated by

at~,

is a proper filter in

r

(p. 79).

Every proper filter is contained in an ultrafilter, i.e., if
proper filter in

6.

r

iff

is a proper filter in

the set

5.

r

is proper in

~

in

~'

r,

r,

then there exists an ultrafilter

~'

r

such

(p. 46).

that

~CA'

If

is an ultrafilter in r, then, for all aer, either

~

in

is a

~

ae~

or

-ae~

and not both (pp. 66-67).

7.

Let a=>p denote the complement of a relative to p, defined by

a=>p = -aUp.

Then a subset a of r is a filter in r if and only if:

lea and, for all a,per, if
8.

A nonempty subset
a,~er,

9.

we have

a

a,~e~

of

r

iff

~

ae~

and

a=>pe~,

is a filter in
a~~e~

De Morgan's laws: for all

10. If

ae~

r

a,per,-(av~)=-an-~

au~ea

a

and

-(a~~)=-aU-~

is an ultrafilter in r, then, for all a,per,

or

aV~e~

(p. 69).

iff either

pe~.

implies that either

is an ultrafilter,

Fact 8 that

(pp. 54 and 56).

(p. 44).

aUPea by the definition of filter (§3.1.1).
since

~e~

if and only if, for all

Fact 10 may be established as follows.

that

then

-an-pe~.

Then

ae~

-ae~

and

-(aU~)e~

or

~ea.

-~ea

If either aea or

then

Thus, it remains to show
Suppose

at~

by Fact 6.

by Fact 9.

This completes the proof, by contradiction.

~e~,

Hence

and

~t~.

Then,

It follows by
ao~ta

by Fact 6.
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§4.2.

Lindenbaum-Tarski Algebras
Let T be any theory; let P and Q be any formulas of L(T).

Define:

P"-Q iff T,,"P=Q.
Proposition 4.2-1.

"P"'Q" defines an equivalence relation on the

set of formulas of L(T).
Proof.

(Details omitted.)

By the tautology theorem, all three

requirements for an equivalence relation are satisfied; i.e., (i) P"'P,
(ii), if P"'Q, then QI\oP, and (iii) if P"'Q and Q"'R, then P"'R.

0

Define: [p]={Qlp"-Q}, fT={[p]lp is a formula of L(T)}, and
Ar={ [P] I Tt-P}.
Proposition 4.2-2.
operations U,

n,

fT is a Boolean algebra with respect to the

and - defined by
[P]U [Q] = [PVQ]
[P]t\[Q] = [P&Q]
-[P] = hP] .

Proof.

By the tautology theorem, all the equations 1 through 5

sited in §4.1.1 are satisfied.
T"'PVQ=QVP.

Then PVQI\oQvP; so [PVQ]=[QVP].

verifies equation 1.

Hence [P]V[Q]=[P]V[Q].

This

0

Proposition 4.2-3.
Proof.

For example, PVQ=QVP is a tautology; so

The set Ar is a filter in fT'

This makes use of Boolean algebra Fact 7 (§4.1.2). (a) By

the tautology theorem,
[~Q]=[P]=>[Q],

T"P~'P;

so l=[P]U-[p]eAr.

(b) Observe that

by the definition of ":)" and "=>"; it follows by modus

ponens that, if [p]eAr and if [P]=>[Q]eAr, then [Q]eAr.
Proposition 4.2-4.
only if T is consistent.

0

The set Ar is a proper filter in fT if and
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Proof.

The set Ar is a filter in fT by Proposition 4.2-3.

Boolean algebra Fact 3, Ar is proper in fT if and only if
Q=[p]n-[p]=[P&,P]tAr iff T is consistent.

QtAr;

By
and

0

The Boolean algebra fT is commonly referred to as the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for T.

Rasiowa and Sikorski (1963, pp. 20 ff)

uses ideas similar to the above in application to several different kinds
of systems.
§4.3.

A more recent treatment is Rasiowa (1974).

Canonical Embeddin&!
Throughout this section, let T be any consistent theory; let [p],

fT' and

Ar

be as in §4.2; in accordance with Proposition 4.2-4 and

Boolean algebra Fact 5, let A be any ultrafilter in fT such that
Define:

t~t'

L(T); let

Ar~A.

iff [t=t']eA, where t and t' are any individual terms of

[t]={t'lt'~t}

Proposition 4. 3-1.

"t~t "'

defines an equivalence relation on the

set of individual terms of L(T).
Proof.

This makes use of the axioms for equality of individuals

and the substitution rule.

We consider the three criteria of an equiva-

lence relation as follows.
1.

Pick any axiom of the form x=x (§3.2.1-2.a).
substitution rule; so [t=t]eAr.

2.

The formula

t=t'~(t=t~(t=t~t'=t))

axiom of the form 2.b (§3.2.1).

Hence [t=t]eA; so

T~t=t

t~t.

Hence we have that
We also have that [t=t]eA,

Thus if [t=t']eA, then, by three applica-

tions of Boolean algebra Fact 7, we have that [t'=t]eA.
if

t~t',

then

t'~t.

by the

is a substitution instance of an

([t=t']=>([t=t]~([t=t]=>[t'=t])))eAr~A.

as demonstrated in (1).

Then

Therefore,
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3.

Similar to (2), using the formula t=t!)(t'=t":>(t=t':)t=t")) to show
that, if t"'t' and t''''t'', then t"'t".
Define: p"'q iff

[p~q]£a,

0

where p and q are any linguistic assertions

of L(T); let [p]={qlq"'P}.
Proposition 4.3-2.

"p"'q" defines an equivalence relation on the

set of linguistic assertions of L(T).
Proof.

Similar to Proposition 4.3-1, using axioms for equality of

linguistic terms (§3.3.1-3), forms a and b.

0

Define: x={[p]lp is a linguistic assertion of L(T)}.
Pro~osition

operations V,

n,

The set X is a de Morgan lattice under the

4.3-3.
and -

defined by
[p]U[q] = [pvq)
[p)f\[q] = [p"q]
-[p] = ["'p].

Proof.

By the axioms listed in §3.3.1-5.

Since X is a lattice, the relation
[p]~[q]

~

0

defined by

iff [p]U[q]=[q]

is a partial ordering of X (Rasiowa, p. 39).
Proposition 4.3-4.
Proof.
[p]~[q)

or

tion of

"~";

is a linear ordering of X.

It is required to show that, for all [p] and [q], either

[q]~[p].

so

Suppose that

[pvq~q)ta.

by Boolean algebra Fact 6.
the tautology theorem,
-[pvq~q]=>[pvq~p)ea;

that

"[p]~[q]"

[pvq~p)ea.

[p]~[q).

Then [p)v[q]#[q], by defini-

Then, since a is an ultrafilter,

-[pvq~q]ea,

By the linear-ordering axioms (§3.3.1-6) and

T~,(pvq~q)~(pvq~p).

It follows that

so an application of Boolean algebra Fact 7 yields

This implies that [p]V[q)=[p); whence [q]V[p)=[p],

since X is a lattice (axiom form 5.a).

Hence

[q)~[p).
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Similarly, if
[p]~[q]

or

[q]~[p].

[q]~[p],

then

[p]~[q].

Thus, necessarily, either

0

Now let < be the strict ordering of X defined by
[p]<[q] iff

[p]~[q]

and

[p]~[q].

Then, for each [p], exactly one of the following must hold:
1.

-[p] < [p], or

2.

-[p]

3.

-[p] > [pl.

= [p],

or

Let Xl' X2 ' X3 ' respectively, be the sets of [p] that satisfy. 1, 2, and
3. Clearly, X=X 1UX VX (where here V is ordinary set union). Define:
2 3
a mapping
1.

$A:X~[O,l]

$A:X1~(\,1]

as follows:

is any <-preserving embedding; i.e., if [p]<[q],

the~

$A([P])<r$A([q]), where <r is the usual strict ordering of the reals,
2.

$A:X2~[\]'

3.

$A:X3~[O,\)

is defined by $A([P])=l-$A([~P])' where [~p]eXl'

This mapping $A will be the canonical embedding based
Proposition 4.3-5.
Proof.

~

A.

The mapping $A is well-defined.

Well-definedness requires that, if [p]=[q], then

$A([P])=$A([q])·

Consider $A(X I ), The set Xl has cardinality ~~1'
the first uncountable cardinal, since we have required the cardinality
of L(T) to be ~t1 in §2.1.3.
<.

Observe that Xl is linearly ordered by

It is easily established that any linearly ordered set having cardi-

nality less than or equal to ~1 can be embedded in any subinterval of
the reals.

Thus, a well-defined mapping of the kind $(X 1) exists.

It is obvious that

~A(X2)

is well-defined.

Consider ~A(X3)'

If

[P]eX3' then [p]<-[p], by definition of X . But [p]=--[p],. because X is
3
a de Morgan lattice; and -[p]=[~p], by definition of Hence -[~p]<[~p];
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so

[~]eXI'

It follows that

well-defined.

~a(X3)

is well-defined because

is

~a(XI)

0

Proposition 4.3-6.

The mapping

~a

is a <-preserving embedding of

X in [0,1].
Proof.

Consider each possible way of choosing [p] and [q] from

Xl' X2 , X3 · For example, if [p] and [q] are both in X3 , and [p]<[q],
then [~p] = -[p] > -[q] = [~q]ex; so that ~~([-P]»~a([~q]), which gives
~a([p])

=

I-~~([~p])

<

I-~a([~q])

Proposition 4.3-7.
Proof.

=

~a([q])·

For all p and q,

If [p]=[q], then

Thus, it remains to show that
By Proposition 4.3-4, either

0

4lA([P])=~a([q]) if~

~a([p])=$~([q]),

~~

is one-to-one.

[p]~[q]

or

[q]~[p].

by Proposition 4.3-5.
Suppose that
Thus, by the

of <, either [p]<[q] or [q]<[p]. But, in either case,
by Proposition 4.3-6.
§4.4.

[p]=[q].

[p]~[q].
defin~tion

~a([p])~$a([q]),

Therefore, if $a([p])=$a([q]), then [p]=[q].

0

Canonical Interpretations
Let T be a consistent theory; let

r T be the Lindenbaum-Tarski

be any ultrafilter in r T, such that ~ca; let
the canonical embedding based on ~, as described in §4.3.

algebra for T; let

~

The canonical interpretation for L(T) based on a (Notation:

$~

be

I~)

may be defined in accordance with §4.2:
1.

UI ={[t]lt is an individual term of L(T)}, where [t] is defined in
a
terms of a as in §4.3,

2.

For each individual constant a of L(T), assign

3.

for each n-ary fuzzy relation symbol a of L(T), define Ia(a) by
j.lI~ (a) ([t I ] , ...

where each

t~

1

I~(a)=[a],

, [tn ] )=$a ([a(ti"'" t~)]),

is any representative from the equivalence class [t.],
1
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4.

for each n-ary hedge symbol

~,

define

IA(~)

by

~A([~(P1""'Pn)])' where P1"",Pn

are linguistic assertions of L(T) such that
~A([p.])=r.,
1

o

1

for all i=l, ... ,n,

assuming such p.1 exist,
if, for some i, no such p.1 exists.

Notation: If some individuals in UI are denoted by [t], [a], and [x],
A
then their respective individual names in L(T) (I ) will be denoted by 1,
A
a and x.

- -

Proposition 4.4-1.

Proof.
4.3-1.

The universe UI is well-defined.
A
The equivalence class [t] is well-defined, by Proposition

0

Proposition 4.4-2.

For each individual constant a of L(T), IA(a)

is well-defined.
Proof.
4.3-1.

The equivalence class [a] is well-defined, by Proposition

0

Proposition 4.4-3.

For each fuzzy relation symbol a, IA(a) is

well-defined.
Proof.

It is required to show that, if [t ]=[t '], ... ,[t n ]=[t '],
1
1
n

then ~IA(a)([t1], ... ,[tn])=~IA(a)([t1,],.·.,[tn'])'
then

t.~t.',
1

1

which means that [t.=t.']eA.
1
1

t1=t1'~(···~(tn=tn'~a(tl,

...

,tn)~(t1'

If [ti]=[t i '],
Observe that the formula

, ... ,tn '»···) may be inferred from

an axiom of the form 2.c, by means of the substitution rule.

It follows

that [t1=t1']=>(···=>([tn=tn']=>[a(t1,... ,tn)~(t1' , ... ,tn')])···)eA.
Then [a(t1, ... ,tn)~(t1', ... ,tn')]eA by Boolean algebra Fact 7, so
[a(t 1 ,···,tn )]=[a(t 1 ',···,tn ')]·
~A([a(t1'

Then

~A([a(t1,

, ... ,tn ')]), by Proposition 4.3.7.

... ,tn)])=

Hence

~IA(a)([t1],

... ,[tn])=
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(a)([t1'],···,[tn ']), by definition of ~I(a) (§4.4-3). 0
Proposition 4.4-4. For each n-ary special operator symbol $, I ll ($)
is well-defined.

~I

II

Suppose that r1=r 1 ' , ... ,rn=rn', with ri,ri'e[O,l], and
such1
that $.([p.])=r.,
for all i=l, ... ,n.
assume that there exist p.1
1
1
Proof.

(If no such p. exists for some i, then there is nothing to prove;
1

FIll($)(rl,···,rn)=O=FIll($)(rl', ... ,rn '), by definition of F

($).)
Ill
Suppose that p.' , ... ,p , are such that $A([P. '])=r.' for all i=l, ... ,n.
n

1

u

1

1

Then $ll([Pi])=$ll([Pi']); so [Pt]=[Pi'], by Proposition 4.3-7.
[Pi~Pi']ell,

for all i=l, ... ,n.

Observe that the formula

Hence

Pl~Pl'~

( ••• ~(p n~p n '~$(Pl""'P n )~$(Pl' , .•. ,p n ')) ... ) is an axiom of the
form 3.f.

It follows that [Pl~Pl']=>(···=>([pn~Pn']=>[$(Pl""'Pn)

~$(Pl""'Pn)])"')

is in ll.

Then n applications of Boolean algebra

Fact 7 yields that [$(Pl""'Pn)~$(Pl' " .. ,Pn')]ell.

Then [$(Pl""'P n)]=

[$(Pq, ... ,P n ')]; so $ll([$(Pl,· .. ,Pn')])=$ll([$(P 1 ' "",Pn ')]), by Proposition 4.3-7. Hence FI($)(rl, ... ,rn)=FI($)(rl' , ... ,r n '). This is what we
needed to show.

0

Note that if T is not consistent, then no such interpretation III
can exist.

For, if T is not consistent, Ar=rT, so that there is no
ultrafilter II in fT such that ~e~ (recall that an ultrafilter must be a
proper filter); whence there is no canonical embedding $ll as required in
the definition of Ill'
§4.5.

Preliminary Results
Proposition 4.5-1.

Let T be a consistent theory, and let III be

any canonical interpretation for LeT).
and q of LeT),

For any linguistic assertions P
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1.

~a([~p])

2.

~a([pvq])

=

max[(~a([p])'~a([q])],

3.

~a([pAq])

=

min[(~a([p])'~a([q])],

where

~a

=

1-~a([p]),

is the canonical embedding associated with la.

Proof.

Let p and q be any linguistic assertions of L(T).

Let X

be as in Proposition 4.3-6.
1.

To show that
Case a:

~a([~p])=I-~a([p]),

Then

[~p]eXl.

consider three cases.

-[~p]<[~p],

which means that [p]<-[p].

Then [p]ex 3 , and ~a([p])=I-~a([~p]), by definition of
for ~a([~p]) gives the desired equation.
Case b:
[p]=-[~p],

so

Case c:
~a(X3)·

2.

Then

[~p]eX2.

This yields

~a([p])=~.

Then

[~p]eX3.

-[~p]=[~p],

But ["""p]=[p]; so

and

~a(X3).'

Solving

~a(-[~p])~a([~p])=~.

But

~a([~p])=~I-~=l-~a([p])·

~a([~p])=I-~a([~])'

by definition of

~a([~p]=I-~a([p])·

From the fact that X is a lattice, we have that, for any [p] and [q],
[p]~[p]U[q]

(cf. Rasiowa, p. 39).

and

(i)

[q]~[p]U[q]

From the fact that

"~"

is a linear ordering

(Proposition 3.3-4), we have that either
(ii)

[p]=[p]U[q] or [q]=[p]V[q].
Since

~a

is <-preserving and one-to-one (Propositions 4.3-6 and 4.3-7),

(i) and (ii) together imply that

~a([p]V[q])=max([~a([p])'~a([q])).

Since [pvq]=[p]V[q], by definition of U, this gives

~a([pvq])=

max[~a([p])'~a([q])]·

3.

Similar to (2).

0

Proposition 4.5-2.

Let T and la be as in Proposition 4.5-1; let p

be any linguistic assertion of L(T); and let p(t,.., , ... ,t ) be any
1
lA-instance of p (where the notation t. is as in §4.4): Then
~

L.lo

""J.
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Ia(P(~I""'1n) = ~a([P(tl,···,tn)])·

Proof:

We use mathematical induction on the length of linguistic

assertions.
Case 1: p atomic, of the form a(t!, ...
loss of generality that all the

t~
J.

,t~).

We may assume without

are individual variables, so that

p(t 1 , ... ,t) is in this case a(t 1 , ... ,t).
""
"'Il
""-n

Then we have the following:

Ia(a(~I" .. ,~) = ~I (a)(I(~I),···,I(1n))

a

(3.2.1-2.a)

= ~Ia(a)([tl],···,[tn])

(4.4-3)

= ~a([a(tl,···,tn)])·
Case 2: p of the form

(3.2.1-3.a)

~q.

(4.2.1-3.6)

Ia(~q(~l""'1n)) = l-Ia(q(~I""'!n)

= 1-~a([q(tl,···,tn)])

(Ind. Hyp.)
(Prop. 4.5-1.1)

= ~a([~q(tl,···,tn)])
Case 3: p of the form qvr.
Ia(q(~I,···,~)vr(!l'···'1n))

= max[Ia(q[~I""'1n)),Ia(r(~I""'1n))]
= max($a([q(t 1 ,···,tn )]),$a([r(t 1 ,···,tn ]))

(Ind. Hyp.)
(Prop. 4.5-1.2)

= ~a([q(tl,···,tn)vr(tl,···,tn)])
Case 4: p of the form qAr.

(3.2.1-3.c)

Similar to Case 3.

Case 5: p of the form ~(Pl(!I""'1n)""'Pm(~I""'1n»)' ~ m-ary.
Ia(~(Pl(~I""'1n)"",Pm(~I""'1n)))

= FI (~)(Ia(Pl(!I'···'1n)),···,Ia(pm(~I"··'1n)))

(3.2.1-3.e)

= Fla(~)(~a([Pl(tl, ... ,tn)]), ... ,$a([Pm(tl, ... ,tn)])

(Ind. Hyp.)

a

= FI

a (~)(rl,···,r n ),

where r.=$A([p.(t 1 , ... ,t )])
J.u
J.
n

= ~a([~(Pl(tl, ... ,tn)""'Pm(tl, ... ,tn»)])'
This is what we are required to show.

0

(Notation)
(4.4-4)
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Proposition 4.5-3.

Let T and

I~

be as in Proposition 4.5-1; let P

be any formula of L(T); let P(11 "",ln) be any
I~(P(11""'ln)=1

Proof.

I~-instance

of P.

Then

iff [P(t1,···,tn}]e~.

We use mathematical induction on the length of formulas.

Then P(t 1 , ... ,t ) is of the form
""
""n
a=b where a,b are either individual constants of L(T) or are names of
Case 1: P atomic of the form t=t'.

individuals in U . Without loss of generality, assume that both are
1~
names, so that P(t 1 , ... ,t ) is just t 1=t2 . Then we have
".."

""'D.

'"

'"

(3.2.1-3.f)

I~(11=12)=1 iff I~(11)=I~(12)

(3.2.2.1-2.a & §3.4)

iff [t ]=[t2 ]
1

(def. [t], §4.3)

iff tl"'t2
iff

(def. "', §3.3)

[t1=t2]e~.

Case 2: P atomic of the form

p~q.

I~(p(11""'ln)~q(11""'ln))=1

iff I~(p(11""'ln))=I~(q(11""'ln))

(3.2~1-3.g)

iff ~~([p(t1, ... ,tn)])=~a(rq(tl, ... ,tn)])

(Prop. 3.5-2)

iff [p(t1, ... ,tn)]=[q(t1, ... ,tn )]

(Prop. 4.3-7)

iff p(t 1 , ... ,tn )"'q(t 1 , ... ,t n )
iff [P(t1, ... ,tn)=q(t1, ... ,tn)]e~.

(def. [p], §4.3)
(def. "', §4.3)

Case 3: P of the form ,Q.
I a (,Q(1 1 "",ln))=1
iff I a (Q(1 1 "",ln))=O

(2.2.1-3.h)

iff [Q(11 "",ln)]ta
iff -[Q(t1, ... ,tn)]ea

(Ind. Hyp.)

iff ['Q(tl, ...

,tn)]e~.

Case 4: P of the form Q R.

(B. alg. Fact 6)
(Prop. 4.2-2)

94

(3.2.1-3.i)

iff either I a (Q(1 1 "",ln))=1 or I a (R(1 1 "",ln))=1
iff either [Q(t1, ... ,tn)]ea or [R(t1, ... ,tn)]ea

(Ind. Hyp.)
(B. alg. Fact 10)

iff [Q(t1, ... ,tn)]U[R(t1, ... ,tn)]ea

(Prop. 4.2-2)

iff [Q(t1, ... ,tn)VR(t1, ... ,tn)]ea.
This proves Proposition 4.5-3.
§4.6.

0

Completeness Theorems
Theorem 4.6-1.

If T is a consistent theory and a is any ultra-

filter in fT such that Area, then Ia is a model of T.
Proof.

Let T and Ia be as specified; let P be any formula of L(T)

such that TrP; let P(11 "",ln) be any la-instance of P. By the definition of "model" (§3.4.2), it is sufficient to show that I a (P(1 1 "",ln)=1.
Since TrP, we have that TI-P(tl"'" t n ), by the substitution rule ...
Then [P(t1, ... ,tn)]eAr~a, by definition of Ar; so I a (P(1 1 "",ln))=1, by
Proposition 4.5-3.

0

Corollary 4.6-1 (Second Form).

Every consistent theory has a

model.
Proof.

If T is consistent, then at least one canonical interpreta-

tion exists for L(T) (cf. §4.4).

By the theorem, any canonical inter-

pretation for L(T) is a model of T.
Theorem 4.6-2 (First Form).

0

For any formula P of L(T), if

~(T)FP,

then TI-P.
Proof.

Suppose that P is a formula of L(T) such that

is consistent (§3.4.1).
[P]tAr'

Consider the filter Ar in fT'

~P.

Since

Then T

T~P,

Thus, by Boolean algebra Fact 4, the filter generated by the

set ArV{-[P]} is a proper filter in fT'

In accordance with Boolean

algebra Fact 5, let a be any ultrafilter in r T such that

~O{-[p]}ca.
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Let I6 be the canonical interpretation for L(T) based

on~.

Consider

the I 6 -instance P(21""'2n) of P, where x 1 , ... ,xn are all the distinct
individual variables that occur in P, i.e., where P is P(x1 , ... ,xn ).
Then -[P(x 1 , ... ,x n )]=-[P]e6, by the choice of 6; so [~P(x1, ... ,xn)]e6,
by definition of -.

Hence,

I6(~P(21""'2n))=1,

by Proposition 4.5-3;

so 16 (P(21""'2n))=O, by §3.2.1-3.h. Thus, we have shown that 16~P,
But I6 is a model of T, by Theorem 4.6-1. Hence we have shown that
~(T)~P.

Since P was chosen arbitrarily, it follows that, for any P of

L(T), if

~P,

then

I(T)~P.

Hence:, if

~(T)FP,

then

T~P.

0

CHAPTER 5

EXTENSIONS AND GENERALIZATIONS
The results of Chapters 3 and 4 provide the basis for formalizing
a wide variety of fuzzy set theoretic concepts within the framework of a
semantically complete class of formal logical systems.

Several of these

concepts have already been discussed in the foregoing--e.g., linguistic
terms, fuzzy Boolean connectives, and semantic equivalence.

The present

chapter deals with further concepts which may be similarly formalized,
either within systems exactly as defined in Chapter 3, or through

mo~ifi

cations thereof.
§5.1 discusses the situation of more than one linguistic variable
operating simultaneously over a single universe of discourse.
§5.2 describes the modifications necessary for generalization to
multiple universes of discourse.
§5.3 discusses fuzzy logic per se, as based on the idea of linguistic
truth, and shows how two different versions--one old and one new--may be
developed into semantically complete modes of reasoning.
§5.4 explores very briefly the status of possibilistic reasoning
within the present context.
§5.5 delves into the formal characterization of alternative modes
of fuzzy inference.
§5.6 lays down sufficient conditions for a linguistic theory to be
decideable, thereby ensuring its capacity for implementation on a finite
state computer.
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§S.l.

Multiple Linguistic Variables Over A Single Universe
The examples considered thus far have considered the representation

of only a single linguistic variable within a formal theory T.

However,

the definitions laid down in Chapter 3 provide all the necessary apparatus
for any finite or infinite number (~~l) of linguistic variables, as
long as all those variables are intended to range over the same universe
of discourse.

The task of introducing mUltiple variables amounts only

to that of developing a grammar which is appropriate for generating all
of the desired linguistic terms.

Once the grammar is

establi~hed,

then

the formal theory of those variables may be obtained by including as
proper axioms a set of formulas which express the manner in which the
variables are interrelated.
For example, suppose that we are discussing a concept of "good
automobile," and it is decided that the criteria for "goodness" are that
the auto be attractive, dependable, manuverable in traffic, reasonably
priced, and fuel-economical.

Then "goodness" would be analyzed as some

logical combination of the linguistic variables "appearance," "reliabilty,"
"manuverability," "cost," and "efficiency."

Formalization of this

concept thus requires a language for six variables together with a
grammar which is at least adequate to provide the formal definition of
"goodness" in terms of the five criteria.
To illustrate the latter, let a,a1, ... ,a be unary relation
S
symbols standing respectively for "good," "attractive," etc. If the
property of goodness is thought of as just the simple conjunction of the
five criteria, then the appropriate defining axiom would be
a(x)~al(x)h ••• AaS(x),

where x is any individual variable.
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The axiomatic theory thus developed would have among its theorems
all the formally derivable consequences of this definition.

By semantic

completeness, moreover, we have assurance that these consequences will
be all and only the formulas which one would expect to be derivable in
the context of a logic based on the multivalent theory of approximate
reasoning.
§S.2.

Generalization To Multiple Universes Of Discourse
It is oftentimes necessary to consider several universes of dis-

course simultaneously.

For example, one might wish to discuss a compari-

son of the heights of trees, the heights of buildings, and the heights
of mountains.

In this case, even though the various heights may all be

measured on the same scale--say, in meters--the meanings of "tall,"
"short," etc. will differ depending on the kind of object being measured.
In order to express a proposition like "tall trees are shorter than tall
buildings and tall buildings are shorter than tall mountains," one therefore needs to formally distinguish between the three kinds of objects
within the same language, and as well, to allow for comparisons.

A manner in which this can be accomplished is illustrated as
follows.

Consider a language which has three distinct sets of individual
for trees, x 2 ,x 2 , ... for buildings, and
l 2
In addition, include in this language a binary

relation

~

which allows its parameters to be individual variables of any

of the three kinds.

Then if

Ci

stands for "tall," and 13 is taken as the

"shorter than" relation, the aforementioned proposition may be written
as

Ci(xl)Aa(x2)Aa(x3)~Mxl ,X2)A~(x2 ,x 3 ),
in words, "if xl (some tree) is tall, x2 (some building) is tall, and x3
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(some mountain) is tall, then xl is shorter than x
than x 3 ."

Here

-+

2

and x2 is shorter

is a fuzzy inference as in §5.5.

To accommodate such a language, the earlier notion of semantic
interpretation would be modified to have triples of universes (U~,Ui,Ui)
and to have meaning assignments, together with a concept of "valid
formula," as dictated by the structure of the language.
The net result of developing this illustration into the general
case will provide a new class of formal theories, together with a
companion semantics, for which semantic completeness can be established
by the same methods as employed in Chapter 4.
§5.3.

Linguistic Truth--Fuzzy Logics
The subject of linguistic truth and the concept of a fuzzy set of.··

type 2 was discussed briefly in §2.2.9.

The objective of treating

"Truth" as a linguistic variable is to develop a formal means of encoding
the everyday usage of truth-related discourse.

This includes not only

the primitives "true" and false," but also the somewhat more complex--and
imprecisely intended--expressions like "very true," "more or less true,"
"not very true," etc.

The desire to accommodate linguistic truth into a

formal system of reasoning leads to fuzzy logic per se, which differs
from the multivalent logic employed in Chapter 3 by having its truth
values be fuzzy subsets of [0,1].
Haack (1979) has argued against the need for such a logic, suggesting that sufficient imprecision is already provided by the multivalent
approach.

This argument is countered, however, by the fact that linguis-

tic truth nearly always appears in vivo as a linguistic variable, so
that fuzzy logic is in actuality a more accurate rendering of the every-
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day reasoning with truth-related terms.

Given that one of the chief

anticipated uses of fuzzy linguistics is in machine intelligence-specifically, improved man-machine interaction via natural language
translation--this "naturalness" of fuzzy logic lends it a central position in the work toward this goal.
The present section recounts some of the earlier work that has
been done in this area; it discusses how the best of these results may
be formalized within a semantically complete class of formal logical
systems; and it introduces a somewhat different, but perhaps more readily
applicable approach to linguistic truth in general.
§5.3.1.

The Germinal Ideas--Basic Truth-Term.Connectives

In developing "Truth" as a linguistic variable, Zadeh (1975b, .
Part II, p. 334) proposes the following interpretations for the linguistic
terms "true" and "false":

J.lI(true) (x) =

0

for O;;i;x;;i;a

2(x-a)2
I-a

< <a+1
for a=x=T

1-2 (!:.!)2
I-a

f or T=x=
a+1< <1 ,

where a is an arbitrarily chosen number in (0,1], and
(x) = J.I I (true) (I-x) for all xe[0,1].
These membership functions have graphs as shown in Figure 5-1.
II

~I(false)

Thus

depicted, they clearly represent intuitively plausible interpretations
of "true" and "false" in that they assume high values in the appropriate
regions of [0,1] and each is a mirror image--hence an antonym--of the
other.
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--~-True

0.5

-

- -

l-a

--r
Figure 5-1.

l-a

a

l+a

-2-

Compatibility functions for "True" and "False."
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A difficulty arises, however, in that the interpretations of the
Boolean connectives given in §2.2.3 for general use with linguistic
variables do not serve correctly in the special case of linguistic
truth.

For example, where common sense requires that "true and false"

be reducible to "false," application of the "min" operator to I(true)
and I(false) produces a fuzzy subset of [0,1] which is not even approximately equivalent to either I(false) or I(true).

Similarly for terms

involving "or" and "not."
To rectify this problem, Zadeh therefore equips linguistic truth
with its own set of connectives.

Let T and T' be terms in the term set

for "Truth," and suppose that their meaning assignments are the fuzzy
subsets of [0,1] represented by
T=

f.1 .a./x.
and T'
1.1.

=

f.Jfj./y
..
JJ

Then the meaning of "not T" is given by

-T

=f.

1.

a./(l-x.),
1.
1.

the meaning of "T or T'" is given by
TVT' =

f..

1.,J

sup
min[a. , fj.] /z,
z=max[x.,y.]
1.
J
1.

J

and the meaning of "T and T'" is given by
TI\T' =

f..

1.,J

sup
min[a. ,fj.]/z.
z=min [ x. , y . ]
1.
J
1.

J

These definitions furthermore suggest redefinition of linguistic hedges.
For example, "very T" receives the interpretation
very-T =

2
f.1. a./x
..
1.
1.

This yields many of the basic common sense requirements.

In particular,

where <-> expresses semantic equivalence, it turns out that
true and false <-> false
true or false <-> true
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not true <-> false
not false <-> true.
However, when one considers arbitrary linguistic terms--i.e., arbitrary
fuzzy subsets of [O,l]--two further difficulties are seen to persist.
First is a problem noted by Haack (1979), that the term set for linguistic truth is not algebraically closed under the above versions of "or"
and "and."

For example, a compound term like "not very true and not

very false" will not in general be reducible to more elementary terms.
Now, due to Yager (1979), this problem appears to be resolve4. by a
simple and intuitively appealing form of linguistic approximation.
Second is a somewhat more crucial problem: that of rank ordering
the linguistic truth-terms according to a "more true than" relation .
which is consistent with the everyday usage of "and" and "or."

Generally,

intuition requires that, for arbitrary truth values T and TI, the conjunction, T and TI, should be no more true than either T or TI, and the
disjunction, T or TI, should be at least as true as both TI and T.
In algebraic terms, this amounts to requiring that the fuzzy
subsets of [0,1], with V and A as defined above, constitute a lattice;
that is, the desired "more true than" relation turns out to be a lattice
order.

Misumoto and Tanaka (1976) have shown, however, that this algebra

of fuzzy subsets of [0,1] is strictly weaker than a lattice; in particular,
the absorptioR laws do not hold.

Therefore, it is in fact mathematically

impossible to define a rank ordering of the kind desired.
For resolution of this difficulty, two avenues present themselves.
First is to again redefine the Boolean connectives, and perhaps also
correspondingly redefine the meaning assignments for truth-terms.
Second is to retain the above connectives, but limit the base collection
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of acceptable meanings for truth terms to some appropriate subcollection
of the fuzzy subsets of [0,1].
is developed in §5.3.3.

A solution along the lines of the former

The section below shows a solution along the

latter provided by Mizumoto and Tanaka.
Note: during the research for this dissertation, the possibility
of limiting the value set to just fuzzy subsets of [0,1] having monotone
membership functions was investigated and was found to be unsatisfactory
for the same reason as above:
§5.3.2.

Fu~zy

absorption does not apply.

Numbers

A fuzzy number N in [0,1] is a convex normal fuzzy subset of
[0,1], where N is convex if, for all x,y,z in [0,1],
implies ~N(y)~in[~N(x)'~N(z)],

x~~z

and N is normal if there is at least one x in [0,1] such that
~N(x)=1.

Mizumota and Tanaka (1976) show that the fuzzy numbers in [0,1], together
with Zadeh's connectives as defined in §5.3.1 form a "pseudocomplemented
distributive" lattice, Le., a deMorgan lattice.
ordering

"~"

and N', if

with the desired properties:

N~',

Hence we have a lattice

for any two fuzzy numbers N

then
NUN' = N'

and.
NnN' = N.
This ordering is simple to visualize in terms of graphs of the
membership function
and

Q defined

by

~N.

The lattice has maximal and minimal elements ,..,1
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1J (x)

1

""

if

O~x<1

=[: if x=O

~O(x)
=
[
I
""
0 if

if X=O

and, in general,

N~'

O<x~H,

if and only if there exists (a unique) ae[O,l]

such that

and
IJN(x)~IJN'(x)
Thus.N~'

if and only if the graph of

the graph of

~N'

fer a~x~l.
~N

lies generally to the left of

and crosses it at no more than one point.

Moreover,

the union and intersection of two fuzzy numbers Nand N' may be
visualized as in Figure 5-2.
related by

~,

Note that in this example Nand N' are not

yet the following relations do hold:
NON'

~

N ~ NON'

NON'

~

N'

~

NVN' .

Of especial interest here is that the fuzzy numbers in [0,1]
provide a version of linguistic truth which is easily formalizable in a
semantically complete class of formal logical systems.

There are required

only two simple modifications of the definitions developed in Chapter 3:
(i) in every linguistic theory, delete from the set of logical axioms
all instances of the linear ordering critereon (§3.3.1-6), (ii) in every
semantic interpretation, replace the value set [0,1] for linguistic
assertions with the set of fuzzy numbers in [0,1], and redefine the
connectives

~,

v and A in terms of the operators of §5.3.1.

Note that

this automatically transforms the interpretations lea) of relation
symbols a into fuzzy sets of type 2.
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1;..0

- - - = Intersection
Figure 5-2.

I' "

= Union

Union and Intersection of fuzzy numbers.
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The resultant class of formal systems may be established as semantically complete with respect to the resultant class of semantic interpretations by the methods of Chapter 4.
is redefining the cannonical embedding

In this case, the crucial step
~~

in such a way that it preserves

the lattice ordering of equivalance classes [p] (as opposed to the
linear ordering employed in §4.3).

The existence of such an embedding

is ensured by the fact that the lattice ordering of fuzzy numbers in
[0,1] is dense, i.e., for any fuzzy numbers Nand N' such that N<N',
there is at least one fuzzy number N* such that N<N*<N.
to adapt the definition
as before.

Let

~1

This allows us

Let Xl' X2 , and X3 be
be the set of fuzzy numbers N in [0,1] such that
~f ~~

in §4.3 as follows.

-N<N (where "_" is as in §5. 3 .1), let 'Y\2 be the set such that -N=N, and
let

~3

be the set such that N<-N.

1.

~~:X1~~1

2.

~~:X2~~2 be any mapping of X

3.

~~:X3~ ~3

Then let

be any <-preserving embedding,
2 into ~2'

by ~~([p])=-~~([-p]), where [-P]&X 1 ·

It follows that the cannonical interpretation
§3.4 in terms of

~~,

I~,

as defined in

of any consistent theory is well-defined, and that

the analogues of all the propositions and theorems of §3.5 and §3.6 hold
true.

Thus one obtains a semantically complete axiomatization of fuzzy

logic.
Because fuzzy nUmbers in [0,1] form a lattice, the logic captured
in this class of systems has many desirable properties.

One possible

defect persists, however, in that the lattice ordering relation is
generally a partial order--i.e., not all truth values will be comparable.
Theories with total orders can be defined, nevertheless, through the
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techniques described in Example 3.4.3.

In this case it must be assumed

that there is a O-ary relation symbol KN for every fuzzy number N.
§5.3.3.

An Alternate Approach

Since it is customary for logicians to use numbers in [0,1] as
truth values, it is only reasonable that when moving to the more general
conception represented by linguistic truth one should employ fuzzy
subsets of [0,1].

In reflecting on the everyday use of truth-related

language, however, it is evident that there is no truely compelling
reason why "Truth," even considered as a linguistic variable,. should
have [0,1] as its universe of discourse.

Indeed, a moments reflection

will remind us that the actual universe of discourse for this variable
as it appears in natural languages is more exactly the class of all
propositions--to wit, it is actually the linguistic assertions, and not
numbers, which are "true," "false," "more or less true," "not very
true," etc.

It therefore makes sense to look for a formulation of

linguistic truth which incorporates this view.
This section presents one such formulation, which is conveniently
formalizable in the systems discussed in Chapter 3.

In this treatment,

linguistic terms from the term set for "Truth" are introduced formally
as operators on linguistic assertions--somewhat on the same order as
linguistic hedges--with each such term being assumed to either hold or
not hold for any given proposition.

For example, the claim that a

proposition p is "true" will be expressed formally by the linguistic
assertion true(p), where "true" here denotes a unary operator symbol;
the proposition that "true(p)" holds, will be represented by the formula
true(p)~Kl'

where Kl is the zero-ary relation symbol with constant value
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1; and the proposition that "true(p)" does not hold will be represented
by the formula

true(p)~KO.

The determination of whether "true(p)" does or does not hold is
then dependent on the value in [0,1] which a given interpretation I
assigns to p.

If it is decided, for example, that a proposition p

deserves to be regarded as true if

I(p)~0.6,

then the operator "true"

may be formally associated with the interval [0.6,1] by some defining
axioms:
(true(p)~K1)
(true(p)~KO)

= (PVKO.6~P)
= '(true(p)~K1).

Additional linguistic truth terms may be defined in a similar fashion.
As examples:

"false" may be defined by
(false(p)~Kl)

- (pAKO.4~P)

(false(p)~KO)

-

'(false(p)~Kl)'

"more or less true" by
(m-l-true(p)~Kl)

- (pvKO.4~P)&(pAKO.6~P)

(m-l-true(p)~KO)

-

'(m-l-true(p)~Kl)'

(v-true(p)~Kl)

-

(pVKO.8~P)

(v-true(p)~KO)

-

'(v-true(p)~Kl)

(a-true(p)~Kl)

-

(p~K1)

(a-true(p)~KO)

-

,(a-true(p)~K1).

"very true" by

and "absolutely true" by

Choice of the range in [0,1] for each linguistic term is of course
arbitrary, but will normally be dictated to a certain extent by the
kinds of interrelations that one wishes to set up among the terms being
used.

With the above definitions of "true" and "false," for example, 'it
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happens that these terms are not autonyms of one another, i.e., for
arbitrary p, both of the formulas
~true(p) ~
~false(p)

false(p)

- true(p)

are semantically invalid; yet they become valid if "true" is associated
with [0.5,1] and "false" is associated with [0,0.5].
The virtue of this approach to linguistic truth rests on the
following result.
Theorem 5.3.3-1.

If the intervals associated with "true" and

"false" are mirror images of one another about the point 0.5, then these
two linguistic terms satisfy all of the classical principles for

~,

v,

and A; that is, the following truth table holds:
q

p

Proof.

"'p

pvq

pAq

true

true

false

true

true

true

false

false

true

false

false

true

true

true

false

false

false

true

false

false

Each entry in the truth table may be verified by straight-

forward appeal to the definitions, together with applications of the
semantic completeness result for formal theories.

To illustrate: the

first entry--if p is true, then "'p is false--is established as follows:
.,(true(p)~Kl)

-

(def. of "true")

(pvKO.6~P)

(sem. completeness)

- ("'P KO.4~P)

-

(def. of "false. ")

false(~p)~K1'

Details of the remaining entries are omitted.

0

One thus has in this formulation a "fuzzy logic" on a different
order.

Individual linguistic truth terms apply non-fuzzily, i.e., they
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either hold for a given proposition p or they do not hold for p; yet
linguistic imprecision is accommodated (i) by allowing a range of [0,1]
to be assigned to each linguistic term, and (ii) by accommodating for
any number of fuzzy linguistic terms, with or without hedges.

Moreover,

by Theorem 5.3.3-1, appropriately defining the meanings of "true" and
"false" leaves the full strength of the classical logic completely
embedded within a multivalent fuzzy logic, thereby preserving the common
sense usage of true-false reasoning.

Last, this version of linguistic

truth is mathematically simpler than the versions considered

~n

§5.3.1

and §5.3.2, thus making it somewhat more amenable to direct implementation on a computer.
§5.4.

Linguistic Possibility
Zadeh (1978a and 1978b) has shown that the imprecision in everyday

discourse may be regarded as essentially possibilistic in nature.
basic idea of a possibility distribution was given in §2.2.10.

The

We here con-

sider the status of possibilistic reasoning from the formal point of view.
Consider the fuzzy set 81 of "small integers" defined in §2.2.10,
81 = 1/0 + 1/1 + 0.8/2 + 0.6/3 + 0.4/4 + 0.2/5.
The proposition that x has a possibility of 0.6 of assuming the value 3
may be expressed by the notation
Poss{x=3} = 0.6.
Thus written, possibilistic assertions are clearly metalinguistic, and
are of a kind which is not directly formalizable in the languages
developed in Chapter 3.
Yet because of the correspondence between fuzzy sets and possibility
distributions, the net effect of a possibilistic interpretation is
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implicit.

It is simply the matter of an intuitive heuristic whether one

takes a formal expression like x=a with truth value I(x=a)=ie[O,l] as
asserting that "x=a is true to the degree i" or as saying "x is possibly
a to the degree i."

Therefore the necessary apparatus for formalizing

many of the concepts from possibility theory is available in the systems
of Chapter 3.
This includes in particular the idea of a possibility measure fi(A)
for a non-fuzzy set A, as induced by a possibility distribution fix: if
fi

is given as some fuzzy set B, then fi(A) represents the possibility
x
that xeA, and is defined by
fi(A) = sUPaeA ~B(a).

By virtue of the two-levels in our formal languages, this definition is
effectively captured in a formula of the following form:
(fi(a{x»~p(x»

:: (,(x'=x)::»P(x' )vP(x)~P(x».

This shows that even fairly sophisticated concepts are formalizable in
the languages as given.
manner, however.

Many concepts will not be accessible in this

In particular are the fuzzy quantifiers mentioned in

§2. 2 .11.
§S.S.

Fuzzy Inference
As was mentioned in §2.2.8, the fuzzy interpretations of the

Boolean connectives are nowdays well-established in the literature,
while the question of an appropriate form of the fuzzy "implies" remains
open.

Gaines (1976) lists several alternative formulations, and other

versions appear in papers by Zadeh.

We shall here give a sampling of

three such connectives and consider their formalizability both within
multivalent theories of fuzzy reasoning and within fuzzy logics of the
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kind developed in §5.3.2.

These three are conveniently chosen as those

for which Dubois and Prade (1979b) have already developed the fuzzylogical analogues, i.e., generalizations for use with fuzzy sets of
type 2.
§5.5.1.

Dienes-Rescher

This is the

~

connective of classical logic, simply generalized to

the case of approximate reasoning.

Formally it may be introduced into

any theory T--multivalent or fuzzy-logical--by adjoining axioms according
to the scheme

In the multivalent case, this defines an operator => on fuzzy sets of

~A=>B(x,y) = max[l-~A(x),~p(Y)]'

where A and B are the meanings of p and q.

In the fuzzy-logical case,

the same scheme defines an operator => on fuzzy sets of type 2 by
A=>B = -AUB,
where - and V are as given in §5.3.2.
This mode of inference is generally not satisfactory as a form of
approximate inference for the reason that, if

p~q

has a higher truth

value than p, then the truth value of q is greater than or equal to the
truth value of

p~q,

contrary to the intuitive requirement that the

conclusion of a logical inference (in this case, modus ponens) should
not be more true than any of the hypotheses.
§5.5.2.

Lukasiewicz

L~
I

1

This mode of inference has been the most popular, partly because
it satisfies the above intuitive requirement for modus ponens, and
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partly because it has already been studied extensively in the theory of
multivalued logics.

Gaines (1976) discusses it at length in the context

of fuzzy reasoning, and Bellman and Zadeh (1977) have used it as a "base
logic" which is "fuzzified" to produce a fuzzy logic over fuzzy sets of
type 2.
In the multivalent semantics the Lukasiewicz connective is defined
by an operator => on fuzzy sets of type 1, as:
~A=>B(x) = min[I,I-~A(x)+~B(x)],

and in the context of fuzzy sets of type 2, it is given by
A=>B =

!~[-A$B],

where ,..1, (), and - are as in §5. 3.2, and where ED is defined by
AeB = f X,y min[~A(x)'~B(Y)]/x+y.
Because of the use of the arithmetic sum, this mode of inference cannot
be formally defined explicitly in terms of the connectives
However, the essence of this

~

~,

v, A.

connective can be captured in a theory

T--either multivalent or fuzzy-logical--by adjoining all axioms for
L"" •

Following Gaines (1976), this leads to axioms having the forms:

'''I
1.

(p~K1&p~q~K1)~q~K1

2.

p~(q~)~Kl

3.

((p~q)~)~((q~)~)~K1

(disjunction)

4.

(p~q)~((q~r)~(p~r))~K1

(transitivity)

In addition, one should have axioms which relate

(modus ponens)
(paradox)

~,

necessary relationships would here be derivable from
5.

~P~P~KO

6.

pvq~(p~q)~q.

A,

and v

to~.

The
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By using these axioms in a formal theory T, one is ensured that

~

has

the requisite logical behavior, even though it will in general have
different meanings in different semantic models of T.
Note: An alternative approach would be to introduce a connective +
which satisfies sufficiently many of the rules for addition of real
numbers so that

~

could be introduced by
p~q~K1J\ (("'p )+q)

.

In fact, it is conceivable that + could be defined in such a way that
its only possible meaning assignment is addition of reals, in which case
p~q

is uniquely defined fot all semantic interpretations.

Development

of the necessary axioms for such a + connective has not been pursued in
this research.
§5.5.3.

Zadeh's Generalized Modus Ponens

A relational mode of inference was proposed in Zadeh's first
papers on the subject, and continues to be discussed (c.f. Zadeh 1975,
Part III for a review).

The assertion "if p then q" is considered as a

special case of "if p then q, else r," which receives as its meaning the
union of cartesian products

(AXB)V(-AXC),
where it is assumed that Band C are fuzzy subsets of the same universe V.
The requisite special case is gotten by taking C=V, so that

A=>B = (AxB)V(-AxV)
This leads to a generalized modus ponens through its combination
with a compositional rule of inference, which is defined as follows.
Let A be a fuzzy subset of U, and let R be a fuzzy subset of uxV, i.e.,
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a binary fuzzy relation.

Then a fuzzy set B may be inferred from the

fuzzy sets A and R as the composition
B

=AoR.

Since the meaning of tip implies qtl given above is a binary fuzzy relation
of U and V, the rule of modus ponens "from p and

p~q

infer q" obtains as

its meaning
B = Ao(A=>B).

This mode of inference is formalizable in the multivalent systems
of Chapter 3, since cartesian products of fuzzy sets and

comp~sitions

of

fuzzy relations are formally definable in the given two leveled languages.
(For compositions, the role of the "sup" operator is captured as for
Il(A) in §5. 4.)

Dubois and Prade (1976) give a fuzzy logical version of this mode
of inference as well.

Here it is left as a conjecture for future inves-

tigations that this mode is similarly representable in a fuzzy logic as
described in §5.3.

The task is to formalize the generalizations of

"max," "min," and "sup" to fuzzy sets of type 2.
§5.6.

Decidability
Given that a substantial portion of the theory of approximate

reasoning has been axiomatized in a semantically complete class of
formal logical systems, the question next arises concerning which of
these systems are representable on a finite state computer.

In mathe-

matical terms this amounts to determining decidability, where a theory T
is decidable if there is a mechanical procedure (a decision procedure)
by which one can effectively determine in finitely many steps whether a
formula P of L(T) is a theorem of T.

(For a more detailed discussion of
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decision procedures, cf. §8.1 and §8.3.)

Here decidability will be

established for a subclass of the theories defined in Chapter 3.
By semantic completeness, a formula P is a theorem of a theory T
if and only if it is valid in every semantic model of T.

Therefore, a

decision procedure for T would amount to a procedure for determining the
semantic validity of formulas of L(T).

By the definition of semantic

validity, for such a procedure to exist it is sufficient that T satisfy:
1.

T has only finitely many semantic models,

2.

every model of T has a finite universe of discourse, and

3.

every model of T effectively uses only finitely many of the truth
values in [0,1].
In certain cases it may be possible to modify a given theory S9

that these requirements are satisfied.

We

he~e

discuss a procedure for

doing this, by treating the three conditions in reverse order.
Condition 3 may be ensured for a theory T .by the techniques
cussed in Example 3.4.3.

dis'~

Let the language L(T) contain a finite set of

O-ary relation symbols K , where the set of indices i1, ... ,i is symmeti
n
ric about the point 0.5. Adjoin as proper axioms all formulas of the
form

Then in every semantic model of T, the linguistic assertions in a valid
formula P can assume only the values i1, ... ,i n .
Condition 2 can be ensured in an analogous manner.

Let L(T)

contain a finite collection of individual constants a1, ... ,a , and
m
adjoin as a proper axiom a formula of the form
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Then individual variables in a valid formula can range over only finitely
many individuals.
Condition 1 is ensured by requiring that the theory T have a
property of categoricity, which may be defined as follows.

Two models I

and II of Tare isomorphic if there is a one-to-one correspondence

~

between UI and UrI such that
I(a(il""'!n))=I(a(~(il)""'~(in))

for all relation symbols a in L(T) and all n-tuples of individuals
i1, ... ,ineUI .

It can be shown that two models I and II of T are iso-

morphic if and only if exactly the same formulas of L(T) are valid in
both I and II.

Then, a theory T is categorical if all of its semantic

models are isomorphic.

Because of the manner in which Conditions 2 and

3 are ensured, categoricity can be ensured by explicitly defining the
meanings of every relation symbol within the formal theory T:

for every

k-ary relation symbol a, and every k-tuple a. , ... ,a. of the individual
11
1k
constants specified for Condition 2, adjoin a proper axiom of the form
a(a. , ... ,a. )
11
1k

= K.,1

where K.1 is one of the O-ary relation symbols specified for Condition 1.
When invoking this procedure, however, it is important to verify
that this does not lead to a theory which is inconsistent.

In particular,

the procedure is not applicable to any theory whose axioms already
require that either the set of individuals or the set of truth values be
infinite.

For in this case, the above methods for satisfying conditions

2 and 3 will yield a theory that has no semantic models and which is
therefore inconsistent by the second form of the completeness theorem
(Theorem 4.6-1).

An illustration of this is the theory

eM developed in

119
§6.3, which requires that its set of truth values obey the axioms for an
algebraic field.

Condition 3 cannot be satisfied in this case, since it

is known that the field axioms are not satisfied by any finite subset of
the real numbers.

On the other hand, the procedure succeeds for the

theory described in Example 3.4.3; and many other, considerably more
complex, theories of one or more linguistic variables can be rendered
decidable in this fashion without difficulty.
Note also that undecidability does not of itself forbid computer
applications.

It rather points out potential sources of error where

assumptions of finitude are involved.
by the theory CM of §6.3.

This situation is also illustrated

CHAPTER 6

AN APPLICATION--SPIN+
Uncertainty about the future is in part a consequence of the
imprecision in our knowledge of the present, together with our manner of
reasoning with imprecise ideas.

This chapter outlines an approach to

structural modeling of complex systems which makes this present-future
relationship formally explicit, via fuzzy sets and the theory of approximate reasoning.

The main result is a direct mathematical connection

between the imprecision in a given structural model and the degree

o~

uncertainty that this imprecision contributes to the model's forecasted
results.
§6.1 states the problem context, taking into consideration the aim
of forecasting methodology, the use of structural models, and the question of "certainty accounting."
§6.2 takes McLean's (1976) modeling package SPIN, and enhances it
to a package SPIN+ by adding some algorithms for computing certainty
values for forecasted events.

SPIN+ is illustrated with sample calcu-

lations for a five-variable "Citizen's Model" of a transit system.
§6.3 lays down all the details needed for representing SPIN+ and
the Citizen's Model in a multivalent linguistic theory.
§6.4 discusses the possibility and potential advantages of improving this approach through an implementation of fuzzy logic as is described
in §5.3.
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§6.1.

Forecasting Under Uncertainty
The task besetting contemporary forecasters stems from man's being

caught between the two sides of a perennial dilemma.
plan.

First, we must

This clearly is necessary merely for human survival.

Even the

simplest of cultures must undertake a small amount of planning in order
to meet the minimum requirements of food and shelter.

And in the more

sophisticated cultures, such as ours, planning is a common aspect of
everyday life.

In order to survive we must have well-defined goals. and

a reasonable idea of how they can be achieved.
At the same time, however, in order that our plans have a practical
viability, they must also be couched within a forecast of possible future
events.

A plan which is crafted in a vacuum, that is, in complete

disregard for the context within which it is to be executed, is not
really a plan at all.

Any project can be affected by myriad factors of

different kinds, e.g., physical, biological, human, economic, environmental, and so on.

Hence no plan can be crafted without a reasonable

prognosis of what lies ahead.
But herein resides the second half of the dilemma.
accurately predict.

We cannot

No one knows for sure what will happen in a given

situation (except perhaps a few self-prcclaimed soothsayers and clairvoyants, whose claims still remain dubious).
tions leave an element to chance.

Therefore, all our predic-

Cognizance of chance overshadows our

plans with uncertainty.
Thus arises the problem of forecasting: to improve our ability to
see into the future so as to reduce uncertainty.

The basic tool of the

forecaster is the concept of a model, by which one abstracts form a
given situation those aspects deemed relevant to the plan or goals one
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has in mind.

Such models may be roughly grouped into the categories of

mathematical and nonmathematical, while the former may in turn be subdivided according to mechanistic and probabalistic.

Mechanistic mathe-

matical models normally implement the mathematics of dynamical systems,
such as linear algebra or differential equations, and treat the future
as being predetermined by the characteristics of the present.

Probaba-

listic models implement the laws of averages, i.e., statistics, and
investigate the future in terms tendencies, or trends, of events.

Non-

mathematical models, on the other hand, forego rigorous computations and
focus on the nonmeasurable "ill-defined" aspects of a system, e.g.,
problems of management or individual human behavior.

These distinctions

are not at all crisp, however, as is illustrated in this
and particularly, in this chapter.

dissertatio~,

There are mathematical techniques

which can be applied to certain kinds of "ill-definedness."
The best forecasts combine an assortment of modeling techniques,
so as to bring into consideration an optimal collection of relevant
factors.

Yet even given the most carefully wrought prognosis, a degree

of uncertainty must remain.

First, there will often be aspects of the

system in question for which no known modeling procedure applies.

This

inability to model leaves uncertainty regarding those aspects unaffected,
i.e., it is at the maximum.

Second, inasmuch as models are only abstrac-

tions of carefully chosen factors, they characteristically blur a large
quantity of detail.

Hence, models are always imprecise, even where they

apply, and this imprecision automatically propogates an element of
uncertainty into the models predictions.

Last, experience teaches that

we in any case must always expect the unexpected.

Here we note a fact
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of the planner-decisionmaker's life, that any number of human factors
and unexpected events may affect what actually occurs.
For these reasons, forecasters have of late adopted the practice
of accompanying their forecasts with an accounting, as best as is feasible,
of the regions where uncertainty remains.

This assists the planner by

pOinting out those areas for which he should incorporate flexibility.
In the face of uncertainty, of course, this is the planner's only realistic alternative: to design courses of action which can adapt.
The work in this chapter deals with a somewhat more

spe~ialized

question within this problem of uncertainty accounting, that of developing an actual measure of the uncertainty that obtains.

In this, the

current approach is a priori limited to a consideration of only

thos~

forecasting methods for which such a measure can be defined, namely, the
mathematical models.

SpeCifically, we consider the "structural models,"

of which a wide variety are currently in vogue.

An extensive study of selected structural modeling techniques,
explicitly for their use in forecasting, was recently undertaken by a
team at Portland State University under the auspices of the National
Science Foundation (Linstone, et. ale 1978 and 1979).

An outgrowth of

that project is a more recent paper which gives a thorough analysis of
the nature of structural models, a comparison of the essential features
of a selected collection of structural modeling tools, and a discussion
of the kinds of information about a system that can be obtained in this
way (Lendaris 1980).
Structural models differ from other mathematical models in that
they directly represent systems in terms of their structure and inner
dynamiCS, while relegating quantitative (i.e., numerical) considerations
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to a level which is mostly nonsignificant.

In general, a structural

model is defined as a collection of variables (or parameters) together
with their interactions (Lendaris, p. 808).

A chief advantage of struc-

tural modeling is that the system being modeled is visualized geometrically as a digraph which shows the impacts of each parameter on the
other (as will be seen later in Figure 6-1).

Impacts may be either

positive or negative, linear or nonlinear, have short or long delay
times; etc., and they may be measurable in real units (e.g., dollars or
BTU's) or in nominal units on a qualitative scale (such as from "high"
to "low").

The digraph in turn can be transformed into a matrix, which

is analyzed on a computer.
Use of the model in generating forecasts involves a "what if ... "
analysis wherein one tests the future consequences over nominal or real
time units of hypothetical changes in the present or future values of
the parameters.

Anyone forecasting study may include a variety of

different sets of hypotheses and results, and as well, the results of
several different structural models of the same system.

These increase

our understanding of the system by illustrating the implications of
conceptualizing the system in different ways.
As both Linstone and Lendaris point out, an important aspect of
this technique is the insight into the system which is gained by the
modeler during the process of building the model itself--i.e., creating
the digraph, assigning weights, delay times, etc.

Given that the model

output is to be published as part of a forecasting study, however, it is
mainly the results which bear meaning for the planner.

For this reason,

the planner is best advised that the results should not be taken too
literally, i.e., as predictions.

As was stressed above, such forecasts

125

always inherit an element of imprecision from the imprecision of the
model.
Hence arises the question of how much imprecision obtains; or more
exactly, given a measure of model imprecision, to what extent does this
affect the confidence that one may place in the forecasted results.

The

sections to follow provide an approach to this question via the theory of
approximate reasoning.

Here the modeling package SPIN of McLean, et. al.

(1976) is enhanced by allowing the modeler to adjoin judgments as to the
"certainty of impacts" along with the usual weights and delays.

These

certainty values are then manipulated in parallel with the ordinary SPIN
calculations, according to a property chosen from of fuzzy inference.
The result is a unique "certainty of forecast" computation along the,
individual system parameters for each time unit that the parameters are
projected into the future.

A sample run of the modified package shows

that a reasonable link between model imprecision and uncertainty of
forecast is established.

If the assigned certainty of impacts in the

digraph are high, then certainty of projected parameters degrades slowly
with respect to time, whereas certainty degrades rapidly if the assigned
certainties are low.
In using this approach, however, two points regarding the present
use of the word "uncertainty" should be noted.

First, the "certainty

measures" which the modeler contributes to the digraph are strictly
subjective measures of the modeler's confidence that the impacts will
occur and will persist over time.

Hence they are measures of "impreci-

sion" as such, but only given that the basic structure and dynamics of
the model is correct.

They do not account for imprecison due to "hidden

variables" or other system aspects which tq.e model does not represent.
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Second, the computed "certainty of forecasts" is strictly connected only
with the model imprecision and should not be taken in the broader sense
discussed above.

Uncertainty due to an inability to model or an aware-

ness of the unexpected must be dealt with by other means.
Last it should be mentioned that, whereas SPIN and its relatives
among the class of structural models are strictly mechanistic in their
representation of reality, the present proposal to introduce approximate
reasoning is a move to combine this mechanism with a form of stochasm.
This of course is not stochasm in the traditional sense of being based
on probability theory (for the reasons cited in §2.2.10).

But it is

stochastic inasmuch as it deals with uncertainty and is based on an idea
which is akin to subjective probability.

Here judgments as to model

imprecision are obtained in the form of subjective choices of degrees of
certainty that a given impact relation will persist over time.
In focusing specifically on the impact relations, moreover, the
present approach differs further from conventional stochastic methods,
which deal only with uncertainty in the values of the system parameters.
Yet it at the same time still leaves unaddressed the common limitation
of all structural models, this being that they do not account for uncertainty regarding the model's topology.

There is no provision for the

possibility that a given impact relation may cease to be effective, or
that new impact relations may appear.

Even given these limitations,

however, it is clear that the models developed here are equally applicable, and in the same situations, as their nonstochastic predecessors.
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§6.2.

McLean's SPIN And The Enhancement SPIN+
It will be convenient to preface the technical details of SPIN+

with an outline of the basic idea.

Suppose that a digraph has been

constructed as in Figure 6-1, and assume that two variables A and Bare
related by
"an increase of AA in the value of A produces an
increase of

~=i~~AA

in the value of B after a

delay of d time units."
This assertion may recast as a logical implication

where
P is "A increases by AA," and
A
P is "B increases by ~=i%XAA
B
after a delay d."
Then a degree of certainty

c(PA~PB)

measured on a scale from 0 to 1 can

be assigned, with a high (low) degree indicating a high (low) confidence
that the inference

PA~PB

is true.

Given an explicit definition of

~

as

a function on [0,1], this leads to a capability for computing an inferred degree of certainty c(PB) from the pair c(PA), c(PA~PB)' In turn
this leads to a capability for computing degrees of certainty for the
from
consequent P
A of a sequence of inferences PA1~PA 2 ""'PAn-1 ~PAn
n
c(PA ) and the c(PA. ~PA.)' i=2, ... ,n.
1
1-1
1
Certainty accounting is accomplished automatically by the computations, with the specific characteristics of the accounting being dependent
on the choice of the implication

operator~.

For the present purposes,

the most appropriate choice appears to be the Lukasiewicz operator
discussed in §5.5.2.

Given the definition
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Variables
Xl
X
2

=
=

X3
X
4
Xs

=
=
=

Im:eacts
1st no. is a ..

Use of Energy
Hassle of Driving Car
(Parking,concestion,etc.)
Use of !4ass Transit

~J

2nd no. is d ..
~J

3rd no. is c ..
~J

Use of Automobile
Convenience of Mass Transit
Figure 6-l.

The Citizen's Hodel for SPIN+.

= vJeight
= Delay
= Certainty
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= min[l,l-c(PA)+c(PB)]
we can solve for c(PB) obtaining
c(PB) ~ max[O,c(PA)+c(PA~PB)-l],

(1)

c(PA~PB)

which forms a basis for the accounting procedure.

(2)
For example, suppose

that c(PA)=1.0, c(PA~PB)=0.9, and c(PB~PC)=0.9. Then, by (2), c(PB)~
1.0+0.9-1=0.9, from which it follows in turn that c(PC)~0.9+0.9-1=0.8.
Note that, while the certainty of the two inferences are equal, we have
that c(PA»c(PB»c(P C)' Le., the certainties of inferred events steadily
degrade. For computational simplicity, equality is assumed i~ (2),
which has the effect of making each inferred value be the highest
certainty estimate that is ensured by the previously computed.values.
The core of McLean's modeling package may be described as fol19WS
(Linstone, et. al., 1978, p. D-9).

Let X1 "",Xn be the parameters in a
digraph representation of a given system; let w.. and d .. be the weight
~J

~J

and delay of the impact of X. on X.; let X.(O) be the assumed value of
J

~

~

X.~ at time t=O; and assume that one or more of the X.~ are "pulsed" by
letting X.(l)=X.(O)+pulse.
~
~

Then future values of the X.~ are computed by

the formula
X.(t+l) =
J

n

X.(t)+~

where t'=max[O,t-l-d .. J.
~J

'-1

J

~-

w.. -(X.(t)-X.(t')),
~J

~

~

In words, the next value of X. is the current
J

value of X. plus the net change (which may be positive or negative)
J

.

brought about by the cumulative impacts of the most recent changes in
all of the X..
~

Calculation of a degree of certainty for X.(t+l) may now be developed in parallel.

Let

ax .. (t)
~J

J

denote X.(t)-X.(t'), the change in X.~
~

~

over the time of the delay d .. ; and let a.X.(t+l) denote w.. -ax .. (t),
~J

~

J

~J

~J
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the change in X. due to the change AX .. (t) in X..
J

l.J

l.

Then let c .. be the
l.J

certainty of the impact of X. on X.; let c(X. (0)) be the certainty of
l.

J

l.

the initial values of the X.; and assume that pulses have a certainty of
l.

1.0.

Then the certainty of the change a.x. in X. due to AX .. (t) may be
l. J

J

calculated in accordance with the Lukasiewicz

~

l.J

by

c(a.X.(t+I))=max[O,c(AX .. (t))+c .. -1].
l.J

~

~

To obtain next a certainty for the net impact of all the changes
n

in the X.--i.e., the quantity AX. (t+I)=I a.X.(t+I)--compute a weighted
l.
J
i=l l. J
average of certainties by
n
I c(a.x-, (t+I))· (a.x. (t+1)1
i=l l. J
l. J
c(AX.(t+I))
n
J
I la.x. (t+l)\
i=l l. J

=--------------------------

The rationale for this calculation is that the certainty of a sum of two
changes in X. is partly dependent on the sizes of those changes, thus.
J

ruling out a straightforward application of the simple logical conjunction (i.e, saying that the certainty of the sum is the "and" of the
certainties of the summands, where "and" is interpreted as the arithmetic
min).

For example, if a change of 10 units has certainty 0.9, and a

change of -2 units has certainty 0.2, then the weighted averaging technique yields a net change of 8 units with net certainty 0.8, which is
much more reasonable than a net certainty of only 0.2.

To distinguish

this weighted average interpretation for the logical "and," we here use
the term balanced conjunction, the formal details of which will be given
in §6.3.
The same rationale may finally be applied again to obtain
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C(X j (t+1»

=

c(X. (t)· IX. (t)1 +c(~. (t+1» ·I~. (t+1)1
J
IXj it)1 + I~j d+1)1
J
,

which completes the certainty calculates for the SPIN computed value
X.(t+1).
J

The acronym SPIN+ refers to the modification of SPIN which is
obtained by including all of these computations.

To test the kind of

output that one can obtain using SPIN+, a small FORTRAN program was
written for a model using five variables, with a forecast covering 30
time units.

The data used was as shown in Figure 6-1.

All variables

were assumed to have an initial value of 50 units, to be bounded by
0~.~100,
1

and to have initial certainty c(X.(0»=1.0.
1

A pulse of 1 unit

was applied to each of X3 (use of mass transit) and X (use of autos).
4
The output at selected time intervals is shown in Figure 6-2. The
five variables fluctuate in accordance with the original version of
SPIN, while certainties degrade, more rapidly for some variables than
for others.

Most importantly, further runs of the same program showed

that adjusting the certainties of the impact relations in the model has
the effect described in §6.1.

Certainty of forecasted events degrades

slowly if the certainty in the model is high, and it degrades rapidly if
the certainty of impacts is low.

Thus is established a firm mathematical

link between the amount of confidence that may be placed in the implications of a given model and the amount of imprecision that the model is
acknowledged to bear as a description of the corresponding system in the
real world.
§6.3.

Formalization Of SPIN+ In A Multivalent Linguistic Theory
The motivation for formalizing a given model of a real-world

system is discussed at length in Part III.

In brief, where non-classical
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Time

Energy
Use

Hassle

Mass
Auto
ConvenTransit
ience
c(X ) X3 c (X ) X
c(X ) X5 c(X )
2
3
4
4
5
1.00 50 1.00 50 1.00 50 1.00

t

I Xl

c (Xl) X2

1

150

1. 00

50

5

50

.99

49

.99

52

.99

49

.99

51

10

52

.98

46

.96

54

.98

50

.96

57

.99
.95
-,

15

157

.96

45

.92

61

.96

48

.92

73

.87

20

67

.92

36

.86

78

.91

38

.84

~00

.77

25

61

.89

13

.72

83

.88

30

.77

00

.66

30

58

.85

3

.59

84

.85

27

.68

00

.60

Xi = parameter value calculated by SPIN
c(x.) = certainty of X. calculated by SPIN+
~

~

Figure 6-2.

Sample output for SPIN+.
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logics are involved, representation of the model in a semantically
complete formal logical system is called for in

orde~

to obtain an

explicit characterization of the underlying logic, which can then be
analyzed for its consistency or coherence.

In the present case of

approximate reasoning, which is classical at the outer level, consistency is equivalent with coherence.

Hence, if the formalization were

discovered to be inconsistent, this would mean that any result is derivable from the given digraph, so that all model output would be devoid of
credibility.
The following establishes that the logic of the SPIN+ Citizen's
Model is indeed consistent.

At the same time it pinpoints a possible

source of inconsistency in the computer implementation, namely, erro+s
of rounding due to decimal approximation.

Since such errors will in

practice be negligible, however, one is hereby assured that the model
will always produce logically meaningful results.
Formalization of SPIN+ and the Citizen's Model requires developing
a formal theory with linguistic and axiomatic capabilities adequate to
express all of the calculations for an arbitrary run of the SPIN+ package.
This involves four main steps:
1)

Starting with the minimal multivalent theory, form the theory

FL of algebraic fields,
2)

From FL, form the theory OF of ordered fields, thus in two

steps laying down the needed properties of real-number arithmetic,
3)

Develop from OF the theory SP+, which includes explicit defini-

tions of (i) the Lukasiewicz

-+,

(ii) a notion of "balanced conjunction"

as mentioned in §6.2, and (iii) general calculations of forecasted
parameters and certainty measures,
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4)

From SP+ build the theory CM which describes the specific

characteristics of the Citizen's Model--i.e., the weights, delays, and
certainties of impacts, together with initial certainties and values of
the model parameters.
In order to develop the theory FL it is necessary first to extend
the basic definition of a linguistic theory, to allow for the formal
representation of functions defined on the individuals of a semantic
interpretation.
1)

The necessary modifications are:

proper symbols now include n-ary function symbols for any

finite n, with general denotations f,g,h, etc.,
2)

individual terms include strings of the form f(t 1 , ... ,tn ),
where f is n-ary and the t.1 are individual terms,
3)

semantic interpretations I for a language L now assign a

function I(f):U I n~Ui to each n-ary function symbol f in L.
To ensure semantic completeness, the following addition can be
made to the definition of the canonical interpretation Ia given in §4.4:
for any n-ary function symbol f in L(T), assign the function IA(f)
defined by

This function is well-defined, and leads to the desired completeness
result.
Now let F be the minimal linguistic theory.

To form the theory

FL, adjoin to L(F) three individual constants, denoted by 0,1, and -1,
two binary function symbols, denoted by + and ., and one unary function
symbol, denoted by -1.

The terms +(t,t'), ·(t,t'), and -l(t) will be

written t+t', t·t', and t

-1

.

Next, where x,y, and z are arbitrary

individual variables, adjoin the following formulas as proper axioms:
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FLl.

(x+y)+z=x+(y+z)

FL2.

x+O=x

FL3.

x+(-l'x)=O

FL4.

x+y=y+x

FL5.

(x·y)·z=x·(y·z)

FL6.

x'l=x

FL7.
FL8.

x'(y+z)=x'y+x'z

FL9.

y=x

-1

:: x'y=l

FLI0. ,(0=1).
This axiomatization follows Shoenfield (1967, p. 70) with the exception
that the concept of multiplicative inverse is here introduced in terms
of a unary function, -1, rather than by the existential axiom
, (x=O)::> 3 y(x 'y=I) .
It can be shown that the two approaches are equivalent, i.e., in either
case multiplicative inverses are properly defined.

To simplify nota-

tions, assume that FL furthermore contains two binary function symbols
denoted by - and / having the defining axioms:
FLU.

x-y=x+(-I'Y)

FLI2.

x/y=x·y-l.

Readability may be enhanced by writing terms of the form (x-y)-z as
x-y-z.
To define the theory OF of ordered field, adjoin a binary fuzzy
relation symbol, denoted by <, and make it non-fuzzy by the axiom
OFI.

X<~KO.OVX<y~Kl.0'

where KO.O and K1 . 0 are the zero-ary relation symbols defined in §3.1.1.
For notational convenience, formulas of the form t<t'~K1.0 will be
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written as t<t'.

Then the axioms specific to ordered fields may be

written exactly as in Shoenfield (1967, p. 87):
OF2.

, (x<x)

OF3.

x<y~(y<z~x<z)

OF4.

x<yVx=yVy<x

OFS.

x<y~x+z<y+z

OF6.

O<x~(O<y~O<x·y).

The theory OF will furthermore be assumed to contain a binary relation
symbol

(with notational convention similar as for <), a unary function

~

symbol I I, and two binary function symbols max[ ] and min[ ], defined
by:

= x<yVx=y

OF7.

x~y

OF8.

(Ixl=x

OF9.

(max[x,y]=x

= O~x)&(lxl=-I·x =x<O)

OFI0. (min[x,y]=x

=y~x)&(max[x,y]=y = x~y)
=x~y)&(min[x,y]=y = y~x).

We are now in a position to consider SP+.

Adjoin to OF: (i) for

each re[O,I], the zero-ary relation symbol Kr defined in §3.1.1, (ii) for
each re[O,I], an individual constant denoted by a , (iii) the defining
r

aO.OO=O & a 1 . 00 =1,
and (iv) for each pair r,r'e[O,I] such that r<r', the axiom

axiom SP+l.
SP+2.

a <a ,.
r

r

Axioms SP+l and SP+2, together with the axioms for FL and OF, ensure
that the constants a r serve as formal representatives of the truth values
in [0,1].
In terms of the a r and Kr' two operators, denoted K and V, may be
introduced by adjoining, for each re[O,I], the axiom
SP+3.

K(a )~K
r

r
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together with all formulas of the form
SP+4.

V(p)=a

r

=p~K r ,

where p is a linguistic assertion.

Although these operators are not

formally accommodated by the present definition of linguistic theory,
their use here causes no difficulty.

Semantic completeness is unaffected

since the behaviors of K and V are explicitly defined in terms of the a

r

and K •
r

Given these operators, the Lukasiewicz
SP+5.

~

has the explicit definition

p~q ~ K(min[l,l-V(p)+V(q)]).

Assurance that there is a unique certainty value for q, given the certainties of p and
SP+6.

p~q,

can be gained by adjoining

q ~ K(max[O,V(p)+V(p~q)-l]).
In order to discuss certainties of model parameters within SP+ it

is necessary to have, for an arbitrary SPIN calculation of X. as having
~
a value b, a means of expressing the degree of certainty that SPIN·+
assigns to the proposition that X.=b.
~

To this end, we may introduce a

binary certainty of equality fuzzy relation symbol, denoted by = (and
writing t=t' for =(t,t')).

A formula of the form x=a r ~ KO. 50 ' for
example, expresses the proposition that the variable x assumes the value
r with a certainty of 0.50.

It is useful to relate certainty of equality

to ordinary equality by
SP+7.

X~K1.0:)X=Y.
The aforementioned balanced conjunction, denoted by

, may now be

defined for a finite sequence of certainty of equality relations as follows:
Sp+g.

x

:y ~ .. ·'Ax:Y ~ K( [Vex :y ).( y 1, +- - ·+V(xn:yn ) -IynI ]
lIn nIl
• [\Y1\ +···+\Ynl ]-l).
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The manner in which this is used for dealing with cumulative impacts
will be seen below.
The next step in the definition of SP+ is to introduce a formal
representation of the time parameter.

At this stage SP+ becomes a

theory of the kind described in §5.2, having the universes of discourse
for its semantic interpretations being pairs of universes, one of which
in this case is understood as a set of times.

To this end adjoin:

(i) a new set of individual variables t ,t , ... , with general denota1 2
tions t,t', etc., (ii) for each s=O,1,2, ... ,M (some finite M) an individual constant denoted by b , (iii) for each individual constant,
s
function symbol, and relation symbol of OF (which contains FL), a
corresponding symbol bearing the subscript t, (iv) the corresponding
analogues of all the proper axioms of OF, but excluding FL9, and (v) the
axioms
SP+9.
SP+10.

bO=Ot
(for each s=l, ... ,M-l).

bS+1=bs+t1t

These axioms ensure that the constants b

s

behave formally as a set of

times which obey the necessary laws of real arithmetic.

The subscript t

will be omitted when the intended meaning is clear.
Now, for each i=l, ... ,N (some finite N), adjoin a unary function
symbol, denoted by X., and for each pair i,j=l, ... ,N, adjoin two unary
1.

function symbols denoted by DX .. and D.X ..
l.J

1.

J

The expressions X.(t),
1.

DX .. (t), and D.X.(t) will represent the SPIN computed values at time t
l.J

1.

J

of, respectively, the parameter X., the change in X. since the time
1.

1.

t'=max[t-1-delay .. ], and the change in X. due to the most recent change
l.J

DX ...
l.J

J
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The general notion of a weight of impact is introduced by adjoining, for each pair i,j=l, .•• ,N, an individual constant denoted by a ...
~J

To represent delays of impacts, similarly adjoin a (time) constant b ..
~J

for each pair i,j.

Then the SPIN computations are described by adjoin-

ing, for each pair i,j, the axioms
sp+n.

DX .. (t)=X. (t)-X. (max [0, t-1-b .. ])

SP+12.

D.X. (t+1)=a .. ·DX .. (t)

SP+13.

DX.(t+1)=D 1X.(t+1)+···+D--X.(t+l)

SP+14.

X. (t+1)=X. (t)+DX. (t+1).

1J

~

1J

~

1 J

1J

J

1J

]f-J

J

J

J.

J

Proceeding to the SPIN+ calculations, it will be convenient to
have the following abbreviations:

o.. (t)

for DX .. (t)=X. (max[O, t-1-b .. ])

~J

1

~J

~J

0' .. (t+1) for D.X. (t+l)=a .. ·DX .. (t)
J

~

~J

~J

1J

o.~ (t+1)

for DX. (t+1)=D1X. (t+1)+" ·+D__x. (t+l)

y. (t+1)

for X. (t+l)=X. (t)+DX. (t+1) .

J

J

J

N-J

J

J

J

Next let c .. e[O,l] be the certainty of the impact of X. on X..
1J

1

J

Then the

certainty computations of SPIN+ are defined by adjoining, for each pair
i,j, the axioms
SP+1S.

o1J.. (t)~o .. '(t+1)~K c ..

SP+16.

o.(t+l)~ol" (t+1)i\ •••AO'N.(t+l)

SP+17 .

y. (t+l)~y. (t)A o. (t+l).

~J

J

1J

J

J

J

J

J

The use of these axioms in SP+ has the effect that, given a specific
model (such as the Citizen's Model formalized below), the certainty of
the value of X. at time t, X.(t), will be the truth value of the linguisJ

tic assertion yj(b t ).

J
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To formalize the Citizen's Model in a theory CM: let M=30, the
number months used in §6.2; let N=S, the number of model parameters; for
each pair i,j=l, ... ,S, let c .. e[O,l] be the certainties of impacts, with
1.J
c .. =0 if no impact was given; for each pair i,j, adjoin the axiom
1.J
CMI.

a .. =a
,
1.J w..
1.J

where w. . e[O,l] is the weight of impact, with w.. =0 if no impact was
1.J
1.J
given; and, for each pair i,j, adjoin the axiom
CM2.

b .. =b d '
1.J
ij

where d .. is the delay of impact, with d .. =0 if no impact was given.
1.J
1.J
For convenience, the range [0,100] of the model parameters wil~ be
compressed to [0,1].

This allows the constants a r to also be used as
specific values of the X.(t). Thus the parameters are initialized by
1.
adjoining, for each i=l, ... ,S, the axiom
CM3.

Xi(O)~aO.SO ~ K1 . 0 ·

There remains only the specification of pulses.

Following the

example of §6.2, this may be accomplished by adjoining the five axioms
CM4~

X1(b1)~X1(bO)+ao.00 ~ K1 . 0

CMS.

X2(b1)~X2(bO)+ao.00

~

K1 . 0

CM6.

X3(b1)~X3(bO)+aO.01

~

K1 . 0

CM7.

X4(b1)~X4(bO)+aO.01

~

KI.O

CMS.

XS(b1)~XS(bO)+aO.00

~

K1.0

These also provide initial values to the SPIN computations, by axiom
SP+7.
It is easily verified that the Citizen's Model of §6.2 constitutes a
semantic model of the theory CM.

The relation symbol < can be interpreted
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as the usual ordering of the reals, and the function symbols +, ., and -1
can be interpreted as the usual addition, multiplication, and inversion of
reals.

Thus, by Proposition 3.4.2-2, CM is consistent.
CM is not categorical, however, since it is known that the theory

OF is not categorical.

Thus CM has semantic models which are not iso-

morphic with the Citizen's Model.

On the other hand, since all of the

functions and relations of CM, other than t, •

-1, and <, are explicitly

defined in terms of the individual constants a r and b s , nonisomorphic
models will always agree at least on the interval [0,1] and for the
times from 0 to 30.

Since CM clearlY encodes all of the computations of

the computer run described in §6.2, it follows by semantic completeness
that a formula of L(CM) which expresses a property of the

Xi--within.th~

given ranges of values, certainties, and times--will be a theorem of CM
if and only if it is generated by the SPIN+ computer run of the Citizen's
Model with the given initial values.

This of course excepts minor

discrepancies due to CM's being infinitary, while the computer deals with
decimal approximations.

Since such discrepancies will in practice be

negligible, we may in any case conclude that CM is a correct characterization of the logic of the Citizen's Model, and hence that the model
output will in general always be logically reliable.
§6.4.

Future Directions
This chapter shows how a reasonable rendering of certainty account-

ing can be built into the SPIN modeling package through some fairly
simple modifications, and it may be expected that similar modifications
can be developed for most of the structural modeling packages in use
today.

The formalized logic of approximate reasoning is generally
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applicable to any "A impacts B" relationship, or for that matter, any
transitive relation such as "A is preferred to B," which occurs in
applications of ISM (see Linstone, et. al., 1978).
At the same time, this work is properly regarded as only an initial step toward a more sophisticated apP,roach which would use fuzzy
logic per se as described in §5.3, and as recently extended to the
possibilistic logic described in §5.4.

This would invoke "Certainty" as

a linguistic variable having linguistic terms such as "certain," "uncertain," "very certain," "absolutely certain," "more or less certain,"
and so on, and having its universe of discourse be the interval [0,1].
In other words "Certainty" may be developed exactly as Zadeh's linguistic "Truth," which has its truth values being fuzzy subsets of [0,1]:
This logic has now been axiomatized (§5.3), but the entirety of
the mathematics for full implementation as an enhancement to SPIN has
yet to

b~

worked out.

Partial steps in this direction are available

from the work of Dubois and Prade (1979), which provides the needed
generalization of the Lukasiewicz?

The main task remaining is a

corresponding generalization of the balanced conjunction defined in
§6.3.
The advantages of using fuzzy logic, rather than the multivalent
logic, are two-fold:
1)

user-machine interaction can be carried out exclusively with

the qualitative linguistic terms in the term set for certainty--i.e.,
both for input certainty values and as output--thus approaching a natural
language conversation,
2)

in addition to the qualitative values given by the linguistic

term set, one also has a measure of the precision of those values.
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The latter may conceivably add a further dimension to certainty accounting, since it is known (Dubois and Prade 1979) that in sequences of
inferences in fuzzy logic, the consequents tend both to become less true
(i.e., less certain) and to become less precise.

PART II
LOGICS OF FORM AND SELF-REFERENCE

CHAPTER 7
THE LAWS OF FORM

The aim in this chapter is to show that the "primary algebra" of
Spencer-Brown's Laws of Form (1969) is essentially isomorphic with the
axiomatized classical propositional calculus.
In §6.1 the classical propositional calculus is presented as a
specific logic (cf. §2.1.3) consisting of a formal language L(PC) together with a semantics I(PC).

The formal system PC is then obtained by

adopting the axioms and inference rules of Hilbert and Ackerman

(192~).

This axiomatization is known to be a consistent and semantically complete
characterization of the classical logic.
In §6.2 we define an extension PC* of PC, and then expand I(PC) to
an appropriate semantics I(PC*) for L(PC*).

PC* is a consistent and

semantically complete inessential extension of PC.
In §6.3 we rewrite Spencer-Brown's primary algebra as a formal
system PA having a semantics I(PA).

Brown's work established that PA

is consistent and semantically complete with respect to I(PA).
In §6.4 the latter result is used to show that PA is isomorphic
with PC* in the general sense that exactly the same English language
assertions can be expressed in both L(PA) and L(PC*) and, of those
assertions, exactly the same ones can be formally derived as theorems of
both PA and PC*.

This in turn leads to a proof that "equality" in PA is

isomorphic with "logical equivalence" in

PC~....
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§6.5 reviews and offers new proofs of some earlier results of
Spencer-Brown (1969) and Orchard (1975) concerning the same questions as
addressed here.
As motivation for the development in this chapter, an outline of
the isomorphism theorem is provided in Figure 7-1.
as follows.

First, a translation t is defined.

The main steps are

t is a one-to-one

mapping of expressions of L(PA) into propositions of L(PC*).
~(PA)

is shown to be identical with

~(PC*)

Next,

in the sense that an equation

E=l is valid in ~(PA) if and only if the proposition teE) is ~autology
of

~(PC*).

One then has the following simple argument:
PAI-E=1 iff E=1 is valid in ~(PA)
(completeness of PA and Proposition 1.1.6-1)
iff teE) is a tautology of

~(PC*)

(by the result mentioned above)
iff

PC'I~I-t (E)

(completeness of

PC~

and Proposition 1.1.6-1).

The task in the first three sections is mainly to describe the systems
PC* and PA with sufficient precision so that the translation t can be
provided a rigorously explicit definition.
§7.1.

The System PC
As symbols for a language L(PC) select a countably infinite set

from the collection which was assumed to exist in §2.1.1.
these symbols be denoted by , and

V,

Let two of

to serve as logical connectives--

respectively, negation and disjunction.

Let two further symbols be

denoted by ( and ), to serve formally as parentheses.

Assume that the
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uivalence
(*)

Figure 7-1.

Isomorphism of PC* and PA.
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other, infinitely many, symbols of L(PC) are denoted by P1,P2"'"

and

serve as propositional variables.
The propositions of L(PC) are defined inductively as follows:
1.

The propositional variables are propositions of L(PC) ,

2.

If a string P is a proposition of L(PC) , then the string of the
form,p is a proposition of L(PC) ,

3.

If two strings P and Q are propositions of L(PC), then the string of
the form (PVQ) is a proposition of L(PC).
It is convenient to introduce other logical connectives--&

(conjunction),

~(logical

implication), and = (logical equivalence)--for

purposes of abbreviating complex formulas, as follows:
., bP'hQ); P:lQ abbreviates '1PVQ; P=Q abbreviates

P&Q abbreviates

(P~Q)&(Q:;)P).

The use of

parentheses is necessary for distinguishing between such formulas as
,P&Q and

~(P&Q).

On the other hand, for writing out formulas of L(PC) ,

parentheses may be dropped when the intended grouping is clear.
Now define a semantics

~(PC)

for L(PC) as follows.

Let the truth

values be the numbers 1 and O--with 1 standing for "true" and 0 standing
for "false."

Let the truth valuations (or truth-value assignments) be

the mappings V of formulas of L(PC) into {l,O}, such that:
1.

For each propositional variable p.,
V(p.)e{l,O},
~
~

2.

For each proposition of the form ,P, V(,P) = 1-V(P),

3.

For each formula of the form PVQ, V(PVQ) = max[V(P),V(Q)].

It is easy to see that
V.

~(PC)

Furthermore, each V in

means of &,

~,

encodes the usual truth-tables for , and

~(PC)

and =, in the expected ways; for example, V(P&Q)=l if and

only if both V(P)=l and V(Q)=l.
of

~(PC)

acts on propositions abbreviated by

A proposition P of L(PC) is a tautology

if V(P)=l for all truth-valuations V of

~(PC).
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By classical propositional calculus is meant the logic which is
represented by the pair

L(PC),~(PC).

In this dissertation, the term

propositional calculus shall sometimes also refer to the axiomatized
propositional calculus--i.e., a formal logical system--denoted by PC.
The following axiomatization was developed by Hilbert and Ackerman
(1928, cf. Rescher 1969).

As axioms, PC has the following propositions

of L(PC):
1.

(P1VP1 )::lP1

2.

P1;:) (P1VP2)

3.

(P1VP2)=>(P2'1P1)

4.

(P1;:)P2);:)((P3'lP1)::>(P3VP2))'
As inference rules PC has the following mappings of L(PC) into

itself:
1.

Modus Ponens: the binary rule consisting of all triples of the form
(P,~Q,Q)

2.

where P and Q are propositions of L(PC) ,

(Uniform) Substitution: the unary rule consisting of all pairs of
the form (P,P(Q/p.»), where Q is a proposition of L(PC) ,
~

p.

~

is a

propositional variable, and the notation P(Q/p.)
is as defined in
~
§2.1.1.
The theorems of PC are generated from the axioms by means of the inference rules, in the manner described in §2.1.4.3.
Hilbert and Ackerman's work establishes that PC is semantically
complete with respect to
tion of the form P&1P.

~(PC).

A contradiction of L(PC) is a proposi-

To see that PC is consistent observe that no

contradiction of L(PC) can be a tautology of

~(PC).

tion can be a theorem of PC, by Proposition 2.1.6-1.

Hence no contradic-
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§7.2.

The Inessential Extension PC*
Let! denote a symbol which is not in the symbol set for L(PC).

An extension PC* of PC can be obtained as follows:

1.

Adjoin the new proposition symbol! to the set of symbols of L(PC),
as a new proposition, thereby generating a larger set of propositions,

2.

Adjoin the proposition !=Pl&'Pl to the set of axioms of PC, thereby
generating a larger set of theorems.

The semantics I(PC) can be expanded to a semantics I(PC*) for L(PC*) by
extending the domain of each valuation V in I(PC) by the additional
requirement that V(!)=O.

Thus the symbol! may be considered seman-

tically as standing for "falsehood," and syntactically as being a "name"
for the contradiction Pl&'Pl' which name has been introduced by means of
a "defining axiom."
Contradiction for L(PC*) is defined similarly as for L(PC); and.
the same simple technique discussed in §7.1 may be used to show that PC*
is consistent.
Proposition 7.2.-1.

The system PC* is complete with respect to

I(PC*).
Proof.
I(PC*).

Let P be a proposition of L(PC*) which is a tautology of

It is desired to show that PC*rP.

Since V(!)=V(Pl&'Pl)=O for

all truth valuations V of I(PC*), the proposition P(Pl&'Pl / !)--which is
obtained from P by replacing each occurrence of F with an occurrence of
Pl&'Pl--must be a tautology of I(PC*).

But P(Pl&1Pl / !) is a proposition

of L(PC), whence it follows that it must be a tautology of I(PC).

PCrP(Pl&'Pl / !) by the completeness of PC with respect to I(PC).

Then
Since

the theorems of PC are a subset of the theorems of PC*, this means that

PC*rP(Pl&'Pl / !).

From this it may be established, by induction on the
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length of propositions of L(PC*), that

PC*~P.

An example of a proof by

induction on the length of strings appears in Theorem 7.4-1.
Proposition 7.2-2.

0

The system PC* is an inessential extension of

pc.
Proof.
that, if

Let P be a proposition of L(PC).

PC*~P,

assume that

then

P~P.

PC~P

(cf. §2.1.5.3).

For a proof by contradiction,

Then, by the completeness of PC with respect to

I(PC), P is not a tautology of I(PC).
tautology of I(PC*).
§7.3.

It is desired to show

Hence

PC*~P,

It follows that P is not a

by Proposition 1.1.6-1.

0

The System PA
Spencer-Brown's Laws of form (1969) develops an equation calculus

in which logical reasoning is connected to a few simple rules governingthe manipulation of some elementary conceptual "forms."

The work begins

with the concept of a "distinction" in a uniform conceptual space.

One

side of the distinction is termed the "marked state" and is indicated by
a "token,"

I;

the other side of the distinction is termed the "unmarked

state" and is indicated by the absence of a token, i. e., a blank space.
A "primary arithmetic" is devised, which has two basic axioms:

II=!

91=

(Law of Calling)
(Law of Crossing).

The Law of Calling may be interpreted by the statement:

To indicate (or

"call") the marked state twice is the same as to indicate it once.
Law of Crossing may be interpreted by:

The

To cross the boundary of the

distinction twice is the same as to not cross at all.
Expressions in the primary arithmetic can be defined formally by:
(i) the token and the blank space are expressions, (ii) if E is an
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expression, then

E1 is an expression, and (iii) if E and F are expres-

sions, then the concatenation EF is an expression.

Spencer-Brawn's

Theorem 3 (1969, p. 14) establishes that the above two laws, together
with a few intuitively plausible "canons," enable one to reduce any
expression of the arithmetic to either the token or the blank space.
Thus every expression of the arithmetic indicates exactly one of the
"marked" or "unmarked" states.
When reducing expres.sions of the arithmetic by means of the two
laws, it is evident that the token has two different interpretations,
depending on whether it "covers" a blank space or some other (non-blank)
expression--to wit, the expression -, is always interpreted as the
"marked state," while an expression of the form

E1

is interpreted as the

state that one arrives at by crossing from the state that is indicated
by E.

These two interpretations may be united, however, by interpreting

as the state one arrives at by crossing from the unmarked state--namely
the marked state.

In other words, the "crossing" interpretation serves

the purpose for all expressions.
Given the primary arithmetic, Spencer-Brown next generalized by
introducing expression variables into the language, and by formalizing
"equality" of expressions so that one obtains equations like

e1 =

e1 fl =g and

This leads to a "primary algebra" having two "initials" and two

"rules" (see the following).

An equation of the algebra is termed

"valid" if it is true in the primary arithmetic for all possible (uniform) substitutions of arithmetical expressions into that equation in
place of the variables.

Spencer-Brown's prinCipal result is that the

primary algebra is complete under this notion of validity.

Because of

the above-mentioned Theorem 3, it is evident that this in effect is

.
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completeness with respect to a two valued semantics, having as its
values the marked and the unmarked states.
The primary algebra will here be represented as a formal logical
system in the sense of §2.1.4.

To this end, several mathematical objects

and properties left unwritten or simply assumed in the primary algebra
must here be made formally explicit.

These are discussed in what follows.

As symbols for a language L(PA), select a countably infinite set
of symbols which are different from those used for L(PC*).

Let two of

these symbols be denoted by [ and ], to serve formally as square brackets;
let two further symbols be denoted by ( and ), to serve as parentheses;
let a fifth symbol be denoted by =, to serve as an equality symbol; and
let a sixth symbol be denoted bye, serving to formalize the notion of
blank space.

The infinitely many remaining symbols will be denoted by

e 1 ,e 2 , ••. , and will be referred to as expression variables.

The language

L(PA) has expressions, defined inductively by:
1.

Expression variables are expressions of L(PA) ,

2.

The symbol e is an expression of L(PA),

3.

If a string E is an expression of L(PA) , then the string of the form
[E) is an expression of L(PA) ,

4.

If two strings E and F are expressions of L(PA), then the string of
the form (EF) is an expression of L(PA).

In writing out expressions, parentheses may be dropped if the symbol
groupings are clear or irrelevant; but square brackets may not be dropped.
Brackets are here being used as logical connectives, and therefore are
always essential to the syntactical form of an expression.
An equation of L(PA) is a string of the form E=F, where E and F

are expressions of L(PA).
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The formal logical system PA has as axioms the following five
equations of L(PA):
1.

[[e 1 ]e 1 ]=e

2.

[[ele3][e2e3]]=[[el] [e 2 ]]e 3

3.

e 1e=e 1

4.

e 1e 2=e 2e 1

5.

el(e2e3)=(ele2)e3·

The inference rules of PA are the following mappings of L(PA) into
itself:
1.

(Not-Necessarily-Uniform) Substitution:

all pairs of the form

(E=F,G=G*), where E=F is an equation of L(PA), G is an expression of
L(PA), and G* is an expression of L(PA) that is obtained from G by
substituting an occurrence of F for each of one or more (but not
necessarily all) occurrences of E in G,
2.

(Uniform) Replacement:

all pairs of the form (E=F,(E=F)(G/e.)),
~

where G is an expression of L(PA), e. is an expression variable, and
~

(E=F)(G/e.)
is as defined in §2.1.1,
~
3.

Symmetry of Equality:

all pairs of the form (E=F,F=E), where E and

F are expressions of L(PA),
4.

Transitivity of Equality:

all triples of the form (E=F,F=G,E=G),

where E, F, and G are expressions of L(PA).
The system LOF has a set of theorems as defined in §2.1.4.3.
The manner in which LOF represents Spencer-Brown's primary algebra
may now be summarized as follows:
1)

The blank space is here replaced by a specific symbol, denoted

by the Greek letter e,
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2)

In order to have expressions be strings--instead of two dimen-

sional arrays made up of tokens and blank spaces--the token -', is here
replaced by the pair of square brackets, [ and ],
3)

On account of item 1, the token -"

thought of as "covering" a

blank space, is now written as [e),
4)

In the present notation, the above axioms 1 and 2 of PA are

Spencer-Brown's "initials" of the primary algebra, entitled "position"
and "transposition"; and the above inference rules 1 and 2 are SpencerBrown's rules of "substitution" and "replacement,"

5)

Axiom 3 encodes the use of the blank space, which in Laws of

form (p. 15) is expressed by the "Rule of Dominance" and, briefly stated,
says that "marked" dominates "unmarked",
6)

Commutativity and associativity of concatenation are here

formalized, by means of axioms 4 and 5,
7)

Parentheses are introduced for expressing the associativity

property of concatenation, in axiom 5,
8)

Symmetry and transitivity of equality are here formalized, by

inference rules 3 and 4.
From these notes it can be seen that exactly the same equations--under
transliteration in accordance with the above items 1 and 2--are expressible and derivable in both the primary algebra and the formal system PA.
The semantics I(PA) for L(PA) has as values the letters
standing respectively for the marked and unmarked states.
of I(PA) are the mappings v of expressions of L(PA) into
that:
1.

For each elementary variable e.,
v(e.)e{m,u},
l.
l.--

2.

v(e)=~,

~

and

~,

The valuations
{~,~}

such
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3.

For any expression of the form [E],
if

4.

v([E])=~

if

v(E)=~;

and

v([E])=~

v(E)=~,

For any expression of the form EF,
v(F)~;

otherwise

v(EF)=~

if either

v(E)=~

or

v(EF)=~.

Item 4 evidently is in keeping with the aforementioned "rule of dominance."
An equation E=F of L(PA) is valid in L(PA) if v(E)=v(F) for all valuations

v of L(PA).
An inconsistency of L(PA) is an equation of the form E=[E].

It

can be shown that the system PA is consistent, by Proposition 1.1.6-1
and the same technique as discussed for PC in §7.1.
Proposition 7.3-1.

The system PA is complete with respect to

I(PA) •
Proof:

Spencer-Brown's completeness proof applies, since the

foregoing remarks show that L(PA) is essentially the same semantics as
used in Laws of form.

More exactly, if an equation E=F is valid in

I(PA) , then it is also valid in Spencer-Brown's semantics, since every
arithmetical expression is uniquely reducible to either -, or the blank
space (Laws of form, Theorem 3); and conversely for the same reason.

§7.4.

0

The Systems PA And PC* Are Isomorphic
A translation t of expressions of L(PA) into propositions of

L(PC*) can now be defined as follows:
1.

For each index i,t(e.)=p., where e. is the i-th expression variable
1.

1.

1.

of L(PA) , and p.1. is the i-th propositional variable of L(PC*),
2.

t(e)=K,

3.

For each expression of the form [E], t([E])=

4.

For each expression of the form EF, t(EF)= t(E)Vt(F).

~t(E),
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It can be shown, by induction on the length of expressions of L(PA),
that the mapping t is well-defined.

Furthermore, by induction on the

length of propositions of L(PC*), t is a one-to-one correspondence
between expressions of L(PA) and propositions of L(PC*).
the inverse translation, t- 1 , is also well-defined.

Consequently,

The following theorem establishes an isomorphism of PA and PC* in
the precise sense that, for any expression E of LePA) , PArE=[e] if and
only if

PC~t(E).

This notion of isomorphism may be interpreted as

saying that essentially the same assertions of ordinary

Engli~h

are

expressible in both L(PA) and L(PC*), and, of those so expressible,
exactly the same assertions are formally derivable in both PA and PC*.
This interpretation is justified by reading teE) as usual for formulas
of PC--Le., simply as asserting "teE)"--and by reading the expression

[e] as standing for "true"--so that "E=[e]" may be interpreted as asserting "the proposition lEI is true".
Theorem 7.4-1.
Proof.

The systems PA and PC* are isomorphic.

By the discussion at the beginning of this chapter, it is

sufficient to show that IePA) can be identified with I(PC*) in the sense
that for any expression E of L(LOF),
I(PA)FE=[e] iff I(PC*)Ft(E).
By the definition of I(PA) , each valuation v is uniquely determined by its action on the expression variables e ..

Similarly, by the

~

definition of I(PC*), each truth-value assignment V is uniquely determined by its action on the propositional variables p ..
~

Consequently,

there is a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets of valuation
mappings, given by:
v(e. )=m iff V(p. )=1.
~

-

~
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Since

v([e])~,

for all v in I (PA) , it now follows by the defini-

tions of "valid in I(PA)" and "tautology of I(PC*)" that it is sufficient
to show: for every expression E of L(PA) , and every valuation v of
I(PA), if V is the truth-value assignment of I(PC*) corresponding to v,
then
v(E)~

iff V(t(E))=l.

This will be accomplished by induction on the length of expressions E of
L(PA).

Let E be any expression of L(PA); and let n be the length of E.
Case 1: n=l.

By definition of the expressions of L(PA) , there are

two possibilities:
Case 1.a: E is an expression variable, e ~.•
definition of t; so

v(E)~

Then t(e.)=p.,
by the
1
~

iff V(t(E))=l, by virtue of the assumed

correspondence between v and V.
Case l.b: E is the symbol e.
there is no v such that
Case 2: n>l.

This case does not arise, since here

v(E)=~.

Here also there are two possibilities:

Case 2.a: E is an expression of the form [F].

Then F has length

less than n, and the induction hypothesis applies, giving
v(F)=~

iff V(t(F))=l.

v(F)=~

iff V(t(F))=O.

It follows that
(1)

Thus,
v(E)~

iff

v(F)=~

iff V(t(F))=O
iff V(,t(F))=l
iff V(t(E))=l

(def. of I(PA))
(by (1))
(def. of I(PC*))
(def. of t)
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Case 2.b: E is an expression of the form FG.

Then each of F and G

have length less than n, and the induction hypothesis provides
v(F)~

iff V(t(F»=l

(2)

V(G)=~

iff V(t(G»=l.

(3)

Thus,
v(E)~

iff either

v(F)=~

or

(def. of

v(G)=~

~(PA)

iff either V(t(F»=l or V(t(G»=l

(by (2) and (3»

iff

(def. of

V(t(F)~t(G»=l

iff V(t(FG»=1.

~(PC*»

(def. of t)

This completes the proof, by induction on n.

0

The following theorem shows that equality in PA is isomorphic with
logical equivalence in PC*.
Theorem 7.4-2.

For all equations E=F of L(PA) ,
PA~E=F

iff

PC~~t(E)=t(F).

Let G be the expression t- 1 (t(E)=t(F» of L(PA).
Theorem 7.4-1 and the fact that t- 1 is well-defined,
Proof.

PC*~t(E)=t(F)

iff

By-

(1)

PA~G=[E].

By Propositions 7.2-1 and 1.1.6-1,
iff

PC*~t(E)=t(F)

(2)

~(PC*)Ft(E)=t(F).

By Propositions 7.3-1 and 1.1.6-1,
PA~G=[E]

iff

(3)

~(PA)FG=[E].

It follows by (1), (2), and (3) that it is sufficient to show
~(PA)FG=[E]

iff

(4)

~(PA)FE=F.

Item (4) can be established as follows.

Observe that G can be

written explicitly as [[[E]F][[F]E]], by the definition of
definition of the connective =.

t

and the
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For the "only if" part of (4), suppose that G=[E] is valid in
Then, for all v,

~(PA).

for any v, then

v(G)~.

equation E=F is valid in

It is easy to verify that, if

v(G)~.

Consequently, for all v, v(E)=v(F)--i.e., the
~(PA).

For the "if" part of (4), suppose that E=F is valid in
Then, for all valuations v, v(E)=v(F).
v(E)=v(F)~

v(G)=!.
in

~(PA).

or

v(E)~(F),

v(E)=v(F)=~.

~(PA).

Hence, for all v, either

Here one can verify that, in either case,

Thus, for all v, v(G)=v([E])--i.e., the equation G=[E] is valid
0

§7.5. Review of Spencer-Brown's and Orchard's Results
Concerning Propositional Calculus
Let t* be the restriction of the inverse translation t- 1 to just
the propositions of L(PC).

Then t* turns out to be Spencer-Brown's

"interpretation" of propositions of the propositional calculus into
expressions of the primary algebra.

In the present notation, his result

concerning propositional calculus may be expressed as follows.
Proposition 7.5-1.
P is a tautology of
Proof.

For P any proposition of PC, PArt*(P)=[E] iff

~(PC).

By Theorem 7.3-1,

t(t*(P)) is just P.

PA~t*(P)=[E]

iff

PC*~t(t*(P)).

But

Hence
PA~t*(P)=[E]

iff

(1)

PC*~P.

Since PC* is an inessential extension of PC (Proposition 7.2-2) and P is
a proposition of L(PC),
(2)

PC*I-P iff PcrP.
By the completeness of PC with respect

~(PC),

PCrP iff P is a tautology of

(3)

~(PC).

Lines (1),(2), and (3) together imply the desired result.

0
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A proposition P of L(PC) is an antitautology of
for all V in

~(PC).

if V(P)=O

~(PC)

A proposition P of L(PC) is a contingency of

if V(P) may be either 1 or 0, depending on V.

~(PC)

Orchard (1975) establishes

the following.
Proposition 7.5-2.

For any proposition P of PC, (i)

iff P is an antitautology of
PA~t*(P)=e

~(PC),

iff P is a contingency of

Proof:

and (ii) neither

PA~t*(P)=e

PA~t*(P)=[e]

nor

~(PC).

(i) Similar to the proof of Proposition 7.5-1.

(ii) It is

obvious that P is either a tautology, an antitautology, or a contingency
of

~(PC).

Thus (ii) follows by (i) and Proposition 7.5-1.

·0

These results established conclusively that the propositional
calculus can be embedded in the primary algebra; but they also raised
the question of why, conversely, the primary algebra cannot be embedded
in propositional calculus.

This led to the isomorphism theorem of §7.4.

It was observed that the translation t* could not be inverted to provide
a translation of expressions of the primary algebra into propositions of
the propositional calculus, simply because the language of the propositional calculus contains no symbol corresponding to Spencer-Brown's
blank space.

This suggested adding a new symbol, together with a defin-

ing axiom, as was done in §7.2 to obtain PC* from PC.

The fact that PC*

is an inessential extension of PC justifies the terminology of the
conclusion: the primary algebra is essentially isomorphic with classical
propositional calculus.

CHAPTER 8
THE CALCULUS FOR SELF-REFERENCE
The primary aim of this chapter is to establish that F. J. Varela's
calculus for self-reference (Varela 1975) provides a semantically complete axiomatization of' S. C. Kleene's three-valued logic of partial
recursion (Kleene 1938 and 1952).
In §8.1 the calculus is represented as a formal system CSR having
a semantics I(CSR).

Varela's work establishes that CSR is complete with

respect to I(CSR).
In §8.2, first, the three-valued truth-table system studied by
Kleene is represented as a formal logic, consisting of a language L(K),
together with a semantics I(K).

This formalizes a notion of "strong

equivalence" of logical propositions, denoted

by~.

Next is defined a

translation t of expressions of L(CSR) into propositions of L(K), which
is then used to define a formal system K.

The axioms and inference

rules of K are just the images under t of the axioms and inference rules
of CSR.

Thus, it is immediate that CSR is isomorphic with K.

§8.3 establishes that K is complete with respect to the semantics
I(K).

This proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 7.4-1.
In §8.4 it is shown that PC, PC* and PA are Aristotelean systems,

while CSR and K are non-Aristotelean systems.
extensions of K having the form
nevertheless coherent.

K(P~'P),

Thus we establish that

although inconsistent, are
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§8.5 studies the completeness and coherence of some special extensions of K.
paper.

This in part corrects an apparent oversight in Varela's

Where that work uses E=D as an "abbreviation" for E=E1; it

happens that these two equations are in fact formally derivable from one
another in CSR.

This section also establishes necessary and sufficient

conditions for a simple extension to be coherent.
As motivation for the developments in this chapter, an outline of
the abovementioned completeness result for K is provided in Figure 8-1.
Here the primary task is to show that I(CSR) is identical with I(K) in
the sense that an equation E=F of L(CSR) is valid in I(CSR) if and only
if the strong equivalence

t(E)~t(F)

is valid in I(K).

With this result,

one may then argue as follows:

KrP~ iff CSRrt- 1 (p)=t- 1 (Q)
(isomorphism of CSR and K)
iff t- 1 (p)=t- 1 (Q) is valid in I(CSR)
(completeness of CSR and Proposition 1.1.6-1)
iff

P~

is valid in I(K)

(by the result mentioned above).
No such axiomatization of Kleene's logic has heretofore been known.
§8.1.

The System CSR
The development in Varela's "A calculus for self-reference"

parallels the discussion in Laws of form.

First, the notion of a marked

and an unmarked state is augmented by the notion of an "autonomous
state."

This state may be conceptualized as the entire uniform space in

which Spencer-Brown makes his "distinction," and it is indicated formally
by a new sign,

LJ.
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U)
U)

(!)

c(!)
.j..l
(!)

1

(?)

CJ

Equivalence
(* )

Figure 8-1.

Semantic completeness of K.
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This leads to an "extended arithmetic" having the following axioms:

et = -,

=U=
51= Ll

, where e is either

, blank, or

(Dominance)
(Crossing)
(Reflexion)
(Autonomy)

iJLJ~L1

which axioms may be interpreted similarly as Spencer-Brown's two "laws."
For example, the third axiom (Reflexion) may be interpreted as saying:
to cross from the autonomous state is to remain in the autonomous state.
Furthermore, the rule of dominance is hereby modified to read: marked
dominates autonomous, and autonomous dominates unmarked.
Based on these axioms, Varela established an analogue of SpencerBrown's Theorem 3: that any expression of the extended arithmetic
reduced to exactly one of -','blank, or

LJ.'

ca~

be

The extended arithmetic is

then generalized to form an' "extended algebra," which includes a
formalized equals sign, expression variables, and three axioms (represented below as axioms 1, 2, and 3).

Last, equations of the extended

algebra are termed "valid" in the analogous sense as equations of the
primary algebra, and it is established in full detail that the extended
algebra is semantically complete with respect to this notion of validity.
It follows that remarks similar to those given in §7.3 will establish that the following system CSR and semantics I(CSR) provides a
correct formalization of the extended algebra.

We may here note that

the Greek letter a is now used as a replacement for the sign

LJ.'

Let the formal language L(CSR) be the language that is obtained
from L(PA) by adjoining a new symbol, denoted by a, to the symbols of
L(PA) (cf. §2.1.5.3).

Let the semantics I(CSR) have as values the
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letters !,

~,

and !, and as valuations have the mappings v of expres-

sions of L(CSR) into

{!,~,!}

such that:

1.

For each expression variable e., v(e.)e{m,u,a},

2.

v(e)=~

3.

For any expression of the form [E],

4.

For any expression of the form EF, if v(E)#V(F), then v(EF) equals

1.

1.

---

and v(a)=!,
v([E])=!,~,

or !, according as

whichever one of v(E) and v(F) is most "dominant", where m dominates
!, and ! dominates

~;

otherwise v(EF) is the value that v assigns to

both E and F.

An equation E=F of L(CSR) is valid in I(CSR) if v(E)=v(F) for all valuations v of I(CSR).
The formal logical system CSR has as axioms all equations of L(CSR)
having the following forms:
1.

[[E]G]E = E

2.

[[EG][FG]] = [[E][F]]G

3.

[Ea]E = E

4.

Ee

5.

EF=FE

6.

E(FG) = (EF)G.

=E

As inference rules CSR has the following mappings of L(CSR) into itself,
all defined similarly as for PA:
1.

(Not-Necessarily-Uniform) Substitution

2.

Symmetry of Equality

3.

Transitivity of Equality

These axioms and inference rules generate a set of theorems of CSR as in
§2.1.4.3.

A rule of (uniform) replacement is not used in CSR since the
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axioms are here defined in accordance with some axiom schemes--i.e.,
the above "forms" 1 through 6--which ensures a priori that all substitution instances of theorems are also theorems.
Proposition 8.1-1.

The system CSR is complete with respect to

I(CSR) .
Proof.

By Varela's completeness theorem and essentially the same

argument as in Proposition 7.3-1.

0

An inconsistency of L(CSR) shall here be defined as an equation of
the form E=[E], exactly as for PA.

It should be noted that this defini-

tion differs from that of Varela, who adheres more closely to SpencerBrown in haVing an inconsistency be anyone of the specific equations

[e]=a, a=e, and [e]=e.

The present definition is a much more

natura~

one, however, especially in view of the following two propositions.
Proposition 8.1-2.
Proof.
CSR~a=[a]

The system CSR is inconsistent.

The inconsistency a=[a] is valid in I(CSR).

by Proposition 8.1-1.

Proposition 8.1-3.
Proof.

Hence

0

The system CSR is coherent.

Consider anyone of Varela's inconsistencies mentioned

above, saya=e.

This equation is not valid in I(CSR).

by Proposition 2.1.6-1.

Hence

CSR~a=e,

0

Thus CSR, although inconsistent, is nevertheless coherent--and is
therefore a nontrivial non-Aristotelean system in the sense described in
§2 .1.5.4.
§8.2.

Kleene's Logic And The System K
Kleene's three-valued system of truth-tables incorporates an

"undefined" truth-value and a notion of "strong equivalence" between
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propositions.

This system is here presented as a formal logic consist-

ing of a language L(K) and a semantics

wherein the undefined

~(K),

truth-value is represented by the number

and the notion of strong

~

equivalence is denoted, as in Kleene's work,

by~.

An addition to

Kleene's system is the special proposition symbol A, introduced formally
below.
Let A and

~

denote two symbols which are not included in the

symbol set for L(PC*).

The language L(K) may be obtained from L(PC*) as

follows:
1.

Adjoin the new symbol

~

as a proposition symbol, thereby generating

a larger set of propositions,
2.

Let the well-formed strings of L(K) be the equivalences of the form
where P and Q are propositions of L(K).

P~Q

The same abbreviations with &,

~,

and

=,

apply here as for L(PC)

and L(PC*).
The semantics

Include the number
set

2.

for L(K) may be obtained from the semantics

by:

~(PC*)

1.

~(K)

~

in the set of truth-values, thereby forming the

{O,~,l},

Extend the truth-valuations of
according to: for all v,
An

equivalance

valuations v in

~(K).

E~

~(PC*)

to the propositions of K

v(~)=~.

of L(K) is valid in

~(K)

if v(E)=v(F) for all

This concept of validity exactly captures the

sense in which Kleene (1952) asserts that a strong equivalence of propositions is "true."
Given the language L(K), one may now define a formal system K, as
follows.

Let the Greek letter

t

here denote the translation of L(CSR)
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into L(K) that is obtained by extending the translation of §7.4 according
to:

= ~.

tea)

It can be verified that this t is one-to-one, so that the inverse mapping
t- 1 is well-defined. Then the axioms and inference rules of a formal
logical system K are obtained simply by applying this translation to the
axioms and inference rules of CSR.

This leads to an explicit description

of the axioms of K as being all equivalences of L(K) having the following
forms:

alternatively,
2.

(P~Q)~P ~

,(,(PVR)V'(QVR»

~

P,

,(,PY'Q)VR

alternatively, (PVR)&(QVR)
3.

, (PV!)VP

~

PVF

~

P

5.

PVQ

~

QVP

6.

PV (QVR)

~

(P&Q)VR,

PV!

alternatively,
4.

~

(PV!)~P ~

PV!,

(P'/Q)V R.

The inference rules of CSR may similarly be transcribed, leading to a
set of theorems for K.
For the systems CSR and K, it is natural to say that they are
isomorphic if the translation t has the property that, for all equations
E=F of L(CSR),

CSR~E=F

if and only if

K~t(E)~t(F).

In this terminology,

we have:
Theorem 8.2-1.
Proof.
can show:

The systems CSR and K are isomorphic.

Given the definition of K in terms of the translation t, one

(i) proofs in CSR translate into proofs in K, by induction
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on the length of proofs in CSR, and (ii) proofs in K translate into
proofs in CSR, by induction on the length of proofs in K.

0

The following results establish that K is non-Aristotelean.
Proposition 8.2-2.
Proof.

Similarly as for CSR, Proposition 8.1-2.

Proposition 8.2-3.
Proof.
§8.3.

The system K is inconsistent.
0

The system K is coherent.

Similarly as for CSR, Proposition 8.1-3.

0

Semantic Completeness of K
This result is patterned after the isomorphism theorem of §8.4.
Theorem 8.3-1.

The system K is complete with respect to I(K).

Proof.

be any equivalence of L(K).

Let

P~

Let E=F be the equa-

tion t- 1 (p)=t- 1 (Q) of L(CSR), where t is the translation defined in
§8.2.

By the argument given at the beginning of this chapter, it is

sufficient to show that I(CSR) and I(K) can be identified in the sense
that
I(CSR)FE=F

iff I(K)FP=Q.

Observe that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
valuations v in I(CSR) and the truth-value assignments V of I(K), given
by

and
v(e.)=u
1.
-

iff V(p.)=O.
1.

Here it is implicit that v(e.)=a iff
1.

-

V(p.)=~.
1.

It follows by this cor-

respondence, and the definitions of "valid" for I(CSR) and I(K), that it
is sufficient to establish: for all expressions E of L(CSR), and all
valuations v of I(CSR),
v(E)~

iff V(t(E))=l,

(1)
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and
v(E)=~

iff V(t(E»=O,

where V is the truth-value assignment of
may be established as follows.

~(K)

(2)
corresponding to v.

This

Let E be an expression of L(CSR), and

let n be the length of E.
Case 1: n=l.

There are three possibilities:

Case 1.a: E is an expression variable, e ~..

In this case, both (1)

and (2) hold by virtue of the stated correspondence between v and V.

•

Case 1.b: E is the symbol e.

by definition of

~(CSR);

v(E)=~, ~or

all v,

on the other hand, t(E)=K, so that V(t(E»=O,

for all V, by definition of
V.

On the one hand,

~(K).

Thus (2) is established for all v and

Assertion (1) holds for all v and V by default; there is no v such

that

v(e)=~,

and there is no V such that V(K)=l.

Case 1.c: E is the symbol a.

In this case, both (1) and (2) hold

by default.
Case 2: n>l.

Here there are two possibilities:

Case 2.a: E is an expression of the form [F].

Since the expres-

sion F has shorter length than E, the induction hypothesis provides that
(1) and (2) hold for F.
v(E)=~

iff

Thus,
(def. of

v(F)=~

iff V(t(F»=O
iff V(,t(F»=l
iff V(t(E»=l
which establishes (1) for E.

~(CSR»

(ind. hypo (2»
(def. of

~(K»

(def. of t)

A similar argument establishes (2).

Case 2.b: E is an expression of the form FG.

In this case the

induction hypothesis provides that (1) and (2) hold for both F and G.
Thus,
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v(E)~

iff either

v(F)=~

or

(def. of I(CSR»

v(G)=~

(ind . hyp . (1 ) )

iff either V(t(F»=l or V(t(G»=l

(def. of I(K»

iff V(t(F)Vt(G»=l

(def. of t)

iff V(t(E»=l
which establishes (1); and
v(E)=~

iff both

v(F)=~

and

(de£. of I(CSR»

v(G)=~

(ind. hyp . (2»

iff both V(t(F»=O and V(t(G»=O

(def. of I(K»

iff V(t(F)Vt(G»=O

(def. of t)

iff V(t(E»=O
which establishes (2).

This completes the proof, by induction on n.

0

§8.4. Aristotelean Vs. Non-Aristotelean Classification
Of PC, PC*, PA, CSR, And K
Classification of CSR and K has already been accomplished in the
preceding sections.

These results may be summarized as follows.

Proposition 8.4-1.

The systems CSR and K are non-Aristotelean

systems.
Proof.

This fact about CSR is a consequence of Propositions 8.1-2

and 8.1-3.

The proposition about K is established by Propositions 8.2-2

and 8.2-3.

0

The corresponding facts about PC, PC*, and PA can be demonstrated
as follows.
Proposition 8.4-2.

The systems PC, PC* and PA are Aristotelean

systems.
Proof.
PC.

For PC: Let PC' be any inconsistent simple extension of

It is required to show that PC' is incoherent.

inconsistency of L(PC) such that PC'rP&,p.
L(PC').

Let P&,P be an

Let Q be any proposition of

Since PC' is a simple extension of PC, Q is also a proposition
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of L(PC).

Observe that the proposition

I(PC).

Then

I(PC).

Hence,

PC~(P&'P)~Q,

(P&'P)~Q

is a tautology of

by the completeness of PC with respect to

PC'~(P&'P)~Q.

By modus ponens, it follows that

PC'~Q.

Since Q was chosen as an arbitrary proposition of L(PC'), this shows
that PC' is incoherent.
The proof for PC* is identical to the above.

Then the fact that

PA is Aristotelean may be established as a consequence of isomorphism,
Theorem 7.4-1.

0

These results show that the present characterization of,formal
logical systems as Aristotelean vs. non-Aristotelean is both natural and
intuitively appealing.

Its strength lies in its being sufficiently

general to apply for all systems as defined in §2.1.
§8.5.

Completeness And Coherence Of Simple Extensions
Let f be a set of equivalences of L(K).

By the semantics I(K[f])

for the simple extension K[r] is meant the semantics that is obtained
from I(K) by limiting the set of valuation mappings to be the set of
only those V such that, for every equivalence

P~Q

in r, we have

V(P)=V(Q).
Proposition 8.5-1.

For any simple extension K' of K, K' is

complete with respect to I(K').
Proof.

Let CSR' denote the inverse image of K' under the transla-

tion t of §8.2; and let a semantics I(CSR') be defined analagously as
the semantics I(K').

By going back to Varela's original proof (Varela

1975), which was used in §8.1 to affirm that K is complete with respect
to I(K) , and everywhere replacing the word "true" with the phrase "valid
in I(CSR')," one obtains a proof that CSR' is complete with respect to
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I(CSR').

Then the methods of §8.3 apply to show that K' is complete

with respect to I(K').

0

The above proof makes tacit use of the fact that Varela's completeness theorem can be generalized to the statement: If the inference "from
E=E' infer F=F'" is valid in the extended arithmetic, then that inference
is formally derivable within the extended algebra.

Proposition 8.5-1

leads to a formal connection between paradox and autonomy in K as follows.
Proposition 8.5-2.

For all formulas P of L(K),
K[P~

P]

f- P~

and .
K[P~] f- P~

Proof.
V(P)=V(~),

Since, for all V in I(K), V(P)=V(,P) if and only if

both assertions follow from Proposition 8.5-1 by the defini-

.tion of I(K').
K[P~].

P.

In the first case, K' is

K[P~'P];

in the second, K' is

0

The next two propositions establish some necessary and sufficient
conditions for a simple extension to be coherent.
Proposition 8.5-3.

For all simple extensions K' of K, K' is a

coherent system if and only if the set of valuation mappings for I(K')
is nonempty.
Proof.

Let K' be any simple extension of K'; and let

set of valuation mappings for I(K').

~

denote the

Suppose that K' is coherent.

Then, by the definition of coherence, there exists an equivalence
L(K') such that
P~

K'~P~.

Hence, by Proposition 8.5-1, the equivalence

is not valid in I(K').

But then, by the definition of "valid,"

there must exist V in I(K') for which V(P)#V(Q).
is nonempty.

in

P~

Thus, necessarily,

~
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Suppose next that $ is nonempty.
a valuation in I(K').

Then some valuation V in I(K) is

Observe that, for all V in I(K),

follows that there exist V in I(K') such that

V(~)#V(~).

is not valid in I(K'), so Proposition 2.1.6-1 shows that
Accordingly, K' is coherent.

It

V(~)#VC~).

But then,

F~

K'~~~.

0

Let the notation V* denote the valuation V of I(K) defined by:
V*(p.)=~,
1.

for all i=1,2, ....

Proposition 8.5-4.
sion

K(P~

For all formulas P of L(K), the simple exten-

P) is a coherent extension if and only if

Proof.
of L(K), that

It can be shown, by induction on the length ·of formulas P
V*CP)=~

iff there exists at least one valuation V of

I(K) such that V(P)=V(1P).
ing way.

V*(P)=~.

We can make use of this result in the follow-

Let K' denote a simple extension

Suppose that K' is coherent.

K[P~'P]

of K.

Then, by the Proposition 7.5-3, the

set $ of valuations of ICK') is nonempty.

Say that V is in $.

definition of the semantics ICK'), we have that the equivalence
valid in I(K').

It follows that V(P)=V(,P).

result implies that
Suppose that

P~'P

is

Then the above-stated

V*(P)=~.
V*(P)=~.

I(K) such that V(P)=V(,P).

Then, by the same result there exist V in
By the definition of I(K'), this means that

the set of valuations for ICK') is nonempty.
Proposition 8.5-3.

By the

Hence, K' is coherent, by

0

An immediate consequence of Proposition 8.5-4 is that the definition of "inconsistency" used by Varela is, more exactly, a form of
incoherence--i.e., the three extensions CSR[a=e].

CSR[e=[e]] are all incoherent extensions of CSR.

CSR[a=[e]], and
This also illustrates

by example that coherence, and not consistency, is the relevant critereon
for determining the meaningfulness of non-Aristotelean systems.

CHAPTER 9
UNDECIDABILITY AND UNKNOWABILITY
The aim of this last chapter of Part II is two-fold: (i) to establish a formal connection between Varela's concept of logical autonomy
and the notion of a totally undecidable partial recursive set, (ii) to
define a general concept of "mechanical unknowability" and to show how
various instances of this idea may be represented in a'non-Aristotelean,
yet coherent, frame.

The former is accomplished in §9.1, the latter in

§9.2.
§9.1.1 lays down basic terminology from recursion theory.

Then

§9.1.2 defines a system PRS of partial recursive sets, which in principle
is a simple recasting of the system K.

Then the desired connection

between autonomy in CSR and undecidability in PRS is then established in
§9.1.3.
§9.2.1 begins the study of mechanical unknowability with a reorientation on the concepts from recursion theory, taking Turing machines as
the basic givens.

§9.2.2 extends this into a definition of mechanical

unknowability vs. mechanical conceivability, based on the popular braincomputer analogy.
paradox.

§9.2.3 looks more carefully at the general form of

§9.2.4 then proceeds to some illustrations regarding

(i) "perfect" systems, (ii) time, (iii) the concept of "goodness," and

(iv) transcendent realms of being.
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§9.1.

Formal Autonomy Vis-A-Vis Recursive Undecidability

§9.1.1.

Partial Recursive Sets

The following is an admixture from Kleene (1952) and Rogers (1967).
Let N denote the natural numbers.
some subset

Dom(~)

N into N.

A partial function

function if

x&Dom(~)

or

xtDom(~).

is a mapping of

is the domain of definition of

Dom(~)

and, for each argument x&N, the value
according as

~

~(x)

~,

is defined or undefined

A partial function is a total

Dom(~)=N.

The concept of recursion may be given in terms of a mathematically
well-defined class
see Rogers (1967).

~

of Turing machines.

For an explicit definition,

Loosely, a Turing machine is an algorithm consisting

of a set of instructions describing precise mechanical steps by which, .
given any number in N, one can proceed with a well-defined computation.
Let M be a machine in
the argument x.

~

and let M(x) represent the application of M to

If the computation procedure terminates, producing a

value y, one writes M(x)=y and says that the computation converges;
otherwise, the computation diverges (loops, provides no information,
etc.).
M~

A partial function

~

is algorithmic if there is a Turing machine

such that:

1.

If

~(x)

is defined, then

2.

If

~(x)

is undefined, then

Each M describes a unique
given

~

~;

M~(x)=~(x),
M~(x)

diverges.

on the other hand, it is possible that a

have more than one choice for M.

algorithmic total function.
rithmic partial function.
partial recursive.

A recursive function is an

A partial recursive function is an algoHence, by definition, recursive functions are
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A characteristic function is a partial function K such that either
K(x)=l or K(X)=O, for all xeDom(K).

For each characteristic function K,

there is a partial set PK defined by
xePK if K(x)=l
xtPK if K(X)=O
undecided if K(X) is undefined.
If K is total, then PK is a total set (hence a "set" in the classical
sense).

For a given partial set p, let K denote the characteristic
p

function for p.

A partial set PK is a recursive set if K is a recursive

function, and is a partial recursive set if K is a partial recursive
function.
The interrelation of partial sets, sets, part1al recursive
and recursive sets is illustrated in Figure 9-1.

We may see that the

various regions of this figure are nonempty as follows.
of a recursive set is the empty set
The set

~

~

set~,

A simple example

defined by K(X)=O, for all xeN.

is recursive because there is a Turing machine M such that

M(x)=O for all xeN.

A partial recursive set which is not a recursive

set is the empty partial set v defined by having Kv(X) be undefined for
all xeN.

v is recursive because Kv can be represented by a machine

which always "loops" or is otherwise nonterminating.

That there are

sets which are not recursive sets and that there are partial sets which
are not partial recursive sets is an immediate consequence of there
being only countably infinitely many Turing machines, while the sets and
partial sets are uncountably many.

A specific example of a (total) set

which is not recursive can be given as an instance of the well-known
"halting problem."

Let tVo , tV l'tV2 ' ... be a standard (Godel) numbering of

the unary partial recursive functions.

Define q by
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Partial Sets

Total Sets

Figure 9-1.

Recursive
Sets

Partial
Recursive
Sets

Interrelation of different "sets."
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xeq iff

xeDom(~x).

Then, for all xeN, either xeq or xtq; so Kq must be total.
Roger's Corollary I-VII shows that Kq is not
Hence, Kq is not recursive.

~i

However,

for any i=I,2, ....

A specific example of a partial set which

is not a partial recursive set can be obtained from q by the ad hoc
specification that K (0) is undefined.
q

§9.1.2.

The System PRS

Kleene's original definition of L(K) treated propositional
variables as n-aryO relation symbols, and each was thought of as representing an "n-ary partial recursive relation" on N.

For convenience, we

here deal only with unary relations, i.e., partial recursive sets.
The system PRS is obtained from K by modifying L(K) as follows:
let! denote a new symbol, called an individual variable; replace Pi
with Pie!), for all i=I,2, .... ; replace

~

and

~

with

~(!)

and

~(!).

Then propositions P become denoted by P(x).
,..,
To motivate the definition of
summarized as follows.

~(PRS),

Kleene's results may be

A partial set p is alternatively denoted by

p(x), taking x as ranging over N, in which case the notation pen)
represents the assertion that nep.

Then some truth-values may be

defined by:
1.

2.

pen) is t if Kp (n)=I,
pen) is f if Kp (n)=O,

pen) is u if Kp (n) is undefined.
This leads to truth tables for 1, V, &,
3.

~,

=,

and

~,

with the following

properties: (i) if p(x) and q(x) are partial recursive sets, then 'p(x)
and p(x)Vq(x) defined by
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K (n) = 1-K (n)
p

p

Kp q (n) = maX[Kp (n),Kq (n)]
are partial recursive sets, (ii) if &, ~, and
are defined in terms of ,

=

and V as in §7.1, then they similarly yield partial recursive sets,
(iii) the strong equivalence

p(x)~q(x)

asserts that p(x) and q(x) are

identical, i.e., that Kp (n)=K q (n) for all n&N, (iv) the connective
not explicitly definable in terms of , and V, and (v) " V, and &

is

~

correspond to the customary partial-recursive set complementation,
union, and intersection.
Now, the semantics I(PRS) has as values the numbers 1, 0, and
corresponding to
(~,a),

~,

!, and

~--

as valuations has all ordered pairs

~--and

where a is an assignment such that

p.a is a partial recursive set,
~
A

1.

2.

3.

4.

Fa'" is the empty set q"
Aa is the empty partial set v,
xa is a number in N,
A

A

and where

5.

~

is defined by

If P is ;[, -A, or p.l. for some i=1,2, ... , then

-

"
~(p(xa»

6.

=

-

"

0 if Kpa" (xa)=O
a'"
'"

-

~ if Kpa (x ) is undefined

If P is of the form ,Q, then

-

'"
~(p(xa»

7.

[

A

1 if Kpa'" (:sa)=l

"

= l-~(Q(xa»,
-.;

If P is of the form QVR, then

~(p(:sa» = max[~(Q(:sa»,~(R(:sa»]
An equivalence P(x)~Q(x) is valid in I(PRS) if ~(p(xa»=~(Q(xa»
"..,

every assignment a.

I'V

It follows that

-

P(x)~(x)
-.;

"...,

"..,

for

is valid in I(PRS) if and

182
only if

P~

is valid in I(K).

Then Theorem 8.3-1 implies that PRS is

complete with respect to I(PRS).
Evidently, PRS is essentially identical with K, and I(PRS) is only
a slightly more sophisticated version of I(K).
§9.1.3.

Undecidability

A partial set is undecidable if it is not a recursive set.

Thus,

a partial set can be undecidable in either of two ways: (i) it is nontotal, or (ii) it is total but not recursive.
set q of §9.1.1.
no

Me~

An example of (ii) is the

In terms of Turing machines, this means that there is

which effectively distinguishes between the members and non-

members of q.

The modified q, on the other hand, is an example of

(i); membership for

a

in q is "undecided" a priori.

This terminology motivates referring to the empty partial set v as
the totally undecidable partial recursive set, since (i) v is in fact·
partial recursive, and (ii) v strictly speaking is not "empty," rather
its membership relation is merely "undecided" for all xeN.

The afore-

mentioned correspondence between v and Varela's concept of formal
autonomy can be exhibited as follows.
The isomorphism t of CSR and K can be taken as an isomorphism of
CSR and PRS.
in I(CSR).

Then t(a)=!(!).
,.

Recall that v(a)=!, for all valuations v

From §9.1.2, !a=v for all assignments

a of

I(PRS).

Since

CSR is complete with respect to I(CSR), and PRS is complete with respect
to I(PRS), it follows that any assertion about the autonomous state a
that is both formalizable and derivable in CSR is simultaneously an
assertion about the totally undecidable partial recursive set v that is
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formalizable and derivable in PRS; and conversely.

Thus, a (autonomy)

and v (total undecidability) are formally identical.
§9.2.

Mechanical Unknowability
A saying among logicians is that in recursion theory one perceives

the world "through a glass darkly."

The sense of this is that the

concept of recursive undecidability can be regarded as a concept of
mechanical unknowability; to wit, from the standpoint of the class of
partial recursive functions, our knowledge about the subsets of N is
limited to the information that is provided us by the collection
Turing machines.

of

~

This section makes this idea explicit in a model of

the observer-observed relationship based on the popular brain-computer
analogy, together with Church's Thesis about the relation of real-world"
machines to recursive functions.
To this end, the concept of recursion is here recast in terms of
just 'n\, rather than with the concept of a "partial set," as follows.
§9.2.1.

Recursion Revisited

An alternative formulation of recursion is as follows.
denote the natural numbers; let
operating on N.

~

Let N

be the class of Turing machines

If Me~converges for all xeN, then M is a total machine;

otherwise, M is a partial machine.

A characteristic machine M will be

such that, for each xeN, either M(x)=1, M(x)=O, or M(x) diverges.

For

each characteristic machine M, let a partial recursive set aM be defined
by: (i) xeaM if M(x)=1, (ii) xtaM if M(x)=O, and (iii) undecided if M(x)
diverges. aM is said to be a recursive set if M is total. These
collections are identical with the corresponding collections defined in
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§9.1.1, except that here "recursive" and "partial recursive" are mutually
exclusive.
Church's Thesis asserts that the intuitive concept of "effectively
computable" is exactly captured by the class of partial recursive functions.

More exactly, if a (partial or total) function defined on N

satisfies one's reasonable understanding of what it means for a function
to be algorithmic, then its values will be computable by a Turing machine.
(The converse, that recursive implies effectively computable, is obvious
from Turing's definition of the class

~.)

The support for Church's

Thesis is largely empirical: (i) every intuitively acceptable mathematical formulation of "effective computability" has been shown to be equivalent to the Turing characterization, and (ii) no function on N has been
discovered which satisfies the intuition as being "effectively computable"
and is not representable in ~.
Let a be a subset of N.

A decision method for

a is a method··by

which, given any xeN, one can determine in a finite number of steps
whether xea or xta.

Evidently, this would be a method of effective

computability for the characteristic function Ka.

The decision problem

for a is: find such a decision method or prove that no such method
exists.

By Church's Thesis, a decision method exists for a if and only

if a is a recursive set, so the decision problem amounts to finding a
Turing machine for Ka or showing that there isn't one.

One says that

the decision problem for a is recursively solvable if a is recursive,
and recursively unsolvable if not.

It follows that the decision problem

for a is recursively solvable if and only if
of §9 .1.3.

C1

is decidable in the sense
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The import of recursive unsolvability is that, given any "candidate"
decision method for an undecidable

0,

which that method produces no result.

there will be numbers xeN for
Yet this does not exclude the

possibility that a decision problem be approximately recursively solvable
or that different decision methods might be better than others in providing recursive approximations of a complete determination for

0.

By

Church's Thesis, such partial approximations will be represented by
partial characteristic machines.

For each such M in

~,

let OM be the

subset of N defined by xeo if and only if M(x)=l. Then a maximal
M
approximation of 0 will be any maximal 0M~o. It follows that 0 is
decidable if and only if 0M=O'

In any case, maximal approximations are

recursive sets.
A totally undecidable set in this context will be any set v such
that every maximal approximation

vM=~.

Such a set might be one whose

members are prescribed completely at random, so that for each xeN,there
is only a 50-50 chance that xev.

In contrast with the v defined in

§8.1.l, as a unique partial set, there here may be any number of such
totally undecidable subsets of N.
solvability via the class
follows that the semantics

~,

From the standpoint of recursive

however, all such sets are equivalent.

~(PRS)

It

can alternatively be defined in terms

of equivalence classes of partial characteristic machines, rather than
partial recursive sets.
§9.2.2.

Universes: Conceivable Vs. Knowable

The popular brain-computer analogy asserts that the human brain
may be regarded merely as an extremely sophisticated computing machine.
Given the present state of the art for computers, however, it is perhaps
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more reasonable to refer to an "intellect-computer" analogy, since
machines have not yet been designed which replicate the emotive, intuitive, and similar aspects of the human personality (even though it might
be speculated that they can be).

Given an intellect-computer analogy,

the foregoing analysis of recursive solvability leads to a provocative-albeit simple--model of the limits of "intellectual knowability."
One easily conceptualizes a countably infinite set of natural
numbers N and its set of subsets f(N) , and it is reasonable to assume
that this manner of conceptualization is mechanical.

Indeed, a computer

program could be developed which describes all the axioms and inference
rules of classical set theory, and proceeds to derive proofs of theorems.
Thus, if the human intellect is a machine, the ordered pair (N,f(N))
constitutes a mechanically conceivable universe Uc.
Yet, as was seen in §9.1.1, not all of the subsets of N--in fact
only countably infinitely many of the uncountable collection P(N)--are
recursively decidable.
~(N).

Let the decidable sets in

~(N)

Then it makes sense to take the ordered pair

corresponding mechanically knowable universe Uk.

be denoted by
as a

(N,~(N))

~(N)

is that segment

of feN) which is completely discernible by the Turing machines
~by

~,

where

Church's Thesis, includes all machines that can possibly exist.

The interconnection between Uc and Uk can be elaborated. Let a be
any subset of N; let aM be 'a maximal recursive approximation of 0; and
let oM be the set of xeN such that M(X) diverges.
all potential elements of

0

which are left undecided by M.

the collection of all subsets of N having the form
Clearly aeU; and
decidable.

0

Then oM consists of

ova

where OeOM.

is the unique member of U if and only if

Suppose that

0

Consider U

0

is

is recursively undecidable and let c be the
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cardinality of 6 . It may be noted that the cardinality of U is 2c ,
M
c
in case c is infinite. Most
where 2 is the uncountable infinity

reI

importantly, from the standpoint of U , the members of U are distinct
c
members of feN), while from the standpoint of Uk' the members of U are
indistinguishable from the set a.

These considerations suggest the

following interpretation for Uc and Uk'
A being which has a strictly mechanical intellect is able to
conceptualize an uncountably infinite universe U of which only a countc
able part Uk is really (intellectually) knowable. The intellectually
unknowable part, however, is' approximately knowable--more or less so
depending on how closely he obtains a knowable approximation.

The same

being is furthermore able to determine a closeness of fit for his
approximation by looking at the number of elements of N which his approximation leaves undecided.

And he can sometimes, through a concept of

recursive unsolvability, be cognizant of whether a complete approximation is possible.
Thus, this being resides in a world where he cannot "know" everything that he calL "conceptualize"; he can approximate a complete knowledge
of some unknowns, but he is aware that absolute knowledge of everything
is impossible.

Indeed, he can be aware of "totally unknowable" concepts

as represented by intellectual loops or otherwise paradoxical circular
reasoning.
In this manner, paradox represents the absolute limits of intellectual knowability.

By means of circularity, intellect formulates

concepts of things which are completely beyond its ability to comprehend.
The interpretation of mechanical unknowability as an idea of
intellectual unknowability can be extended to an idea of empirical
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untestability.

For, all manners of scientific observation, measurement,

and analysis here become strictly mechanical as products of the human
intellect.

To elaborate, suppose that the physical universe consists of

countably infinitely many objects.
by the members of N, and

~(N)

Then these objects can be enumerated

represents the collection of all conceiv-

able properties of objects--i.e., x has the property represented by cr if
and only if xecr.

Thus, one has a physical interpretation of U , while
c

Uk correspondingly becomes interpreted as giving the properties for
which one can determine by strictly scientific analysis whether an
object does or does not have that property.

Thus

properties which alone are empirically testable.

~(N)

represents those

Partially knowable

concepts accordingly become partially testable properties, and
unknowable concepts become totally untestable properties.

total~y

Thus, a being

having a strictly mechanical intellect and living in a countably infinite
universe can conceptualize properties of objects which he should not
hope to establish by strictly empirical methods.

While this in itself

is not surprising--indeed it is rather common knowledge--it is remarkable
that recursion theory provides such a simple model which suggests why
this is true.
§9.2.3.

Paradox

As a preface to specific examples of mechanical knowability, it
will be useful to look more carefully at the general form of paradoxical
assertions.

In the classical notations, a proposition P is paradoxical

if it enters into an assertion of the form
(1)
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which reads IIp is true if and only if not-P is true."

This is to be

distinguished from an ordinary contradiction having the form
P &.,p,

(2)

which reads "both P and not-P are true."

The latter asserts the simul-

taneous truth of P and ,P, while the former asserts that the truth of
each is predicated on the truth of the other.
However, both (1) and (2) are antitautologies of I(PC) , and hence
are formally equivalent with one another--i.e., each implies the other.
Thus paradoxes cannot be adjoined to a classical Aristotelean system
such as PC without rendering the system trivially incoherent.

Similar

remarks apply to the adjunction of a paradoxical assertion of the form
P

to the primary algebra.

=

Pl

This shows that in Aristotelean systems, para-

doxes are always formally meaningless.
Paradoxes can become meaningful, however, in non-Aristotelean
systems.

In the calculus for self-reference, paradoxical assertions

have the form
P

= Pl

(3)

and, when translated into the system K, have the form
P

~

,P.

(4)

Each of (3) and (4) can be validated in their respective semantics--the
former by any v such that v(P)=a, and the latter by any V such that
V(P)=~.

Thus (§8.5), they can be adjoined to their respective systems

without ruining coherence.
This shows generally the value of Kleene-Varela type systems for
the discussion of paradoxical ideas.

Moreover, it suggests a generalized

definition of paradox per se as being any assertion to the effect that a
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proposition is equivalent with its negation.

The familiar semantic

paradoxes, such as the paradox of the liar (Martin 1970) and Russell's
set of all sets which are not members of themselves (Russell 1902 and
1908) are special cases of paradox which involve an internal linguistic
self-reference.

The general paradoxical form does not require such

self-reference, but when it is regarded in the context of the calculus
for self-reference, it is revealed as involving a self-reference on
another level; to wit, the logical status (i.e., autonomy) of

d

para-

doxical proposition is formally defined in term of itself through
"re-entry" into the "form of indication" -, (Varela, 1975).

The logical

autonomy of paradoxical propositions P is furthermore made explicit in
the systems K, PRS, and the calculus for self-reference by
Proposition 8.5-2.
§9.2.4.

Sample Interpretations

The foregoing shows how the model of a universe, the knowledge of
which is limited by the capabilities of a collection of machines, can be
formalized in PRS.

Of course, for more sophisticated interpretations of

"mechanical unknowability," a much richer linguistic structure than
L(PRS) is required.

To this end, PRS might be expanded, in the same

manner that PC is normally expanded to obtain first-order and secondorder systems.

Indeed a work by Zadeh shows that the prototype self-

referential paradox, the paradox of the liar, is representable in the
logic of possibilistic reasoning (Zadeh 1979), which suggests that the
required richer languages may be just those, or developments of those,
for the linguistic theories defined in Chapter 3.
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The interpretations described below are intended merely as illustrations of how such expanded systems might be employed.

Moreover, they

focus only on "total unknowability" and therefore do not explore the
full range of potential application to "approximately knowable" ideas.
§9.2.4.1.

Perfect Systems

Weinberg's "perfect systems law" asserts: "true systems properties
cannot be investigated" (Weinberg 1975, p. 160).

The standard method of

investigating a real-world system is to observe it while it undergoes
transformations.

But "true systems properties"--such as "perfect whole-

ness" or "absolute autonomy"--are invariants intrinsic to the system and
are therefore lost if the system is changed.

Consequently, a "perfect

system"--Le., a system which has only true system properties--"could
not be studied if found."
The concept of a perfect system may be formalized in a KleeneVarela system by developing a proposition PC!) which asserts that! is
perfect--e.g., P might be built up of propositions P , P , etc., which

w

a

assert !'s wholeness, autonomy, etc.--and by adjoining the equivalence
P(!)~(!)

as an axiom.

Then P becomes interpreted as a totally unknow-

able property of real-world objects.
In this context, the semantics may receive an alternative interpretation, based on a logic of empirical methods, which is defined by
having a proposition be
1.

"true" if it has been verified by experiment,

2.

"false" if it has been refuted by experiment,

3.

"unknown" if it has been neither verified nor refuted.
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Then

P(!)~(~)

asserts that for all

~

the truth-value of

P(~)

is always

unknown.
§9.2.4.2.

McTaggart's Paradox

Gale (1968) "uses McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time
as a starting-point for an examination of the logic of and interconnectedness between tensed and tenseless discourse" and defends "the common
belief in the objectivity of temporal becoming" (from the book jacket).
McTaggart's paradox involves two conceptions of time: an A-series based
on the notions of "past," "present," and "future," and a B-series based
on the relation of "before and after."

A "positive thesis" shows that

the A-series is reducible to the B-series, while a "negative thesis"
shows that the B-series leads to an irreconciable infinite regress of
paradoxes.
Gale's treatment begins with the observation that all attempts to
define time inadvertently lead to paradox, and it proceeds by the method
of linguistic analysis to show that people naturally accept a belief in
the objectivity of temporal becoming even though they cannot define it
or rationally prove it to be real.

"What time makes it possible for us

to say is exactly what cannot be said about time" (p. 234).
This implies that the natural use of temporal language involves
paradoxical, or otherwise circular, reasoning.

Thus a Kleene-Varela

system which includes McTaggart's paradox as an axiom might serve for
formalizing temporal discourse as it actually appears in observable uses
of human language.

Time is a clear example of something that can be

conceptualized but cannot be understood by ordinary "rational" means.
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§9.2.4.3.

Moore's Paradox

Another is the idea of "goodness."

Hartman (1967) develops a

"logic of value" which uses Moore's paradox as a prototype test case.
This paradox is quoted from Moore (p. 18) as consisting of "the two
different propositions that are both true of goodness, namely: (i) that
it does depend only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it, and
(ii) that, though this is so, it is as yet not itself an intrinsic
property."

Hartman "solves" this paradox by unraveling a confusion of

levels, showing that "the negative proposition--concerning what goodness
is not--refers to the thing itself; and the positive proposition-concerning what goodness is--refers to the concept of the thing."
Hartman's work then disbands the self-referential negative proposition and elaborates the positive one in terms of properties of concepts
rather than of things.

While this is certainly a reasonable approach.to

the problem of values, it leaves unaddressed a fact that remains embodied
in Moore's paradox: that people nevertheless do speak and think !! if
goodness is an inherent property of things.

This raises the question of

why it is so natural for people to think of value in this way.

Evidently,

one has here another example of circularity in natural human reasoning,
and the property of goodness becomes another candidate for formulation
in a logically autonomous proposition.
§9.2.4.4.

Transcendent Realities

God, Truth, Justice, Beauty, Perfection, Freedom of the Will, and
so on all represent realities which are completely beyond the human ken.
Indeed, it is almost an embarrassment to philosophers and theologians that
the existence of such entities has no logical or empirical verification.
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In point of fact, the only position of complete intellectual integrity on
such matters is Skepticism: the existence of transcendent realities is
uncertain.

In theology, this is Agnosticism.

Yet it is equally true that intuition, beliefs, experiences of
faith, and the higher ideals, frequently take precedence over the rational
intellect as prescriptors of human behavior.

While much effort has been

directed toward justifying this phenomenon, little has been done to
explain how it occurs.
The Kleene-Varela logic can be offered as a model of the kind of
intellect which makes such occurrences possible.

In this model, the

intellect remains strictly mechanical, but goes beyond the exclusive
"true of false."

Clearly, if the intellect was exclusively two-valued,

there would be no question of transcendental realities.

It is only by

virtue of man's ability to entertain logical uncertainty that he has the
opportunity to extend beyond the purely "rational" and act intuitively,
to formulate beliefs, and to experience fai th--i. e., to be "human" in
the higher sense of the word.

PART III

THE USE OF NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS

CHAPTER 10

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
The primary aim of this chapter is to set the stage for the methodological issues taken up in Chapter 11.

We lay down a few items of

terminology, discuss the sense in which the proposed use of nonclassical
logics obtains a theoretical rationale, and generally motivate the
ensuing considerations.
§10.1 constitutes a brief survey of the development of logical
ideas insofar as this illustrates a particular view regarding the
processes by which mathematical studies evolve.
§10.2 takes up the matter of "selecting" one's mode of reasoning,
and considers the manner in which this relates to an inherent "bimodality"
of mathematical thinking.
§10.3 discusses the use of nonclassical logics for purposes of
modeling qualitative aspects of real-world systems.
§10.4 is a general introduction to the subject of formal systems
and their semantics, which is intended both as a supplement to §2.1 and
as a prelude to Chapter 11.
§10.1.

An Evolutionary Overview

The prospect of using nonstandard modes of reasoning in the design
of system models stems largely from there being a wide variety of known
nonclassical logics.

In order to obtain a better idea of how such

logics may be employed, it will be useful to first consider the manner
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in which they have evolved.

We therefore begin here with these more

general considerations, before going into the particulars concerned with
"selecting" alternative modes of reasoning.

In process, this brings to

fore some ideas which will playa role in later sections.
The development of logical ideas may be viewed as involving two
distinct but interrelated processes of human intellection.

First is the

one by which mathematics most directly serves the purposes of science,
and which shall herein be referred to as observation formulation.
Specifically, this designates a process which springs from studies of
concrete physical, biological, social, etc. systems under the motivation
to provide these systems with precise analytical descriptions.
observation formulation sometimes leads to implementation of

As such,

existin~

bodies of mathematical knowledge, whereas it at other times leads to the
invention of completely new kinds of mathematics.

To illustrate: the

differential calculus was created for purposes of formulating the concept
. of a "rate of change" as it appears in the laws of mechanics; and statistics
were developed to capture the notion of "tendencies" or "trends."
Observation formulation thus construed clearly underlies the development
of all mathematical models of real-world situations.
The second process to be considered is a somewhat more subtle one,
pertaining to the intrinsic nature of mathematics proper.

It may be

characterized as a process by which the mathematician makes explicit
certain aspects of his own role in relation to his work--i.e., his
manners of thinking about specific mathematical ideas.

Two examples

here are the invention of the "variable quantity" and the definition of
a "set of elements."

Ordinarily, the process by which such concepts as

these come into being is referred to as one of "abstraction."

A truer
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assessment, however, is that these concepts are tools by which certain
acts of abstraction may be carried out.

The concepts themselves arise,

rather, only when the mathematician strives to comprehend and then make
explicit his own manners of thinking, for purposes of organizing and
clarifying ideas or for simplifying the mental exercises that his work
requires him to perform.

Accordingly, this second process shall be

referred to as introspection articulation, which emphasizes furthermore
that it customarily leads to new items of mathematical language.
This classification of mental activities is of course not inclusive
of all aspects of mathematical endeavor.

It is concerned rather only

with the creation of new ideas and therefore omits other activities,
such as theorem proving, by which mathematical theories grow to fruition.
Nor is the classification crisp, since most mathematical investigations
invoke both processes.

On the one hand, the desire to formulate a model

of a given real-world situation may lead to introspection in search of
new modeling techniques.

On the other hand, the results of mathematical

introspection may inspire the development of modeling approaches not
previously conceived. ' In physics, for example, an illustration of the
former would be functional analysis, which generalizes the theory of
differential equations; and an instance of the latter would be quantum
logic (Reichenbach 1944), which applies formal systems to the treatment
of anomalies in the physical theory.
In any case, the present distinction is not to be confused with
the conventional classification of mathematics as being "pure" or
"applied."

Among contemporary mathematicians, the latter distinction is

almost universally regarded as an unfortunate choice of words, since the
underlying intention of all mathematics is that it is either directly or
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indirectly meant to be applied.

This pertains even to philosophical

studies, which are undertaken to provide the mathematics of science with
a solid foundation.

Yet even taking this into account, it may be argued

that various forms of mathematics involve more of one of the above
processes than the other.

Mathematical logic, in particular, is funda-

mentally a product of introspection articulation and, only after reaching
a sufficient maturity, became available for direct applications.
As motivation for the style of applications proposed in this
dissertation, and to illustrate more fully the notion of introspection
articulation, it will be useful to recount some of the milestones in the
development of logical ideas.

Except where indicated otherwise, the

following references are from Kleene (1952, pp. 60-65).
The discovery of the axiomatic deductive method is attributed to
Pythagoras (c. 700 B.C.) who used it to derive many of the fundamental
theorems of elementary geometry.

After several centuries of continued

development, the Pythagorean geometry received its optimum crystalization
in Euclid's "Elements" (c. 300 B.C.), which work for many centuries
thereafter remained unchallenged as representing the ideal of mathematical elegance and clarity of thought.
Institution of the formal treatment of logic per se, as a method
of reasoning with sentences in terms of their grammatical forms, is due
to Aristotle (also c. 300 B.C.).

Out of Aristotle's work come many of

the basic principles of classical logic, notably: Excluded Middle (for
any proposition A, either A is true or not-A is true); Non-Contradiction
(for no proposition A do we have that both A is true and not-A is true);
and Modus Ponens (if A is true, and it is true that A implies B, then B is
true).

Also due to Aristotle is the idea of "syllogism," which constituted
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a major step toward the theory of logical "quantification" as used in
modern first- and second-order logics.
The invention of the variable quantity, and in general, the development of the algebraic symbolism, is attributed to Vieta (1591) and
others working around the same time.

Kleene indicates this period as a

significant turning point in the history of mathematical ideas:

"The

discovery of simple symbolic notations which lend themselves to manipulation by formal rules has been one of the ways by which modern mathematics has advanced its power" (p. 61).

Prior to Vieta, mathematicians

suffered the tediousness of describing their deductions in words.
Significant early developments in the contemporary logic are
Leibniz (1866), de Morgan (1847 and 1864), Boole (1847 and 1854), Pierce
(1867 and 1880), and Schroder (1877 and 1890-1905).

These works collec-

tively led to formalizations of various portions of mathematics.

The

theory of arithmetic was first axiomatized by Dedekind (1888), and_then
developed deductively from Dedekind's axioms by Peano (1889).

Frege

(1893 and 1903) wrote down the first definition of formal "proof," by
means of diagrams showing interconnections between assertions, and used
this to study the "logical foundations" of arithmetic.

Whitehead and

Russell (1910-1913) reduced much of the prior work to a concise symbolism,
thereby providing what is today the standard prototype of a formal
logical system.

The sense in which logical systems are "formal," how-

ever, may be attributed to Hilbert, who was first to emphasize the total
abstraction of symbols from meanings, so that proofs became simply
mechanical derivations carried out in accordance with precise rules for
operating on symbols and symbolic expressions.
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Not included in Kleene's list are important advances by Tarski and
Godel.

To Tarski we are indebted for articulating the concept of mathe-

matical "truth," which now forms the basis for the study of "semantic
interpretations" of formal systems (model theory).

Tarski's definition

(cf. Tarski 1949), "The assertion 'Snow is white' is true if and only if
snow is white," is an excellent example of how a simple statement of the
obvious can have profound consequences in the development of mathematical thought.
Godel's contribution (1931) made use of all the foregoing ideas,
together with a development of Skolem's idea of "recursive function"
(Skolem 1923).

This work showed that the system of Whitehead and Russell's

Principia Mathematica (1910-1913), which derives Peano arithmetic within
a formal logical system, can be interpreted within its own language by
means of a straightforward enumeration of that system's symbolic components.

Attendant with this came the now famous result (the incomplete-

ness theorem) that that system contains "formally undecideable"
propositions--i.e., propositions which can neither be affirmed nor
denied on the basis of the system's axioms.

This result in tHrn led to

a general study of undecideability and the discovery of many other
formally "unsolvable" problems of contemporary mathematics.

A collec-

tion of these is documented by Odifreddi (1981).
In viewing this development as a phenomenon of articulated introspection, it is easy to see how mathematics arrived at the genre of
systems that are studied in this dissertation.

As soon as the concept

of a formal logical system was fully articulated, and became a subject
on its own for mathematical investigation, a phenomenon analagous to the
development of the non-Euclidean geometries began to occllr--namely, the
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invention of non-Aristotelean or otherwise nonclassical logics.

The

first of these new logics were studied for purely philosophical reasons,
by Brower's school of Intuitionism (cf. Heyting 1956).

However, once

those studies were begun, it soon became evident that the basic idea of
a formal logic could be extended for purposes of describing many further
aspects of human reasoning.

Thus ensued the plethora of multi-valued

logiCS, modal logics, temporal logics, inductive logics, autogenetic
logiCS, and so on, that we have today.

Very recently these logics have

begun to be applied, and the aim of the next following section is to
consider the foundational justifications for this development.
Before proceeding to that issue, however, it should be said that
merely regarding a particular logic--be it classical or nonclassical--as
articulated introspection is not tantamount to upholding that logic as
being in any sense superior to another as a model of natural human
reasoning.

A case in point is Boole's "laws of thought," which has

hence been regarded as mistitled.

What is intended by "introspection

articulation" is rather only to emphasize that different logics have
arisen in the effort to model different aspects of reasoning.

Whether

anyone logic gives a better fit to the natural reasoning is a separate
matter.
The prevailing' opinion regarding formal logics is therefore upheld,
that these serve mainly as guides to thinking, and that no one logic
should be sacrosanct.

This opinion shall here be overlayed, however,

with a less conventional view regarding, if not the sacredness, then at
least the inherent fundamentality of bimodal reasoning, insofar as
mathematical studies are concerned.
the discussion below.

This will be part and parcel with
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§10.2.

On Selecting One's Logics
The physical sciences have clearly acknowledged that no one model

of the universe is absolute.

This was an irrevocable albeit unexpected

consequence of the Einsteinian revolution in physics.

Logical studies,

developed mostly in isolation from physics, have nonetheless produced an
analogous conclusion: neither is anyone mode of reasoning absolute.

As

articulated introspection, the various known forms of logic make it
evident that a wide variety of modes of reasoning are viable; and inasmuch
as these logics exist as formalized mathematical systems, it is evident
that a wide variety of modes of reasoning also are available for use.
Hence, in exactly the same way that science selects alternative

~eometries

for modeling the universe, it can also select the logics by which it
derives conclusions and organizes ideas.
This in effect is a realization of the prophecy by Lukasiewicz
(1930), that science eventually would make direct application of multivalued logics in its methods of research (cf. Gaines 1976).

The freedom

to select one's mode of reasoning, however, comes only at the expense of
some new difficulties.
Soon after science clarified the distinction between a system and
a system model, it became evident that models are always problem specific and observer- (or user-) dependent; that is, they have meaningfulness only in a particular context as provided by a certain problem
setting, and only to a certain collection of observers.

But, in order

for a model to be meaningful among a group of observers, it is necessary
that it "make sense" in the manner of functioning effectively as a means
of communication among that group's members.

This in turn reflects back

on the reasoning processes by which the model was constructed.

Things
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generally "make sense" to people only if they are expressed within those
peoples' own logics.

Such has been emphasized especially in a work by

Maruyama (1974), which shows how basic epistemologies or "structures of
reasoning" may differ from culture to culture, profession to profession,
and so on.

Consequently, it is important that, whenever a nonstandard

logic is selected as the basis for a model, that logic must itself be
described precisely in the context of some given, mutually comprehensible
logic.
But this raises the question of what logics are mutually comprehensible.

In light of Maruyama's remarks it is clearly unreasonable to

expect that anyone logic be comprehensible across all disciplines.
Nevertheless, it may be argued that there is at least one logic which is
comprehensible among the mathematical disciplines.

Specifically, the

claim is that all mathematical discussions--inasmuch as they are indeed
mathematical--always at some level revert back to the classical bimodal
mode of reasoning.
This view is supported in part by the Intuitionist philosophy of
mathematics, which asserts that, even when studying a formal mathematics,
the mathematician necessarily makes use of an informal, or "intuitive,"
mathematics which is not part of the formalism in question (cf. Kleene
1952, pp. 46 ff).

At the same time, this is a departure from Intuitionism

inasmuch as the intuitionist logic, as proposed by Brouwer, is three-valued.
Brouwer's view of the foundations of mathematics was that logical propositions only obtain their ultimate verity in the context of somewhat
deeper conception of "constructibility" (or "finite computability").
Briefly stated (cf. Kleene 1967, p. 196), a proposition 3xP(x), which
says that there exists a number x having a certain property P, can only
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be asserted as "true" if one can show how to actually compute such an x
in finitely many steps.

Furthermore, logical negation is interpreted

"positively," meaning that the proposition 3xP(x) can be asserted as
"false" only if the proposition 3xP(x) leads to a contradiction in
finitely many steps.

This is tantamount to a denial of Excluded Middle

in reference to infinite domains, since there are propositions P about
the completed totality of natural numbers for which no such computation
procedure is known.

Thus the intuitionistic logic embodies the three

values: "true," "false," and "undecided."
But now let us consider this logic further.

Brouwer strongly

resisted all attempts to axiomatize his logic, since in his view, logic
is grounded in mathematics, and not conversely, so that the
of such an axiomatization would be largely irrelevant.

possibil~ty

Nevertheless,

Kleene (cf. 1952) bothered to carry out this exercise, and the nature,of
his accomplishment is an important case in point.

Kleene's axiomatiza-

tion takes the form of a formal logical system in exactly the same sense
as defined in this dissertation--i.e., as having its formulas be either
derivable or nonderivable from its axioms--and it counts as a correct
axiomatization of Brouwer's logic in that a proposition is so derivable
if and only if it satisfies the intuitionistic criteria of constructibility.

Thus we obtain a clear illustration of the present view.

Kleene's work implicitly demonstrates that, even though intuitionistic
logic is three-valued, there remains another level at which it is twovalued.

Namely, Intuitionism is bimodal inasmuch as its propositions

are either "constructible" or "nonconstructible."
The claim that bimodality applies to all mathematics is of course much
more broadscoped than a reference to selected classical or nonclassical
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logics.

Nevertheless, the general claim is also justifiable by the

(introspective) observation that there is always a bimodal logic which
the mathematician ultimately makes use of when he seeks to make sense to
himself (which also parallels Intuitionism, cf. Heyting 1964, but on a
different level).

This fact of mathematical life admittedly cannot be

proved in any conclusive fashion.

Yet it is an observation which each

individual mathematician may make as a personal assessment of the underlying basis of his own manners of reasoning.

Granted this, it then

follows that the classical logic is necessarily comprehensible among
mathematicians and therefore provides a solid basis for intermathematical
communication.
Affirmation of the inherent bimodality of mathematics does not,
however, deny that other modes of reasoning might be more "natural" or
at least more appropriate for describing certain kinds of ideas.

On the

contrary, the foregoing analysis clearly supports the validity of applying the theory of formal logical systems in developing models based on
nonstandard logics.

For the theory of formal logics is itself expressed

in the formal, bimodal, and hence mathematically communicable logic,
while at the same time providing a precise context within which nonstandard logics can be described.
Note furthermore that, as the foregoing discussion indicates,
where formalized nonclassical logics are concerned, bimodality can
usually be located at the metalevel, i.e., at the next higher level
that the one which is occupied by the formalism itself.

This is a

fact that will be of especial use in §11.5, where we consider the
empirical testability of models which are based on nonclassical modes of
reasoning.
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§10.3.

Quality Representation
Qualitative mathematics was described in Chapter 1 as that kind of

mathematics which leaves numerical considerations in the background and
focuses on general conceptual forms.
abstract algebra, and logic.

Examples were cited from topology,

We may here expand this idea insofar as it

pertains to the logical systems studied in this dissertation.
The theory of approximate reasoning is especially suited for
modeling qualitative aspects of complex systems.

In contrast with

traditional uses of formal logic for representing expressions in mathematical languages (such as the language of arithmetic, or of algebraic
groups), approximate reasoning is aimed at the reppresentation of expressions in natural languages (eg., English).

The extent to which this

has been achieved to date is shown in recent works (Zadeh 1978a and
1978b) which lay down "translation rules" for translating a wide variety
of more or less complex natural language expressions into a formalism of
the kind studied in Part I.

This means that one can use the theory of

approximate reasoning for the direct formulation of verbal models of
systems in an internally coherent, and machine implementable, mode of
reasoning.
Such an approach leads to somewhat more realistic models than do
the standard modeling techniques.

For, an analysis of a complex system

can never be carried to the deepest level of detail.

Indeed, practical

experience shows that during the process of a real-world system's analysis,
the complexity of the system even appears to grow before one's eyes.
Hence, every model of the given system must inadvertently "blur" all
details which lie beyond the point at which the analysis was stopped.
This is emphasized also by Bunge (1973, cf. §11.2) who states that

208
models are always "approximations" of reality, and that mathematical
models in particular are "idealizations" of the object it is intended to
represent.

The virtue of approximate reasoning is therefore that this

vagueness which permeates our models of reality is formally taken into
account.

An example of this was given in Chapter 6.

The theory of

approximate reasoning allows for reasonably sophisticated system properties and situations to be described, and the formalized logic embodies
the necessary principles for correct reasoning toward meaningful results.
The Kleene-Varela systems studied in Part II illustrate another
use of formal logic for quality representation: the modeling of paradoxical, and hence traditionally unanalyzable, system properties.
highlights the significance of formal logic as providing the
to "select" alternative modes of reasoning.

This

opport~ity

While there is nothing

emperical which affirms the existence of paradoxical aspects of reality,
there is also nothing emperical which denies that such aspects arepossible.

The traditional mathematics, however, forbids a priori that

paradoxical qualities be discussed.

Thus, for purposes of even formally

"assuming" the existence of such qualities, shifting to a nonclassical
mode of reasoning is absolutely required.
The use of nonclassical logics for such purposes as these presents
two important methodological questions which have yet to be addressed.
These are (i) whether mathematical logic provides the "semantics for
science" in the sense that formal systems can be interpreted as meaningful
representations of the observable world, and (ii) whether models based
on nonstandard modes of reasoning can have viability in the sense of
satisfying the conventional criteria for emperical testability.

The
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foregoing has obviously assumed that both of these questions can be
answered in the affirmative.

The justification for this assumption is

developed in the chapter to follow.
§10.4. Formal Logical Systems And Their Semantics:
A General Introduction
An axiomatization of a body of mathematical knowledge lays down in
concise terms exactly those ideas which that knowledge is thought to
entail.

In some cases, such as with Peano's axioms for elementary

arithmetic (cf. §10.1), this isolates and condenses the essential ingredients of a well-established collection of mathematical facts and
principles.

In other cases, such as with group theory, or the theory of

two-person games, the axiomatization is a generic definition of a particular class of mathematical structures, e.g., the class of groups, or a
class of games.

In all such cases, however, the axiomatization serves

as the foundation for a particular mathematical "theory," consisting of
all propositions, or "theorems," that the given axioms logically imply.
Formal logical systems go a step beyond such axiomatizations, by
furthermore making explicit (i) a precise language within which all the
propositions of the given theory may be expressed, and (ii) an axiomatization of the underlying mode of reasoning, according to which propositions may be derived from the given axioms.

By

vi~tue

of (i), formal

logical systems exist on a level of abstraction in which the original
mathematical structures (e.g., the arithmetic of natural numbers, the
groups,'etc.) become "interpretations" of the languages of those systems.
For example, the formal theory of groups has as two of its interpretations the positive integers under addition and the rotations of a
square in the Euclidean plane.

In different interpretations, one simply
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takes the symbols of the fonnal language as standing for different kinds
of mathematical entities.

This, together with (ii), renders the fonnal

logical system as a representation of the given theory in terms of which
the theory may be examined as to its consistency, its completeness, its
decidability, and other properties related to the kinds of propositions
that the theory allows to be derived.

Such a representation of a mathe-

matical theory is generally known as a "formalization" of that theory.
Precise definitions of "formal logical system," "interpretation,"
etc., are given in §2.1.

The following two subsections elucidate these

same ideas in a manner which may be useful for the reader to whom these
ideas are new.
§10.4.1.

Basic Ideas And Terminology

A formal logical system is comprised of: (i) a formal language;
(ii) a set of axioms, expressible in that language; (iii) a collection
of inference rules (or rules of formal derivation); and (iv) a set of
theorems, which consist of (a) the given axioms, and (b) all expressions
of the given language that can be generated from those axioms by means
of the given inference rules.

The basic structure of a formal logical

system is represented in the top half of Figure 2-1.

The essential

characteristics of the various components may be described as follows.
A formal language is specified in two steps.
set of objects to serve as symbols.

First one selects a

Strictly speaking, symbols are

purely syntactical objects--that is, they are just abstract, independently existing objects, having no preassigned meanings.

At the same

time, however, a particular choice of symbols is always guided by a
predelection of the kind of ideas that one will want to use the language
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to express.

For example, if the language is to express the properties

of "equality of numbers," one will want to have at least one symbol for
use as an "equality symbol," in which case it would be customary to use
the sign = as its denotation.

But note especially that this sign,

consisting of two parallel, horizontal dashes on the page, is merely a
device for denoting that symbol, and strictly speaking is distinct from
the equality symbol itself.

Symbols as herein discussed can neither be

seen nor written down; rather, they are purely conceptual entities which
are taken as "given," as the members of some sufficiently large collection
of abstract things (e.g., the ordinal numbers, cf. §2.1.1).
Given a set of symbols, one then automatically has the collection
of all finite sequences of those symbols, called strings.

The second

step in specifying a language is to select from this collection of
strings some formulas (well-formed strings, etc., cf. §2.1), these being
all those strings having one of various "forms."

Deciding on appropriate

forms is always guided by an intuition about what it takes for a formula
to be meaningful, given some appropriate interpretations of the string's
constituent symbols.

For example, in a language for a formal system of

arithmetic, a string of the form a=+ would probably not be selected as
a formula, whereas a string of the form a=b might be, since the latter
string becomes meaningful if one makes the natural interpretation of =
as representing "equality of numbers," and of a and b as standing
for particular numbers, e.g., a pair of non-negative integers.

The

formal language is then the above set of symbols together with this
resultant set of formulas.
Axioms are taken from the set of formulas, and inference rules are
definable as mappings from the set of formulas into itself.

Inference
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rules are so-called because they show how certain "conclusions" may be
"inferred" from certain "hypotheses."

By the definition of a formal

logical system, the set of theorems is uniquely determined by the given
language, axioms, and rules of formal derivation.

Hence, the choice of

axioms and inference rules for a particular formalization is always
guided by a consideration of the kinds of theorems that one will want
the system to allow.

Continuing the above example, to formalize a

theory of "equality of numbers," one will want enough axioms and
inference rules to ensure that the theorems include all, and only, the
usual properties of equality.
Now whereas the components of a formal logical system are purely
syntactical entities--i.e., are symbols, strings of symbols, and rules
for operating on strings of symbols--these components may obtain meanings
by virtue of a semantic interpretation (alternatively, a semantic
structure) for the language of that system.

This consists of: (i) a

universe of discourse, (ii) assignments from within that universe of
specific meanings (or referents) for the symbols in the given language,
and (iii) a precise definition of the sense in which the meaning of a
formula, as determined by the meanings of the constituent symbols, is
"valid" or "true."
The principal components of a semantic interpretation are represented in the bottom half of Figure 2-1.

A universe of discourse is a

set of objects, the members of which are called individuals.

Strictly

speaking, individuals are purely mathematical entities, e.g. numbers or
sets of numbers.

They may, however (cf. §11.2), sometimes be taken as

representing concrete things, e.g., people, automobiles, or atoms.
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The specific characteristics of meaning assignments depend on the
linguistic roles that the symbols of the language are intended to play.
For example, if the language contains some "individual constants"
(cf. §3.1.1), then these symbols would be assigned as their meanings
some specific individuals in the given universe, and if the language
contains some "relation symbols" or "function symbols" (also cf. §3 .1.1),
these would be assigned as their meanings certain relations of individuals, or functions on individuals, in the given universe.
To illustrate: suppose that the language being considered is for a
formal system of arithmetic, and that it contains individual constants,
denoted by

Q and 1,

an equality symbol, denoted by =, and an addition

symbol, denoted by +.

Then a natural interpretation would be one whose

universe of discourse is the set of non-negative integers, and whose
meaning assignments are: the numbers zero and one serve as the referents
of the symbols

2 and !,

the referent of

= is

the equality relation on

the nonnegative integers, and the referent of + is addition of nonnegative integers.
But note furthermore an important aspect of the relation between a
formal language and its semantic interpretations.

There is nothing here

which requires that the domain of interpretation necessarily consist of
numbers.

On the contrary, an alternative interpretation could have as

its universe of discourse a collection of sets, in which case
interpreted as the empty set,

1 as some maximal set,

sets, and + as set intersection.

= as

Q might

be

equality of

This reitterates a fact mentioned

earlier, that a given formal language will in general have many different
semantic interpretations, and it shows that the alternative interpretations
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may in fact be quite different from the one (or several) which served
initially as the intuitive guide for that language's formal definition.
A notion of validity, or truth, is defined in terms of some truth
values and some truth valuations.

Truth values can be any objects,

e.g., the letters T and F, or the numerals 1 and 0 for a bivalent interpretation, or the set of reals in the interval [0,1] for a multivalent
interpretation, and so on.

Truth valuations are mappings of formulas of

the given language into the set of truth values.

These mappings may

sometimes be functions of the meanings of the formulas.
For example, if = is interpreted as the equality relation in the foregoing illustration, then the valuations would be defined in such a way
that, for arbitrary individual constants a and b, a formula of the form
a=b is mapped to the value T (or 1) if and only if the given interpretation assigns the same individual as a meaning for both a and b.

On the

other hand, truth valuations are the means by which the referents of
certain symbols are assigned.

Specifically, these are the logical

connectives, such as , (not, negation),
conjunction),

~(implies,

V (or,

disjunction), & (and,

logical implication), and

= (is

equivalent

with; logical equivalence), which always have as their referents certain
functions from the set of truth values into itself.

For example, in a

bivalent interpretation the meaning of & may be defined by: for any
formulas A and B, the formula of the form A&B receives the value T
under a valuation V--i.e., V(A&B)=T--if and only if both V(A)=T and
V(B)=T.

By agreeing that all valuations in a given interpretation act

similarly on formulas built up with the symbol &, one thus captures the
sense in which, in classical logics, & is taken as representing the
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English "and."

In multivalent interpretations, of course, the meanings

of the logical connectives are assigned differently.
A convention which has evolved for dealing with languages that
contain individual constants and individual variables is to reserve the
appellations "true" and "false" for only those formulas which make
assertions about specific individuals in some universe (i.e., contain no
individual variables which range freely over the universes of its interpretations).

This convention is captured mathematically by having only

such formulas be included within the domain of the truth-valuations.
For example, the valuations would map the above formula a=b to the set
of truth values, but not a formula of the form x=x.

The latter type

of formula is referred to as being "valid" or "invalid," where validity
means that all possible substitutions of individual constants (which
"name" the elements of a given universe, cf. §3.1 and §3.2) for the
individual variables yield formulas in the domain of the valuations that
are mapped to "true."

If the formula is already in the domain of the

valuations, then "true" and "valid" are used synonomously.
A semantics for a specific formal language is a class of interpretations for that language.

Typically, a semantics is defined in terms

of an arbitrary member of that class, in which case it is automatic that
all the interpretations in that class have certain features in common.
For example, they might all be bivalent, all assign the equality relation
to the equality symbol (if indeed there is one in the given language),
and all interpret the logical connectives in exactly the same way.
semantics for a class of formal languages is defined similarly.

A

In this

case it is customary for the languages in the class to have been defined
generically--i.e., in terms of an arbitrary member of that class--and
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hence to have a certain minimal set of symbols (sometimes called logical
symbols) in common.

Then an arbitrary semantic interpretation in the

semantics for that class of languages may be defined in terms of the
manner in which it assigns meanings to the logical symbols.

The net

effect is analagous with the situation of one language; the common
symbols, which typically include a set of logical connectives, are
interpreted in the same way by all interpretations for all the languages
in 'the given class.
A formal logic consists of a formal language, or class of languages,
together with a semantics for that language or class.

In light of the

above, this says that a formal logic is essentially determined by some
specific meaning assignments for a specific set of symbols, in which
case, use of the term "logic" signifies that this set includes some
logical connectives.

Hence this corresponds to the sense in which a

logic is sometimes defined by some "truth tables" for logical connectives.
Examples of logics appearing in this dissertation include the classical
propositional calculus (§7.1), Kleene's three-valued logic for partial
recursion (§8.2), and the logic of approximate reasoning C§3.1 and
§3.2), which is a hybrid, having both bivalent and multivalent components.
Given the foregoing, a semantics for a class of formal logical
systems is naturally defined as a semantics for the languages of these
systems.

In dealing with formal systems, however, it is generally the

case that the systems in a particular class are defined analagously as a
class of formal languages--i.e., in terms of an arbitrary member of the
class--in which case the systems will have in common, not only a specific set of symbols, but also certain forms of axioms and inference
rules, called logical axioms and logical rules.

Then a semantics for
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that class of systems will not only interpret logical symbols uniformly,
but normally will also have it that the logical axioms are always valid
(or true) and that the logical rules are validity- (or truth-) preserving
in that they always yield valid conclusions from valid hypotheses.
in turn ensures that certain forms of theorems are always valid.

This
For

example, if a class of formal logical systems is to be based on the
classical logic, then a semantics for that class would naturally be
defined in such a way that all the tautologies of classical logic are
semantically valid.
A semantic model of a formal logical system is a semantic interpretation for the language of that system in which all theorems of the
system are valid.

Evidently, by the-definition of a formal logical

system, in order for a semantic interpretation of its language to be a
model of the system, it is sufficient that this be an interpretation in
which all axioms of the system are valid, and all inference rules are
validity preserving, since this will ensure that all formal derivations
within the system lead only to valid theorems.

Furthermore, it may

happen that many interpretations for a formal system, even from within
the same semantics, will not be models of that system.

For example, a

semantics for a formal system of arithmetic may have an interpretation
for that system which assigns the meaning "one" to the symbol
to the symbol

Q,

and multiplication to the symbol +, in which case the

theorem 1+0=1 would not be valid.
"" "" ""

1, "zero"

Finally, while it is immediate by the

definition of model that the theorems of a formal logical system are
always valid in every model of the system, the converse proposition need
not be true--i.e., it is not necessarily true that a formula which is
valid in every model of a formal system need be a theorem of that system.

218
This leads to the following important idea from the theory of formal
systems.
Let F be a formal logical system, and let
Then F is said to be complete with respect to

~

~

be a semantics for F.

if it turns out that a

formula P in the language of F is valid in all models of F (in

~)

only

if P is a theorem of F--i.e, if the abovementioned converse holds true.
Accordingly, a class

e

of formal logical systems is complete with

respect to a semantics ..& for e. if each formal system in c:, is complete
with respect to its interpretations in .d •
The concept of semantic completeness makes precise the sense in
which a class of formal logical systems is said to formalize a certain
mathematical theory, or to characterize a certain collection of mathematical structures (i.e., the structures in the concern of that theory).
If the formal systems are defined correctly, i.e., have the appropriate
languages, axioms, and rules of inference, then the given mathematical
structures will simply be the models in a properly defined class of
semantic interpretations, in which case semantic completeness ensures
that the axioms allow enough proof-theoretic strength to derive formally
as theorems all formulas that express true propositions in the theory of
those structures.
To avoid possible confusion with other works, here let us note
also that a second usage of the word "complete" is sometimes employed.
When expressed for systems whose languages include the standard logical
connectives, a formal logical system F is proof-theoretically complete
if, for every formula P of the language of F (or for every formula P of
a certain form in that language) we have either that P is a theorem of F
or that

P is a theorem of F.

It is known, for example, that every
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axiomatization of the classical propositional calculus is complete in
this sense.

This proof-theoretic notion of completeness happens to not

be used in this dissertation.
§10.4.2.

Game Theory: An Example

At this point it will be convenient to illustrate the foregoing
with an example that will also serve a purpose in the sections to follow.
Suppose that it is desired to formalize the mathematical theory of
games.

(To date, no one appears to have carried out this exercise, but

it is certainly reasonable to suppose that this could be accomplished
with little difficulty).

Here, "game" means any "two-person game" as

studied by Rapoport (1966).

Then it is implicit that the semantics of

interest should include the entire class of two-person games; that is,
these will be the "natural" interpretations of the formal systems we
want to define.
To start out, therefore, we must select a symbol set having sufficient richness to express all the basic ideas of game theory.

In parti-

cular, the symbol set should include the logical connectives denoted by,

"

V, etc., the equality symbol denoted by

=,

some symbols to represent

players, such as A and B, and so on, leading up to enough linguistic
strength to describe strategy/outcome (or game) matrices and any functions
which would represent each player's responses to the other player's
moves.

Among these would be a certain minimal set of logical symbols

that are common to all the systems in the class being defined.

Then,

special ideas, unique to a specific system in the class, would be
expressed by adding further symbols to this basic set.
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Axioms and inference rules are chosen similarly.

The axioms (or

axiom "forms") and inference rules common to all the systems in the
class should include (i) the axioms and rules for classical propositional
calculus, (ii) the axioms for equality (i.e., standard axioms such as
(a=b&b=c) a=c, which expresses transitivity of equality), together with
(iii) enough further axioms and rules to describe the interrelations of
players, strategies, rewards, etc. that must be present in any game.
This provides us with a basic, or minimal, formal theory of games.
Further systems in the class may then be obtained by adding new
symbols to the language, and by adding new axioms and/or inference rules
defining how these new symbols interrelate with the basic symbols and
with one another.

For example, starting with the basic formal theory of

games, one obtains the formal theory of zero-sum games by adding some
axioms which require that the net outcome of any game be zero.

On the

other hand, starting with the same basic formal theory of games, one
obtains the formal theory of nonzero-sum games by adding some axioms
which explicitly state that the net outcome of any game should not equal
zero.

Furthermore, given the theory of nonzero-sum games, one may

adjoin additional axioms which state that a game ultimately leads to the
"prisoner's dilemma."
Note:

A simple game matrix exhibiting the prisoner's dilemma is

shown in Figure 10-1 (taken from Rapoport 1966, p. 128).

This depicts a

game wherein: (i) if the two contestants trust one another, they can
cooperate and mutually choose strategies by which they mutually gain,
while (ii) in a context of mutual distrust, and a desire on the part of
each contestant to minimize his losses, the game becomes non-cooperative,
and the contestants choose strategies by which they both lose.
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Player B Stratagies

Al

5,5

-10,10

Player A
Statagies
A2

10,-10

-5,-5

1st number is payoff to player A
2nd number is payoff to player B
Figure 10-1.

Prisoner's dilemma game matrix.
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The above remarks illustrate a process of obtaining formal systems
of more and more specialized kinds of games by adding more symbols,
axioms, and/or inference rules.

But the fact of such specialization

taking place is ensured only by virtue of a completeness result, i.e.,
by establishing that the class of all formal theories of games is complete
with respect to the given semantics.

As an illustration of this, let G

stand for the minimal formal theory of games, let ZG stand for the
extension of G which gives the formal theory of zero-sum games, let NZG
be the analogous extension of G for nonzero-sum games, and let NZG+PD be
the extension of NZG which furthermore contains axioms expressing the
prisoner's diler::ma (see Figure 10-2).

Then a completeness result for

the class of formal systems thus defined, with respect to a semantics
which includes all possible games, would ensure all of the following:
(i) a formula of the language of G is a theorem

~f

G if and only if it

is true for every game, (ii) a formula is a theorem of NZG if and only
if it is true for every nonzero-sum game, (iii) a formula is a theorem
of NZG+PD if and only if it is "true" for every game which leads to the
prisoner's dilemma, and so on for ZG and any other systems based on G
that one might want to define.
It follows that additional axioms for a logical system constrain
the set of interpretations which can be models of that system.

Models

of NZG+PD are models of NZG, which in turn are models of G; models of
NZG, however, need not be models of NZG+PD, and models of G need not be
models of NZG.

The latter· models of G may instead be models of ZG.

Thus the most general formal system--which may itself be called "game
theory"--has the most models, while the less general systems have fewer
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G

ZG

.'

NZG

.

NZG+PD

•

•

•
•
Figure 10-2;

Adding new axioms to a formal system.

•
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models.

Today there is an extensive literature on techniques for deter-

mining the exact number of models of a given formal system.
§10.4.3.

Further Terminology

Formal systems which have essentially only one model--i.e., all of
whose models are "isomorphic"--are sometimes called categorical systems.
A slightly weaker but sometimes more useful condition is that the system
have essentially only one model of each finite or infinite cardinality-i.e., for each finite or infinite cardinal number c, all the models
whose universes have cardinality c are isomorphic.

This property for a

particular c is sometimes referred to as categoricity in c.

For a brief

discussion of these ideas, see §5.6.
A formal logical system is said to be consistent if its set of
theorems does not include a contradiction (or an "inconsistency,"
cf. §2.1.5.2).

In standard languages, i.e., languages which employ the

usual logical connectives, a contradiction will be a formula of the form

P&,P, while in nonstandard languages, contradictions will normally have
different forms (as in §7.3).
A formal logical system is coherent if there is at least one
formula in the language of that system which is not a theorem of the
system.

The property of coherence leads to a broad division of all

formal logical systems into two categories: Aristotelean systems, in
which inconsistency always implies incoherence, and non-Aristotelean
systems, which can be simultaneously inconsistent and coherent.

A

discussion of these ideas, and of how they relate to the literature, is
given in §2.1.5.2 and §2.1.5.4.

Examples of their use appear in §8.4.

CHAPTER 11
THE METHODOLOGICAL FRAME
Chapter 10 discussed the foundational aspects of using nonclassical
logics as alternative guides to thinking.

The present chapter continues

this discussion in an investigation of methodological issues surrounding
the use of formal logical systems and, particularly, nonclassical modes
of reasoning for constructing models of real-world systems.
In §11.1 we review M. Bunge's work on the theory of modeling in
the natural sciences, recounting basic definitions and explaining the
concept of empirical testability.
§11.2 then takes up the views of Bunge and Suppes regarding the
role of formal systems in providing the semantics for science, with the
aim of clarifying certain points for purposes of the discussion at hand.
§11.3, makes use of §11.2 to show how Bunge's basic definitions
(§11.1) can be rendered within the theory of formal systems.
§11.4 carries this one step further, by recalling the discussion
of Chapter 10 and laying down the manner in which formal systems can
enter into the relation of the observer to the observed.
§11.5 examines the question of empirical testability as it applies
to models based on nonstandard modes of reasoning.

It is concluded that

Bunge's criteria apply, although in a more or less qualified fashion
depending on the particular logic employed.
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§11.1.

Review Of Bunge's Theory Of Modeling
This section recounts the central ideas of Bunge (1973) on the use

of mathematical models in the natural sciences, insofar as these pertain
to the questions mentioned in the final paragraph of §10.3.

Namely,

these concern the status of the theory of formal logical systems in
providing the "semantics for science," and the empirical testability of
models that are based on nonstandard modes of reasoning.
We begin with a summary of basic definitions.

A model here is any

entity which performs "a partial representation of a chunk of reality"
(Bunge, p. 19).

A model object is a model which serves as "a schematic

representation of a thing or of a situation assumed to be actual or
possible" (p. 97).

A theoretical model (or specific theory) is a

mo~el

which is a "hypothetico-deductive system concerning a model object"
(p. 97) and which is obtained by "grafting" a model object onto a general
theory--where a general theory is a body of laws, or a "generic framework" which is "concerned with the gross structure and behavior of
systems of almost any kind, regardless of their physical and chemical
constitution" (pp. 33-34).

The interrelation of these ideas is

illustrated in Figure 11-1.
As examples of general theories Bunge cites "information theory,
game theory, systems theory (in particular cybernetics), automata theory,
and other extremely general black box theories, as well as nonspecific
mechanism theories such as general field theory, both classical and
quantal" (p. 33).

Such theories are regarded as "generic sets" of

general descriptions and laws which describe the structure and behavior
of a very large (usually infinite) collection of set-theoretical structures (eg., game matrices).

Alternatively, general theories may be
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General Theory
(Non-Zero-Surn Two-Person Games)

Specific
Theory

Model Object
(Prisoner's Dilemma)

concrete
Referent

Real-World
System
(Actual Game)

Figure 11-1.

Structure of a theoretical model (specific theory) •
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regarded as containing the collection of set-theoretical structures
themselves, in which case the general descriptions are taken only as
technical devices by which the collection of mathematical structures is
defined.

The laws of course remain separate from the structures.

In either case, general theories are "stuff free" in the sense
that their set-theoretic structures are not assumed to have any specific
referents in the real world.
mathematical entities.

They are merely uninterpreted abstract

It follows that general theories are not com-

pletely testable, since they do not have the requirement
Popper of being refutable.

desc~ibed

by

According to this conception, a model is

refutable only if it says something about a real-world system, in terms
of which the model can be determined as true or false.
theories are neither "true" nor "false."

But, general.

Rather, a set-theoretic struc-

ture only either "applies" to a real-world situation, or it does not,
according as that situation does or does not satisfy the definitions of
the kinds of situations which are under that general theory's concern.
For example, a real-world situation is either a two-person game, or it
is not, depending on whether it satisfies the definition of a two-person
game; and if it does not, then the general theory of two-person games
remains unchallenged--one simply has here a situation in which two-person
game theory is inapplicable as an analytical tool.
At the same time, however, general theories are partially testable
in that they are confirmable, where confirmation is enacted through the
testing of theoretical models (or specific theories) obtained by embedding
specific model objects within that general theory's framework.

As

greater numbers of specific theories are verified within such a framework,
the framework itself becomes increasingly more confirmed as a useful and
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hence viable scientific theory.

Complete confirmation, of course, is

normally not possible since this would entail the testing of a usually
infinite variety of specific theories.
A typical example of a model object would be a set-theoretic
description of the prisoner's dilemma game matrix given in §10.4.2,
applied to a real-world two-person game.

In contrast with general

theories, model objects are always assumed to have specific real-world
referents.

In Bunge's work, where M is a model object and R is a real-

world referent, this modeling relation is denoted by the
expression M=R, and is referred to as an interpretative axiom or a
semantic assumption (p. 96).

Semantic assumptions are always implicit

in informal scientific discourse, but must be made explicit in the
foundations of science and in particular in the axiomatization of a
scientific theory.

Such explication is important since any given model

object might be involved in multiple semantic assumptions.

For example,

(i) a pair of competing corporations who have the option of choosing
between continued competition or a merger, and (ii) a pair of countries
who have adopted a mutual status of detente, might constitute two
referents of the same set-theoretic description of the prisoners dilemma.
Expression of a semantic assumption thus makes clear which real-world
referents are in concern.
A characteristic of model objects is that they are "idealizations"
of their referents (p. 92).

As such, model objects always omit certain

details that are deemed to be irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
Quoting Bunge (p. 92), "all the individuals of a given mice strain may
be taken to be indiscernable and all ways of pressing a bar for food
pellets may be assumed to be eqUivalent as well.

In other words, the
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real population, made up of different individuals, is modeled as a homogeneous set (an equivalence class), and likewise the set of all possible
events is partitioned into homogeneous (equivalence) classes".

It is in

this sense that model objects are always "conceptual" or "abstract."
As with general theories, model objects are untestable in the
sense of being irrefutable, but for a different reason.

Although they

are always assumed to have at least one real-world referent, model
objects in themselves make no predictions.

But predictions are necessary

for refutability, since it is only in terms of a model's

pred~ctions

that one ultimately determines whether that model is true or false.
Model objects do make predictions, however, when they are embedded
within (or grafted onto) the framework provided by a general theory.

°

In

this manner the model object inherits a set of general laws according to
which predictions can be inferredoas logical implications of the model
object.

This in fact is what one tests in actual practice--i.e., a

theoretical model, or specific theory, of the model object.
This highlights the major conclusion of Bunge's analysis: for a
model to be completely testable it is necessary and sufficient that it
be both refutable and confirmable.
fully testable.

Hence only theoretical models are

The confirmability of theoretical models stems from

their having specific real-world referents, and their refutability stems
from their capacity to make specific predictions regarding their referents'
behavior.

Insofar as standard approaches to mathematical modeling are

concerned, it may therefore be said that the criteria of empirical
testability are fairly well secured.
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§11.2.

The Semantics Of Science
Let us now turn to a comparison of the scientific notion of "theo-

retical model" with the purely mathematical notion of "model of a formal
logical system."

The import of Bunge's remarks (pp. 110-113) is that an

earlier view set forth by Suppes (1961) makes too strong of a case for
the potential role of mathematical logic in scientific studies.

Speci-

fically, Bunge qualifies Suppes's view with the observation that the
theory of formal logical systems and their semantics is not in itself
enough to fully constitute the "semantics of science."

Although Bunge

does not provide an explicit definition of this phrase, it is clear from
the context of his discussion that this semantics should include all of
the linguistic and semantic apparatus necessary for the formulation and
testing of specific theories.

In this section we shall ultimately

concur with Bunge on this point and then (in this and later sections)
proceed to build on Bunge's analysis so as to better pinpoint the use of
formal systems at least in serving the semantics of science even though
not comprising its entirety.
It will be instructive to start with a brief summary of Suppes's
contribution.

The paper begins with a series of quotations, the first

being Tarski's definition of a semantic model of a formal theory (i.e.,
of a formal system in the sense of this dissertation), and the remaining
five quotes being descriptions of models used in the empirical sciences.
The crux of his argument is then given as follows (pp. 165-166):
I claim that the concept of model in the sense of Tarski may be
used without distortion and as a fundamental concept in all of
the disciplines from which the above quotations are drawn. In
this sense I would assert that the meaning of the concept of
model is the same in mathematics and the empirical sciences.
The difference to be found in these disciplines is to be found
in their use of the concept. In drawing this comparison between
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constancy of meaning and difference of use, the sometimes difficult semantic question of how one is to explain the meaning of a
concept without referring to its use does not actually arise.
When I speak of the meaning of the concept of a model I shall
always be speaking in well-defined technical contexts and what I
shall be claiming is that, given this technical meaning of the
concept of model, mathematicians ask a certain kind of question
about models and empirical scientists tend to ask another kind
of question.
The support for this claim stems from some observations about the
nature of set-theoretical models of formal systems and their connection
with physical systems.

These observations are illustrated by an example

as follows (pp. 166-167):
It is true that many physicists want to think of a model of
the orbital theory of the atom as being more than a certain kind
of set-theoretical entity. They envisage it as a very concrete
physical thing built on the analogy of the solar system. I
think it is important to point out that there is no real incompatibility in these two viewpoints. To define formally a model
as a set-theoretical entity which is a certain kind of ordered
tuple consisting of a set of objects and relations and operations
on these objects is not to rule out the physical model of the
kind which is appealing to physicists, for the physical model
may be simply taken to define the set of objects in the settheoretical model. . . .
It is simple enough to see how an actual physical model in the
physicist's sense of classical particle mechanics is related to
this set-theoretical sense of models. We simply can take the
set of particles to be in the case of the solar system the set
of planetary bodies. Another slightly more abstract possibility
is to take the set of particles to be the set of centers of mass
of the planetary bodies. This generally exemplifies the situation. The abstract set-theoretical model of a theory will have
among its parts a basic set which will consist of the objects
ordinarily thought to constitute the physical model . . . .
A summarization of these remarks is represented pictorially in
Figure 11-2.

That this figure is implicit, although somewhat obscurely,

in Suppes's remarks is evidenced by (i) the statement that "the physical
model may be taken to define the set of objects in the set-theoretical
model," (ii) the statement that one can "take the set of particles to be
the centers of mass of the planetary bodies," and particularly (iii) the
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statement that the "basic set. . .

will consist of the objects ordinarily

thought to constitute the physical mode1."

In the context of §11.1, it

is here evident that Suppes is referring to the fact that the elements
of a model are "idealizations" of the elements of the physical system.
As it stands, this may be regarded as a fairly accurate description
of the actual state of affairs.

Yet, as Bunge points out, it lacks a

small, but nonetheless important, matter of detail; namely, there is
nothing inherent in formal systems or their semantic interpretations
which connects them with the empirical world.

While the upper half of

Figure 11-2 is always an essential ingredient of the mathematics of the
model, the lower half represents something which is "extramathematical,"
i.e., something which must be added to the set-theoretical structure in
order that it become a bona fide theoretical model of a concrete (or
supposedly existing) real-world system.
Observing this, Bunge proceeds to cast an alternate view in terms
of some further examples.

These shall be given here in detail, since

they will serve a purpose also in later sections.
Consider the following system of symbols and axioms (Bunge, p. 111):
1.

S~cp.

2.

(a)F:S-+R.

3.

s,s'eS => H(s,s')=heR.

4.

(a)O:RXR-+R.

5.

s,s'eS => G(s,s')=hO[F(s')OF(s)]

(b)G:sxS-+R.

(c)H:sxS-+R.

(b)O:RxR-+R.

In the following this system will be referred to as a "formal system"
even though, strictly speaking, is only the proper part of a formal logical
system which would furthermore embody some axioms characterizing an
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underlying logic, together with some axioms which lay down the formal
interrelations of $, =, x, 0, 0, etc.
Bunge notes first of all that this system is "nonsignificant"
since we may assign the symbols as many different meanings as we please.
A specific semantics (as in §10.4.1) is provided, however, by an agreement
that under all interpretations we shall have that R stands for the real
line, 0 for the arithmetic product, 0 for subtraction, and that the
remaining symbols and punctuation marks receive their conventional
interpretations.

It follows that all the interpretations in this

seman~

tics will have the properties (Bunge, p. 111):
1.

S is a non-empty set.

2.

(a) F is a real valued function on S.

(b) G and H are real

valu~d

functions on the set of pairs of members of S.
3.

H is the constant function with value h.

4.

For every sand

S'

in S, G(s,s')=h[F(s')-F(s)].

Different interpretations thus are obtainable by assigning different
sets to S, different functions to F, and different real values to h.
Given an assignment for S,F and h, the meanings of G and H are determined.
Any such set-theoretic structure, Bunge refers to as a settheoretical "formalism."

His argument then proceeds (p. 112):

This is a formalism interpreted within pure mathematics. It
makes no sense outside mathematics. In particular, it is not a
theoretical model in any metascientific sense of the term, for
it does not concern anything extramathematical: the basic set S
is an arbitrary (abstract) set and therefore the functions F, G,
and H cannot represent any concrete properties. Precisely this
renders the formalism valuable from a scientific point of view,
for it is a read-made dummy that can be clothed in a number of
ways.
Such "clothings" of the set-theoretic formalism are called "factual
interpretations," two examples of which are given as follows:
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1.

A "physical interpretation," wherein
a.

the individuals s of the universe of discourse are thought of
as points on a d.c. electric circuit,

2.

b.

F(s) is electrical potential at the point s,

c.

G(s,s') is intensity of current between sand s',

d.

H(s,s') is conductivity between sand s',

A "sociological interpretation," wherein
a.

the individuals s of the universe of discourse are thought of
as countries,

b.

F(s) is enticement offered by s (eg., standard of living),

c.

G(s,s') is migratory pressure from s to s',

d.

H(s,s') is permeability of the border between sand s'.

This set of examples calls to mind a slightly different image than
Suppes's, as shown in Figure 11-3.

Here we have a formal system inter-

preted within mathematics as a certain set-theoretical structure, which
is then further provided with "clothes" by which it becomes simultaneously
a factual interpretation of the set-theoretical "formalism" and a theoretical model of a real-world system.
Yet, Bunge continues, "this is just a first approximation."
Mathematical models of formal systems are always, by definition
(cf. §10.4.1), required to be "true" for all the theorems of the system,
while theoretical models are at best only "approximately true" of their
designated real-world systems (since they are always "idealizations").
Consequently every theoretical model is, in the best of cases, a
quasimodel in the sense that its formulas are (at best) satisfied
only approximately by reality. Therefore the model-theoretic
concept of a model does not coincide with either of the two
metascientific notions of model. Which shows that model theory
is not enough to consitute the semantics of science, and suggests
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that the very term 'theoretical model' (and also 'mathematical
model') would be advantageously replaced by 'specific theory.'
Now on these points Bunge's position evidently stands firm.

In

fact, it is likely that this would gain the concurrence of Suppes himself.
Indeed Bunge's rebuttal of Suppes may be somewhat strongly stated, since
Bunge merely extends the analysis in a way which augments but does not
necessarily contradict Suppes.

That Suppes overlooked the above distinc-

tion between the "exactness" and "inexactness" of the separate modeling
relations apparently stems from his focusing on the set-theoretical
entity itself, rather than on the nature of the implicit semantic assumptions.

Nevertheless, Bunge's point that development a specific theory

out of set-theoretical structure always requires something "extramathematical" is significant.
Regarding the nature of theoretical models thus construed, however,
it is worth noting also that there is a further difference between the
relations of factual interpretation to

set-~heoretical

set-theoretical interpretation to formal system.
as follows.

structure and of

This may be unraveled

In the latter relation, the set-theoretical structure is an

entity which is completely separate from the system which it interprets-i.e., it contains no symbols or symbolic elements, but only set-theoretical
objects together with some interpretative mappings (cf. §10.4.1) from
symbolic elements into set-theoretical entities.

In the former relation,

on the other hand, the set theoretical structure (or some fragment
thereof) is properly contained within the factual interpretation--i.e.,
correctly envisioned, the theoretical model consists of at least a part
of the set-theoretical structure together with some further mappings
which link set-theoretical entities with objects in the real world.

On
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this count, it may be argued that one could with no loss revert back to
a three-leveled diagram such as Figure 11-2, as long as one keeps in
mind that it is the lower part, i.e., the semantic assumption, which
indeed qualifies the semantic model of the formal system as a representative of some real-world system.

This three-leveled image will be used

in the work below.
Last, while Bunge's work clearly does not deny the usefulness of
formal systems to science, his rendering of "theoretical model" obscures
a point that is central to all that follows here.

Namely, that the

presence of such a system, either implicitly understood or explicitly
formalized, is essential to the model for providing both the linguistic
and the logico-deductive mechanism.

That this is so stems from there

being no symbolic or logical apparatus at the level of the set-theoretical
model.

These features, by which the factual model obtains "formulas"

and implies "predictions." exists only at the level which is represented
by the formal system.

To practicing scientists, of course, this distinc-

tion is seldom relevant, since first, the underlying logic is usually
the classical logic, whose verity is normally unquestioned (cf. §10.2),
and second, even in standard mathematical theories the possibility of
separating symbols from their meanings is unimportant.
Nevertheless, as a further step toward making the notion of theoretical model complete in this context, it is worth observing in addition
to the above that not only do such models properly contain a part of
their set-theoretical "formalism," but they also contain at least a
fragment of some formal system, namely that part which expresses the
properties and behaviors of the given set-theoretical model.
understanding will be tacit in the sections to follow.

This
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§11.3.

A Formalization Of The Basic Modeling Itleas
Now that we have clarified the role of formal logical systems with

respect to the semantics of science, we are in a position to lend further
detail to this role by reinterpreting the analysis of Bunge (§11.1)
within this frame.

Here it will be shown that the theory of formal

logical systems contributes a new level of precision to the concepts of
model object, theoretical model and general theory, and, more importantly,
that the "exactness" of the relation of formal system to its semantic
models is precisely what lends theoretical models their

prope~ty

of

refutability.
In §11.1 it was seen that the idea of a general theory is exemplified by the theory of two-person games, and that this theory may be .
regarded as the collection of all possible set-theoretical structures
that satisfy a generic set of definitions and laws.

Furthermore, it was

seen that the idea of a model object is exemplified by a set-theoretical
structure which represents a prisoner's dilemma situation in the real
world, whereas a specific theory of that model object is obtained by
"grafting" that structure onto the general theory of two-person games.
As part of the following, we make this notion of "grafting" formally
explict.

It will be convenient to take as our theory the theory of

nonzero-sum two-person games which, although somewhat less general than
the full theory of two-person games, nonetheless qualifies as an example
of a general theory.
We may proceed to translate Bunge's definitions into the terminology of formal systems in the following manner.

Consider the formal

system NZG of §10.4.2, and let the collection of all possible semantic
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interpretations of NZG be the semantics I(NZG).

Then the general theory

of nonzero-sum two person games may be defined as NZG together with the
collection of all interpretations in I(NZG) which are models of NZG (in
the "exact" model-theoretic sense).

Note that this merely formalizes

the generic set of descriptions and laws which (§11.1) normally comprise
the informal general theory, and all of the set-theoretical entities
thus described are correctly characterized, i.e., it is assumed that NZG
is semantically complete with respect to I(NZG).

The sense in which a

general theory is "stuff free" is here represented by the fact that the
semantic interpretations in I(NZG) are not assumed to have any particular
referents in the real world.
The manner in which a general theory obtains its connection with
the real world, through the use of a model object, can be elucidated by
similarly translating the definitions of model object and specific
theory.

A model object of a real-world system which exhibits the

prisoner's dilemma may be defined as the axioms PD (described in §10.4.2),
together with any part of a semantic model in I(NZG) that satisfies
those axioms, and furthermore together with any semantic assumption
which maps that part of the semantic model into the real world.

Note

that here the model object per se usually does not utilize the full
semantic interpretation, but only a certain subcollection of functions
and relations on the universe of that interpretation.

Furthermore note

that there might well be more than one model in I(NZG) that satisfy the
axioms PD (Le., in which PD is "true" thereby possibly giving rise to
more than one model object.

Such model objects mayor may not be equiva-

lent, either from the standpoints of the axioms PD or that of and the
concrete referent.
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A specific theory of a prisoner's dilemma model object may then be
defined as the formal theory NZG+PD together with the smaller semantics
~(NZG+PD),

and furthermore including any semantic assumptions in which

the interpretations in I(NZG+PD) might be involved (i.e., as containing
model objects).

This illustrates that the process of "grafting" a model

object onto a general theory may be represented formally as a process of
"adjoining" some additional axioms to a formal logical system.
there is only one such model in

~(NZG+PD)--i.e.,

In case

if NZG+PD is categorical

in the sense of §10.4.3--then the specific theory is just

tha~

model;

otherwise the specific theory consists of a collection of more or less
similar models.
This collection of definitions has been summarized
in Figure 11-4.

schematical~y

Here is illustrated the formation of the theory NZG+PD

as the composition of NZG and PD.

Further it is indicated that the

semantics for NZG will in general be larger than the semantics for
NZG+PD (as was discussed in §10.4.2) and that the set-theoretical part
of the model object is normally a part of a particular interpretation,
here denoted by 14 , within the semantics I(NZG+PD).

The presence of 13

in the diagram covers the possibility that there might be similar but
nonisomorphic models of NZG+PD--i.e., that NZG+PD might not be categorical.
The lower part of the diagram shows the semantic assumption which links
the set-theoretical part of the model object with the real world, and
furthermore suggests that the specific theory of that model object will
normally pertain to some larger system within which the concrete referent
is embedded.

Thus we see that all the essential aspects of Bunge's

definitions are taken into account.
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Next let us consider the concept of refutability in this context.
Recall from §11.1 that the requirements for a model to be refutable are
(i) that the model have a specific referent in the real-world, and
(ii) that it allow for making predictions about its referent.

Then the

fact that a specific theory of a model object has an empirical referent
will always be--as we have seen--"extramathematical," since the introduction of a referent is based only on a choice by the modeler.

The

nature of a prediction, on the other hand, is intrinsically mathematical
and is based on the characteristics of the general theory.

W~

may

therefore define this concept in a continuation of the above example as
follows.
By a prediction of the above specific theory (of the

prisoner'~

dilemma) is meant the semantic interpretation (i.e., the meaning) of any
theorem of NZG+PD in the semantic model of NZG+PD which contains the
given model object.

In other words, a prediction is simply a logical

consequence of axioms of the formalized general theory, interpreted
within that theory's semantics.

This clearly makes precise the signi-

ficance of general theories in providing logico-deductive systems.

And

the concept of a refutable model thus becomes precise via a precise
rendering of the concept of prediction.
Actual verification or refutation of a given specific theory is,
of course, always a matter of scientific investigation.

One tests the

predictions of the theory against the behavior of the concrete referent
and thereby determines whether the predictions are "true," "false,"
"approximately true," and so on.

Clearly, these predictions will normally

be only approximately true of the real-world system.
"exactness" in the relation of the semantics of

However, the

~(NZG+PD)

to the formal
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system NZG+PD is' mandatory for the investigative procedure to be correct.
For it is only because a prediction is the "meaning" of a theorem in
NZG+PD that one is assured that that prediction is indeed a valid logical
inference from the given model object.

Without the presence (either

implicitly or explicitly) of a formal logical system, no such correctness
can be ensured.
Semantic completeness of the formal logical system is also an
implicit necessity, in order to ensure that the formal system indeed
characterizes the given general theory.
hand, might or might not playa role.

Categoricity, on the other
If the formal system is cate-

gorical, then one knows that the specific theory utilizes the only
semantic model which satisfies the axioms of the given model object, in
which case a formula of the language of the system is derivable from the
axioms of the system if and only if it is true for that particular
specific theory.

But even if the formal system is not categorical, we

still have that all derivable formulas are true for the specific theory,
by the definition of semantic model; only we do not have the conve=se.
In terms of testability, this means that simply because a formula is
semantically valid, we do not know if it qualifies as a prediction,
since only the formally derivable formulas are bona fide logical
inferences within the context of the general theory.

In actual practice

however, this fact of mathematical life is of no real consequence, since
scientific testing is always restricted to only those predictions which
are indeed formally derivable.

Thus, categoricity is not generally

needed for testability, even though it might be useful in some situations.
Finally, it is true that in practice the underlying logical system
is rarely made formally explicit; and in most cases this explication
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serves no useful purpose.

The usual approach in scientific work is to

simply assume a given, commonly known, body of knowledge and to
explicitly present only the "proper axioms" which describe the specific
theory in concern.

This is what was done, for example, in Bunge's

description of a formal system in terms of the axioms 1 through 5 C§11.2).
But, this does not negate the fact that there is always some formal
logic, indeed usually the classical logic, permeating the entire
investigation.
§11.4.

The Use Of Formal Systems
With these ideas in hand we may now bring forward the discussion

of §lO.1 and §10.2 and bear more carefully on the manner in which formal
systems may enter into the relation between the observer and the observed.
Let us begin with a brief review of the way in which models are formed.
We have seen that the use of a general theory is always necessary
for the modeling exercise, for it is 'only when a model object is grafted
onto a general theory, thereby forming a theoretical model, that it
becomes fully testable.

At the same time, however, general theories

enter into the modeling procedure in another way.

For when undertaking

to study a given real-world system, some general theory is needed a
priori as a guide in prescribing the kinds of data and measurements one
is to obtain.

For example, the kind of research conducted will be quite

different if one regards the system as an instance of information theory
as opposed to the theory of games.

Oftentimes, of course, the charac-

teristics of interest are not adequately representable with the existing
theories, in which case there develops an interest in formulating a new
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theory.

But in any case, the existence of some general theory, either

actual or possible, is implied.
Given a general theory, the main steps toward model construction
may be outlined as follows.

First, observational data is gleaned from

the real-world system, by some appropriate means--visual observation,
electron scattering, and so forth.

This data is perceived by the observer

in terms of measurements, interrelations of behaviors, and so on.
Second, these perceptions are formulated within the language of the
general theory, thereby creating the abstract (i.e., set-theoretic)
component of a model object.

Third, this formulation is hypothesized as

having the given real-world system as its referent, thereby becoming a
full-fledged model object.

Fourth, this model object is taken together

with the general theory so as to constitute a testable theoretical model
of the system in concern.
Now, as discussed in the foregoing, when adopting a general theory,
there is always implicit an underlying mode of reasoning.

This mode of

reasoning is usually not made explicit, since it is almost always the
classical bimodal mode with which all mathematicians are assumed to be
familiar (cf. §10.2).

If the logic is made explicit, however, then one

winds up having the general theory being represented by a formal logical
system, complete with axioms and rules of formal derivation in the
manner described in §11.3.

Accordingly, the model object becomes repre-

sented by special symbols and axioms within this formal system, and the
theoretic model itself takes the form of a semantic model of this system,
which, in the manner of §11.2, has the real-world system as a factual
interpretation.
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This state of affairs is summarized in Figure 11-5.

Here is

illustrated the observer's perceptions being developed into a model
object by the process of "formulated observation" (cf. §10.1), and the
observer's mode of reasoning (for now, assumed to be bimodal) first
being used internally as an organizing principle for thinking about his
perceptions, and second being developed into an axiomatized formal logic
through the process of "introspection articulation" (also cf. §10.1).
Thus formalized, the logic then becomes an external organizing tool and
a mechanism for drawing inferences.
It is furthermore indicated in Figure 11-5 that (i) the same
formal logical system might have different semantic models whose referents
are the same real-world system (although typically representing

diff~rent

aspects or parts of that system), and (ii) that the same semantic model
might simultaneously serve as a representation of more than one real-world
system (i.e., be involved in different semantic assumptions).

Each of

these situations may be exemplified as follows.
Consider the latter case first.

Assume that our formal system is

Bunge's axiom system as described in §11.2, i.e., we take the five axiom
schemes as being formalized in the explicit context of an axiomatized
logic, together with all the necessary axioms for multiplication, subtraction, equality, and so on.

Now consider Bunge's two factual inter-

pretations: the physical system consisting of a dc circuit, and the
social system consisting of a collection of countries.

As was shown in

§11.2, each of these concrete systems may be modeled with semantic
models of our formal system.

Here we may make the further observation

that, if it is assumed that these two semantic models are such that
their universes of discourse have exactly the same number of elements,
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then these models are for all practical purposes identical.

Thus we

here have one semantic model serving simultaneously as a theoretical
model of two distinct real-world systems.
To exemplify the situation of two distinct theoretical models of
the same real-world system, we can make use of a tongue-in-cheek example
provided by Bunge (p. 112).

In this case, the real-world system consists

of all persons currently employed in academe.

Then the symbol S is

assigned as its semantic meaning a universe of discourse consisting of
one abstract representative of each professional academic; F is assigned
as its meaning the function which gives each person's number of publications; and H is assigned a real-number measure of "natural hatred."
Then G respresents a function which gives the amount of "professional
jealousy" between the individual academics.
To develop a second semantic model, of the same formal system, and
having the same body of academics as its referent, consider the collection of all professional societies within academe.

Let S represent the

collection of subsets of the previous universe of discourse, each of
which subsets has its members being the representatives of all the
members of a particular professional society; let F be assigned the
function which gives the number of elements in each such subset, thereby
having as its real-world referent a membership count of each professional
society; and let H represent a measure of the average pairwise overlap
in interests among the societies.

Then G represents a function which

gives a pairwise measure of the total amount of fruitful collaboration
that can be expected to occur among academics which simultaneously
belong to both societies in that pair.

As a semantic interpretation of

the formal system, this is obviously distinct from, and not isomorphic
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with the one which models "professional jealousy."

Nevertheless it

qualifies as a theoretical model of the same real world system.
Now, while we have thus far assumed that the underlying logic of
our formal system is bimodal, Figure 11-5 makes it obvious that alternative modes of reasoning can be chosen.

In this case, the arrow labeled

A/I represents the selecting of an alternative mode of reasoning, in the
form of an explicitly defined formal logic.

Here note furthermore, that

this alternative logic need not be consciously present within the thinking processes of the observer.

Rather, it is here

im~licit

that the

alternative logic is being implemented merely as a tool for model construction, while the actual mode of reasoning of the system observer may
remain bimodal, but now in the slightly more sophisticated sense of .
being operative at the metalevel, for thinking about the nonstandard
logic (cf. §10.2).

By the same token, this also includes the possi-

bility that part of the metalanguage even be made formally

e~licit,

as

in the theory of approximate reasoning studied in Part I.

In any case,

the explicitly defined logical system thus becomes available to the
observer for ensuring that he obeys the laws of his chosen mode of
reasoning.
Thus we have at least the possibility of using the theory of
formal systems for developing real-world system models based on nonclassical modes of reasoning.

In turn, this raises a question regarding

their ultimate usefulness for producing testable models of real-world
systems.

This question is taken up below.

252

§11.5.

Empirical Testability Of Nonstandard Models
The two criteria of testability, as discussed in §11.1, are the

Popperian critereon of refutability and Bunge's critereon of confirmability.

It has been shown that only theoretical models satisfy both

criteria.

Moreover, it was seen that the relation of a model to its

factual referent is at best one of approximation, so that Bunge's semantic
assumption M=R is always at best only approximately true.
As such, this analysis opens a pathway for the application of the .
logic of approximate reasoning, which has as its main objectiye the
formulation of a concept of approximate truth.

Indeed, an illustration

of this idea is given in Chapter 6, where the "certainty" of predictions
is linked directly to a measure of the "imprecision" in the model.
Yet at the same time, it must be asked to what extent such models
are testable, especially insofar as this concerns refutability.

Are we

to allow here that models be acceptable even if they are "not very
true"?

Surely, merely down-grading the certainty of the predictions is

no substitute for discarding a poor model and striving for a model which
is "more true."
And the question of refutability becomes even more exacerbating
when we consider applications of Kleene-Varela logics to formulation of
empirically untestable properties, as in §9.4.1.

Here, by our very

interpretation of the logic, we appear to automatically rule out the
possibility of Popperian refutation.
These questions become tractable, however, if we look more carefully at refutability in light of an earlier discussion.

First, the

Popperian notion of refutability only apparently rests on an assumption
of semantic bimodality.

This is true because, in semantically complete
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classical systems, a proposition is derivable from the axioms if and
only if it is semantically true.

Thus, saying that a prediction is true

is here equivalent to saying that the proposition which expresses that
prediction is formally derivable from the axioms.

However, on closer

scrutiny, we can see that it is actually the condition of "derivability"
and not "semantic truth" which is of primary significance.

For it is

only insofar as the proposition is a valid logical consequence of the
axioms (describing the model in question) that that proposition may be
regarded as a prediction.

Propositions which do not follow from the

model are of no concern, regardless of their truth value.
Second, even though bimodality is not essential for refutability,
it is clearly necessary at some level of analysis.

For the criteria of

testability itself is meant to serve for deciding whether a model should
or should not be accepted.
discussion of §lO.2.

This problem is ultimately resolved by the

There it was argued that, even when dealing with

nonstandard logics, the mathematician's intuitive reasoning about those
logics is always bimodal at some, perhaps higher than the formal, level.
In terms of refutability, this means that one need only seek out this
particular level as the one at which the criteria of testability are to
be applied.

Furthermore, since in all formal systems (as defined in

this dissertation) a proposition is either derivable or nonderivable
from the system's axioms, it turns out that the appropriate level is
easily isolated.

This may be illustrated by some examples.

The theory of approximate reasoning allows for the formulation of
such propositions as

"JOHN is young,"
wherein the truth value of the proposition is determined as the degree
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of compatibility of JOHN with the fuzzy set of ages of young persons.
Suppose that this truth value is 0.5, indicating a degree of equivocation
between "young" and "not young."

Certainly one would not discard this

proposition as a correct representation of reality simply because it is
not even approximately true.
mate reasoning.

This would be to miss the point of approxi-

In effect, we here have a situation in which the truth

value itself has become a part of the model, and having its own factual
interpretation, i.e., as a degree of compatibility.

The concept of

refutability applies, therefore, not to the proposition as

st~ted,

but

to the higher-level, and somewhat more complex, proposition
"'JOHN is Young' is 0.5 true."
Such a proposition is in fact refutable in the same sense as

classic~l

models, since its correctness as a statement about the factual world
depends only on a particular measurement, i.e., the measurement of
compatibility, and it is certainly reasonable to suppose that appropriate compatibility measures can be crafted for whatever objects are in
concern.

A consideration of refutability for Kleene-Varela systems leads to'
a similar conclusion.

Consider again Wienberg's "perfect system"

(§9.2.4.1) and suppose that the proposition P in the formula
P~'P

asserts the property of "perfectness."

Suppose further the same seman-

tics as before, with truth values taken as representing "verifiable,"
"refutable," and "neither verifiable nor refutable."

Then once again,

Popperian refutability does not apply to the proposition as stated,
since it is again implicit that the truth values themselves are a part
of the model.

What one must consider is the proposition
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IIp is neither verifiable nor refutable,"

which can at least in principle be either a correct or incorrect statement about the factual world.
Thus we conclude that models based on nonstandard modes of reasoning can indeed provide usable perspectives on the observable world.

It

is simply a matter of locating the appropriate semantic level at which
the criteria of testability are to be applied.

Moreover, as the above

examples suggest, this appears to be exactly that level at which the
truth values themselves become a part of the model.
Underlying all of this is of course the assumption that the logics
employed be at least coherent logics, if they are inconsistent.

Although

this has nothing to do with the question of refutability, it is an
important requirement in order that the formal system which uses that
logic have meaningful semantic interpretations.

Incoherent system will

in general have no semantic models in the sense defined in this dissertation.

Given a coherent general theory, however, one always has essentially

the same situation as in traditional science, where consistency of the
general theory is ensured by the nature of its mathematical formulation.
Logical coherence will be the minimum condition under which rational
viabilty is ensured.

CHAPTER 12
CONCLUSION
Recent years have evinced a small but rapidly growing interest in
using nonclassical logics for the analysis of complex systems.

This

dissertation has succeeded in bearing this idea a few more steps out of
the realm of mere conjecture and into the realm of pragmatic

~ctuality.

On the whole, the farest reaching result is the demonstration that
nonclassical logics can indeed be used as a basis for modeling.

Since

this settles the relevant issue of empirical testability, it shows tpat
in principle any logically "coherent" mode of reasoning qualifies for
the formation of usable perspectives on the world.

Thus a solid

methodological foundation is established for implementing an immense
variety of multivalent logics, modal logics, temporal logics, and so
on.

It is simply a matter of furthering the development of such

logics to a sufficient linguistic richness that they can express the
system properties in concern.
In this sense, the Kleene-Varela logic discussed in Part II shows
promise for modeling paradoxical, and hence classically intractable,
system properties.

That many systems do exhibit logically anomalous

behavior is nowdays patent, and the prospect that certain systems bear
paradoxical attributes per se has recently surfaced in the literature.
An internally coherent formal context is therefore needed in order that
such behaviors and attributes can be discussed in a meaningful way.
this case the explicitly defined formal logic serves as a guide for

In
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correct reasoning where ordinary mathematical intuition no longer
applies.
A similar purpose is served by the semantically complete axiomatization of approximate reasoning, developed in Part I.

In light of the

rather extensive literature on this topic, and the plethora of known
applications, this particular result is likely to be of widespread
theoretical significance.

The present axiomatization lays down in

concise terms most of the principles of reasoning which any application
of fuzzy logic must obey.
Hand in hand with its providing answers to a small collection of
questions, however, this work also points to several other issues which
have yet to be explored.

A major theoretical problem left untouched. by

Part I is the extension of the concept of linguistic theory to accommodate fuzzy-logical quantifiers, i.e., generalizations of the classical
"for all" and "for some" to expressions like "for many" and "for few."
By analogy with the corresponding problem for classical systems, this
presents a challenge of considerably greater difficulty than the semantic completeness results established here.

In addition is the issue of

linguistic approximation which, although requiring a more sophisticated
formal language, could conceivably also be provided with a concise
formalism.
It is also evident that the full range of potential applications
of approximate reasoning has hardly begun to be explored.

The example

developed in Chapter 6 represents only one of many directions that could
be undertaken, i.e., the use of dynamic models for forecasting.

Overall,

the cutting edge of fuzzy set theory is its power as a model of natural
languages, together with its ultimate implementability on the modern

258
computer.

Based on this conception it is likely that fuzzy sets will

play an important role in data base management, interactive question-answering
systems,
computer aided instruction, business decision analysis, mechanized
.
,~

control systems, and pattern recognition, as well as in higher level
systems applications, such as semantic modeling and complexity approximation.
The discussion in Chapter 6 concerning the use of fuzzy logic for
establishing a direct link between model imprecision and certainty of
predictions illustrates a more general class of problems for which fuzzy
sets may also become a vital tool.

In particular is the proposed exten-

sion to full implementation of fuzzy logic for incorporating a concept
of linguistic "Certainty."

And this may in part involve, or even require,

an explicit fomalization of Zadeh's generalized modus ponens for fuzzy
sets of type 2 C§5.5.3).

Further, the present formalization of approxi-

mate reasoning is implicitly an extension of the Kleene-Varela logic to
a logic having a substantially richer linguistic structure, which means
that the linguistic theories developed in Part I may well provide exactly
what is needed for

exp~essing

paradoxical notions which go beyond the

capacity of the languages studied in Part II.
On a higher level is a more broads coped project of the kind mentioned
in the preface.

Given a certain body of known laws and principles

regarding an aspect of reality, if one formalizes those into a semantically
complete formal system, that system will normally have a large collection
of semantic models other than the ones which initially served as the
intuitive guide for developing the formalization.

Such models will then

represent alternative "worlds" in which the given principles and laws
hold true, and therefore may conceivably stimulate new avenues of emperical
investigations.
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Last, while there nowdays exist a wide variety of nonclassical
logics which scientists might choose to employ in model construction, it
is also clear that emperical research may inspire the development of
totally new modes of reasoning.

On this count, the present work may be

deemed a success if it has only planted the idea that such an approach
is both feasible and in fact promising of a deeper understanding of the
world.
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of linguistic assertions, 3.1.2
strong, 8.2
essentially isomorphic formal systems, 7.5
exact truth, in mathematical models, 11.2, 11.3
extension, of formal system, 2.1.5.3
factual interpretation, 11.2
filter, 4.1.1
formal,
language, 2.1.2, 10.4.1
logic, 2.1.3, 11.1.1
logical system, 2.1, 2.1.4, 10.4, 10.4.1
role in modeling, 11.4
formalization, 2.1.6, 10.4.1
formulated observation, 10.1, 11.4
fuzzy,
Boolean connectives, 2.2.8
inference, 5.5
logic, 2.2.8, 2.2.9, 5.3
number, 5.3.2
quantifer, 2.2.11
relation, 2.2.2
set, 1.1, 2.2.1
set-theoretic operations, 2.2.3
singleton, 2.2.1
types, 2.2.9
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games,
theory of, 10.4.2
formalized, 10.4.2, 11.3
types of, 10.1.2
general theory, 11.1
formalized, 11.3
general systems theory, 1
grammar, 2.2.6
halting problem, 9.1.1
hedge, linguistic, 1.1, 2.2.4
idealization, 11.1
inconsistency, 2.1.5.2
individual,
constants, names, terms and variables, 3.1.1, 10.4.1
in semantic interpretations, 2.1.2, 3.2.1
inductive definitions and proofs, 2.1.4.4
inference rules, 2.1.4.2, 10.4.1
inessential extension, 2.1.5.3, 7.2
instance,
of inference rule, 2.1.4.2
of formula, 3.2.1
interpretation,
factual, 11.2
semantic, 2.1.2, 10.4.1, 11.2
interpretative axiom, 11.1
isomorphism,
of formal systems, 7.4, 8.2
of semantic models, 5.6
language, formal, 2.1.1, 10.4.1
laws of,
calling, crossing, and form, 7.3
autonomy, crossing, dominance, reflexion, 8.2
length of,
proof,2.1.5.1
string, 2.1.1
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra, 4.2
linear-ordering critereon, 3.3.1
linguistic,
approximation, 2.2.7
assertion, 2.2.8, 3.1.2
hedge, 1.1, 2.2.4
possibility, 2.2.10, 5.4
term, 2.2.5
theory, 3, 3.4.1
truth, 5.3
variable, 2.2.5
logie, formal, 2.1.3, 10.4.1
logical,
axioms, 3.3.1, 10.4.1
connectives, 2.1.2, 3.1.1, 7.1, 10.4.1
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inference rules, 3.3.1, 10.4.1
symbols, 3.1.1, 10.4.1
Lukasiewicz inference, 5.5.2
marked state, 7.1
mathematical systems theory, 1
maximal approximation, recursive, 9.2.1
McTaggart's paradox, 9.2.4.2
meaning assignment,
for formal languages, 2.1.2, 10.4.1
for linguistic variables, 2.2.5
mechanical,
conceivability, 9.2.2
procedure, 9.1.1
unknowability, 9.2, 9.2.2
membership, degree or grade of, 2.2.1
minimal,
language, 3.1.3
linguistic theory, 3.4.1
mode of reasoning, bimodal, classical, and nonclassical, 10.2
model,
in science, 11.1
isomorphism of, 5.6
mathematical, 11.1, 11.2
semantic, 2.1.6, 10.4.1, 11.2
set-theoretical, 11.1
structural, 1, 6.1
model object, 11.1
formalized, 11.3
modus ponens, 2.1.4.2
generalized, 5.5.3
Moore's paradox, 9.2.4.3
multivalent fuzzy logic, 2.2.8
negation, logical, 2.1.2, 7.1
non-Aristotelean, see Aristotelean
nonclassical logic, 2.1.5.4, 10.2
used in modeling, 11.4, 11.5
normal fuzzy set, 5.3.2
observer/observed relation, 11.4
open expression, 3.1.2
paradox, 1.2, 9.2.3
of liar, Russell's, and logical autonomy of, 9.2.3
McTaggart's, Moore'e, and Wienberg's, 9.2.4
partial,
function, 9.1.1
machine, 9.2.1
recursive approximation, 9.2.1
recursive function, 9.1.1
recursive set, 9.1.1, 9.2.1
recursive solvability, 9.2.1
set, 9.1.1
perfect systems law, 9.2.4.1
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possibilistic reasoning, 1.1, 2.2.10, 5.4
possibility,
distribution, 2.2.10
measure, 5.4
precision, of linguistic truth values, 6.4
prediction, 11.2
formalized, 11.4
primary algebra, 7.3
prisoner's dilemma, 10.4.2
proof, formal, 2.1.5.1
proper,
axioms and inference rules, 3.4, 10.4.1
symbols, 3.1.1, 10.4.1
qualitative mathematics, 1, 10.3
recursive,
approximation, 9.2.1
functions and sets, 9.1.1, 9.2.1
solvability, 9.2.1
refutability, 11.1
formalized, 11.3
of nonstandard models, 11.5
relative complement, 4.1.2
selecting a logic, 10.2
semantic,
assumption, 11.1
completeness, 2.1.6, 10.4.1
entailment and equivalence, 2.2.5
interpretation, 2.1.2, 10.4.1, 11.2
model, 2.1.6, 10.4.1, 11.2
structure, 10.4.1
semantics,
of formal system, 2.1.2, 2.1.7, 10.4.1
for science, 1.3, 11.4
simple extension, 2.1.5.3
specific theory, 11.1
formalize~, 11.3
SPIN, and SPIN, 6.2, 6.3
s ta te, 2. 1. 2
marked and unmarked, 7.3
autonomous, B.1
string, 2.1.1, 10.4.1
strong equivalence, 1.2, B.2
structural model, 1, 6.1
structure,
semantic, 10.4.1
set-theoretic, 11.1
substitution,
uniform, 2.1.1
rules, 3.3.1, 7.1, 7.3
support, of fuzzy set, 2.2.1
symbol, 2.1.1, 10.4.1
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syntactical, 2.1.1
systems,
approach, 1
science, 1
tautology, 2.1.2, 7.1
theorem, 3.4.1
terminal, of grammar, 2.2.5, 2.2.6
theorem, of formal system, 2.1.4.3, 10.4.1
theoretical model, 11.1
formalized, 11.3
total,
function, 9.1.1
machine, 9.2.1
undecidability, 9.1.3, 9.2.1
transcendent realities, 1.2, 9.2.4.4
truth,
linguistic, 2.2.9, 5.3
valuation, 2.1.2, 10.4.1
value, 2.1.3, 10.4.1
undefined, 9.1.2
Turing machine, 9.1.1, 9.2.1
translation,
of formal languages, 7.4, 8.2
rules for fuzzy languages, 2.2.10
ultrafilter, 4.1.1
undecidable, partial set, 9.1.3
unit element, in Boolean algebra, 4.1.2
universe of discourse,
for linguistic variables, 2.2.1
for semantic interpretations, 2.1.2, 10.4.1
unmarked state, 7.1
valuation, mapping, 2.1.2
value, for semantic interpretations, 2.1.2
validity,
semantic, 2.1.2, 2.1.6, 10.4.1
theorem, 3.4.2
verbal model, 10.3
well-formed string, 2.1.2, 10.4.1
zero element, in Boolean algebra, 4.1.2

